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THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF AUSTRIA: RETREAT FROM MARX

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WHEN the first post-war Austrian elections in September 1945 established the Socialist Party (*Sozialistische Partei Österreichs*) as the second strongest political force in the country, it almost seemed as though eleven years of total eclipse had produced no visible effect upon Austria's traditional balance of power. "There is little political drifting sand in this country," explained the late President Karl Renner, "and the bitter experiences of the last decade have brought all wavering elements back to their original outlook."[1] This simple conclusion, however, was largely illusory. It is true that there has been no essential change in the numerical relationship between the Socialists and the new Peoples' Party (*Volkspartei*) resurrected of conservative elements. But significant changes behind the familiar façade have, in the course of time, become increasingly evident.

For the Austrian Socialists the post-war road has been a relentless abandonment of the Party's time-honored doctrinaire standards. Not that this "evolution to conservatism" has been a phenomenon exclusively limited to Austria: it presents probably the most persistent *motif* in the general dilemma of European socialism. But the Austrian Socialists' *volte face* is startling when measured against the vaunted doctrinaire radicalism of pre-1934 when "Austro-Marxism" had a special place in the Socialist vocabulary. It assumes added significance when we recall that, with an estimated membership of 620,000, the *SPÖ* ranks fourth among the parties of the Second International, surpassed only by such traditional Socialist hunting grounds as Britain, Germany, and Sweden.[2]

The present capitulation to pragmatism, although startling at first glance, culminates the struggle between the demands of the city of Marx and those of the city of Vienna which has characterized Austrian socialism

[1]Renner, Karl, *Nachgelassene Werke: Österreich von der Ersten zur Zweiten Republik*, (Vienna, 1953), p.238-239.

[2]The total membership of the Second International is estimated at 9,601,000. This gives the Austrian Party an impressive 6.6 per cent. Figures are cited from the *Arbeiter Zeitung* (Vienna, August 11, 1950), p.5

throughout its history. Born in the garbled mosaic of conflict that was the anti-bellum Hapsburg empire, Austrian socialism was from the first compelled to concentrate more on the adjustment to political realities than on the spinning of delicate dialectics. For, to the Austrian workers, accustomed not only to traditional political and economic strife, but also to peculiar international struggles, politics was a very practical, everyday matter. However, the movement did indeed produce its quota of theoreticians, and with them, bodies of dogma which gave the party a brand of theory distant from that of its European counterparts.

The Social Democratic Workers' party of Austria was formally founded at the Hainfeld Congress of December 30, 1888 - January 1, 1889. Midwife of this meeting was Dr. Viktor Adler, an organizational genius whose efforts were mainly responsible for uniting the radical and moderate wings of the labor movement under a mutually acceptable program. In his newspaper, *Gleichheit,* which he founded in 1886, he had advocated a course midway between the revolutionary demands of the former and the evolutionary reform program of the latter, and succeeded in winning the confidence of both groups. This efforts culminated at Hainfeld in the adoption of a program stressing the attainment of immediate political and economic reforms. These were to be obtained not "with all methods" of struggle, as had been advocated by the Radicals, but "with all methods that were serviceable and that correspond to the natural feeling for justice of the people." Furthermore, the fight was to be carried on within the existing framework of society, and "without any false illusions on the value of parliamentarism —a form of modern class control."[3]

Political unity among the Socialists having been achieved, the way was now open for concerted activities in the economic field. As in most other countries, the aspirations of the Social Democratic Party were virtually synonymous with those of the working class generally. But, unlike most labor parties, which were the creatures of the trade unions, the Socialist party of Austria was itself largely responsible for developing the workers' organizations which were to become its source of strength. Although governmental disapproval stymied attempts at trade union centralization, permission was gradually obtained for the creation of associations which would unite all local unions in a provincial body, and on August 6, 1892, the metal workers secured official recognition as the first nationwide union of Austria. The following October a general meeting of the unions of Vienna was held in protest to the international conference called by the British Trades-Union Congress, which the Austrian leaders felt would interfere with the Socialist meeting scheduled in Zürich that year. This protest meeting elected a committee empowered to call the Vienna unions together whenever the need for concerted action arose, and from this committee grew the Provisional Commission—a body similar in scope to the old British Junta. This Provisional Commission evolved into the National Trade-Union Commis-

[3]*Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Österreichischen Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1889), pp. 3, 28, 29.

sion in December 1893, at the country's first general trade union congress, and lasted until reorganized in 1920 as the Federation of the Free Trade Unions of Austria. Other important agencies of the Party were the workers' co-operative stores (*Konsumvereine*), the workers' educational associations, and a variety of workers' "clubs."

But if the Party did provide its adherents with a wide choice of intellectual pursuits, it left them no choice as to the proper path to be followed to Salvation. For the Party was theoretically based upon strict, orthodox Marxism, and its members were required to adhere to its dogma with undivided allegiance. This meant, as in other Catholic countries, an *ipso facto* conflict with the Church. Fundamental antagonism was heightened by the contemporaneous growth of the clerical, conservative, professedly anti-Semitic Christian Social Party. Furthermore, the development of this movement only served to drive the Jewish intellectuals, who had little initial sympathy for the Church, to a stronger anti-clerical position. Thus a large segment of the working class, despite the theories that "religion was the private concern of the individual," became extremely anti-religious, and the fight for the Socialists became all the more ideological.

But the primary *casus belli* with the existing order was, after all, the underprivileged position of the working classes, and it was to an amelioration of this situation that the Party devoted its energies. Its weight was felt almost immediately after its foundation, and great strides were made in the 'nineties towards improving the economic lot of the wage earners. Political reforms followed, beginning with the election of the first Social Democratic deputies to Parliament in 1895, and greatly increased with the final adoption of suffrage in 1907.

Yet, all was not entirely harmonious within the Social Democratic Party. The burning nationalities question, the source of great discord within the Empire, was also disrupting the unity of the proletariat. Marx and Engels had declared that Socialism would be achieved in Central Europe under the leadership of a truly "progressive" people—the Germans.[4] The early leaders of the Party, such as Engelbert Pernerstorfer, were of German extraction and products of the German liberal tradition. Thus a certain *Herrenvolk* snobbishness developed which, coupled with the Marxist concepts which meant making Austria a bulwark against Pan-Slavism,[5] caused great resentment among the non-German elements of the Party.

A *modus vivendi* was reached at the Party Congress of 1896, where it was agreed that representatives of the Czech, Polish, Italian, and Slovenian groups should constitute the central executive committee. The Party Congress of the following year meant complete reorganization as a "total Party"

[4]The concept of German leadership in freeing the European proletariat, and the backward, "counter-revolutionary" character of the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is clearly stated by Marx throughout *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* in Adoratsky, V., ed., *Karl Marx: Selected Works* (New York, undated), p. 39 ff.

[5]Marx had written, for example: "The only reason which, since the middle of the Eighteenth Century, justified the existence of Austria as a state is her resistance against the onward march of Russia in the east of Europe." *Herr Vogt* (London, 1860), p.77.

made up of the aforementioned groups plus the Ruthenians, organized as a sort of federation of parties. A precarious compromise thus arranged kept the Social Democrats officially under one roof for fifteen years, but the defection of the Czechs from the national trade-union organization, beginning also in 1896, rendered this unity somewhat hollow.

Austrian Socialism was concerned with the nationalities question from the standpoint not only of its own organization, however, but from that of the Empire as well. It was this problem more than any other which produced the most interesting, and most characteristically theoretical contributions of Austrian Marxism.

The Marxist-Liberal intellectual heritage of the Party leaders led them early to the conclusion that German leadership of the Empire should be preserved, albeit with concessions to the non-German nationalities. This resulted, after much wrangling with the Slavs, in the adoption of the first federal, national program of Austrian Socialism at the party convention of Brünn, in 1899. The main proposals were that Austria should be transformed into a democratic federation of nationalities; nationally (ethnically) determined autonomous bodies should replace the historic crown lands, all autonomous territories of one nationality should combine into an association having complete self-administration in national affairs, and protection by law of the rights of national minorities should be assured.[6] This basic concept of ethnic federalism was consequently elaborated upon by the Party's two leading intellects, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. To the former, a right-wing party leader, the empire was already a state above nationalities and ought to be preserved, but in a new federal form in which "the subordinated power is the nation and the Supreme Power should be supranational, yet confined to the administration of the military, economic, and social affairs of community life."[7] Thus was born the famous principle of "personal autonomy," i.e. of the autonomous nationality status applying to the *individual,* rather than to the territory. Bauer, however, although roughly accepting the main features of ethnic centralism, was more conscious of the fact that national demands were splitting the working class, and that therefore the proletariat would have to subordinate its national feelings to its class interests. Thus national claims should be recognized and settled within the empire[8] so that the workers of all nationalities could devote their energies to the class struggle and to the achievement of a place in the cultural community from which capitalism had excluded them.[9] Hold

[6] *Verhandlungen des österreichischen sozialdemokratischen Parteitages, 24-29 September, 1899, im Arbeiterheim zu Brünn* (Vienna, 1899), pp. 104 ff.

[7] Renner, Karl, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen* (Vienna, 1916), p.146.

[8] "Every thoughtful person," stated Bauer, "has to strive to find the forms in which the nationalities can live together in the frame of the state. Nobody is permitted to withdraw from the struggle for the solution of the Austrian nationality question by comforting himself with the thought that a great revolution in world politics would solve the national question on the soil of the empire." Bauer, Otto, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1907), p.505.

[9] "In capitalist society the working class is excluded from the national cultural community. The ruling and possessing classes alone appropriate the national cultural goods.

ing untenable the Marxist distinction between "revolutionary" and "reactionary" national groups, but recognizing clearly the differences between nationalities with and without a history, Bauer was led to place greater emphasis upon upholding the rights of underprivileged minorities. Ultimately, full recognition of the changed position of the subject nationalities and their more extensive claims during the World War led Bauer and the left wing Socialists to abandon the fight for settlement of the nationalities problem within the framework of the multi-national state, while Renner maintained the German directed *Reichsidee* until shortly before the revolution of 1918.

But back to more practical matters. The pre-war period, as we have noted, found the Austrian Socialists at the forefront of the fight for political and economic reforms, and conscious of maintaining, in general, the existing order. In 1914 the old leaders had voted full support of the war efforts, but as the war drew to a close, a new leadership inspired by pacifist and revolutionary ideas came forward, backed by a large section of the populace which had little interest in Socialism, but a desire for peace. Thus the Party grew tremendously, and, with the collapse of the Empire, the Socialists found themselves in control of the government. The post-war years were to see them skilfully treading a path midway between the revolution-minded radicals of the left and the more conservative elements, such as the *Länder,* on the right. This was done mainly by letting the radicals operate as they wished in the Workers' Councils, which became the "boxing ring" of radical Socialists and Communists, and by keeping the official Party policy sufficiently leftist to keep the radicals within the fold. This resulted in the development of a new species of Socialism known as "Austro-Marxism."

In power until 1920, the Socialists pursued a course which benefited the workers—often at the expense of the other classes. An inflationary policy had the effect of stimulating exports, thus decreasing unemployment and forcing up wages. This, along with the maintenance of rent controls, meant tremendous savings for the urban masses. In the field of social and labor legislation many admirable reforms such as health and accident insurance, and the eight-hour day were brought about, An interesting innovation here was the introduction of compulsory "works councils" (*Betriebsräte*) in the factories, which corresponded somewhat to the shop stewards in Britain.

Out of power after 1920, the Socialists endeavored, with general success, to maintain and extend the social gains already on the record. But their struggles took place within a growing abnormality of political life: the Christian-Social Party controlled the state, the Social Democrats controlled the city of Vienna. There were in effect two governments, one under Monsignor Ignaz Seipel, Chancellor from 1922 to 1929, the other under Dr. Karl Seitz, the "Red Burgomaster of Vienna." Because the Social Democrats

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The Social Democratic Workers' Party wants to make national culture the product of the work of the whole people, the property of the whole people. . . . The organization of mankind into autonomous national communities enjoying, organizing, and developing their national cultural goods is the final aim of international Social Democracy." *Ibid.,* pp. 531 ff.

felt themselves increasingly threatened by the army controlled by the federal government, they wanted their own defense forces, and consequently formed the Republican Defense League (*Republikanischer Schutzbund*). To match this, the Christian-Social Government gave full reign to the ambitions of a group of adventurous leaders of private armies: the *Heimwehr* of Prince Starhemberg and Major Fey and the less important *Ostmärkische Sturmscharen* of Dr. Schuschnigg, one of Chancellor Seipel's "young men." The result was a taut uneasiness of Austrian internal life which erupted initially in 1927, when a Socialist-sponsored general strike led to sporadic fighting. But this was only a mild prelude to the turmoil of the early 1930's: the assumption of dictatorial powers by Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss at the head of a "Fatherland Front" coalition in March 1933, the Civil War of February 1934, and the subsequent assassination of Dollfuss in an abortive Nazi *putsch,* all of which is familiar to the student of contemporary history. Some controversy persists as to who really touched off the bloody fighting which remains forever identified with the Karl Marx Hof housing development,[10] but there is little doubt as to its outcome. The Socialists, disorganized and caught completely unawares, were totally beaten. Their principal leaders followed Otto Bauer into exile, and the old Social-Democratic Party ceased to exist.

Immersion into illegality began a period which significantly has been called "the Twilight of Socialism" by the former leader of the underground organization.[11] All of the pent-up radicalism of the younger socialist *Scharen* now found expression in the revamped *sub rosa* movement which expressly renamed itself the "Revolutionary Socialists." The flight of the outstanding party leaders created a vacuum of leadership which was inevitably filled by the younger men who had heretofore been buried in the party apparatus and had chafed under (what they considered) the old Party's political opportunism. With all political kid gloves cast aside, the Socialist remnant maintained a shadowy, clawing existence while events even darker than the Heimwehr dictatorship were beginning to cast their shadow over the tiny country. Only once was an attempt made to revive the past: in the eleventh hour of the *Anschluss,* Austrian Chancellor von Schuschnigg made a final, desperate move to avert the inevitable by negotiating with Socialist leaders to join him in a common front against Nazism.[12] But the attempt was as futile as it was tragically late, and in March the more valorous members of the Catholic right slipped underground to join their former antagonists

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[10]Schuschnigg still contends that the tragedy began when "the Schutzbund called on illegal battalions to revolt openly", although he does admit that a thorough disarmament of the Schutzbund had been planned by the Government. Von Schuschnigg, Kurt, *Austrian Requiem* (New York, 1946), p. 189-190. Starhemberg, for one, blames the whole episode on an independent plot by Major Fey, leader of the Vienna *Heimwehr.* Starhemberg, Ernst Rüdiger Prince, *Between Hitler and Mussolini* (London, 1942), pp. 122-125.

[11]Buttinger, Joseph, *In the Twilight of Socialism: A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria* (New York, 1935).

[12]See, for example, Lennhoff, Eugene, *The Last Five Hours of Austria* (New York, 1938), p.45 *et passim.*

in a sporadic, and largely innocuous, sniping action against the conquerors from the North.[13]

On April 21, 1945, the Russian army leadership summoned the aged Socialist right-wing leader, Dr. Karl Renner, from his retirement in the small village of Gloggnitz near the Hungarian border and appointed him head of a Provisional Government, a move so starkly in contrast with the Soviet *modus operandi* elsewhere that it defies interpretation. A week earlier, with the guns still roaring along the Danube River, four Revolutionary Socialist members of the resistance movement had met with Dr. Adolf Schärf, the present Party chairman, and urged the "reunion" of the Revolutionary Socialists with the old Party. The result of these negotiations was a compromise, implicit in the formal change of identity from the old *Sozialdemokratische* to the more inclusive *Sozialistische Partei Österreichs.* A hastily conglomerated provisional executive committee, composed of an equal number of people from each faction, quickly established contact with unions and other old affiliates. In an amazingly short time the long-abandoned party apparatus creaked into action again.[14]

From these humble beginnings started a strong rise of Socialist political power, as demonstrated by the increase from 1,598,444 votes in 1945 to a record high of 1,818,517 in 1953.[15] The reasons for this rise are complex. Part of it is attributable to the growth of the working class itself. The establishment of new industries under the impetus of the National-Socialist war economy was accompanied by a steady migration from the country to the towns—a trend which was accelerated by the comparative neglect of Austrian agriculture by the Nazis and the slow pace of agricultural reconstruction since the war. This new agglomeration of uprooted elements, augmented by a sizeable heritage of displaced persons and ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) from the Nazi era, represented a fertile field for constant recruitment.[16] It explains in part why the Socialists have been able to deliver a majority in every city of consequence except Innsbrück and Salzburg.

But an even more portentous sign emerges from the election statistics: namely, the broad inroads gained by the Socialists in rural areas heretofore

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[13]An excellent definitive analysis of the Austrian resistance movement is presented by Engel-Janosi, Frederick, "Remarks on the Austrian Resistance," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* XIII, 2, (1953), pp. 105-122.

[14]Most of the credit for the reactivation of the party apparently belongs to the late Josef Pfeffer, who had served as chairman of the Salzburg Revolutionary Socialists and later entered the resistance group led by Major Biedermann. Pfeffer had already established contact with union leader Johann Böhm before the meeting with Schärf on April 14. See Schärf, Adolf, *April 1945 in Wien* (Vienna, 1948), pp. 69 ff.

[15]The intermediate figures show 1,623,524 votes in the 1949 elections, and 1,682,881 votes cast for Theodor Körner in the presidential run-off election of 1951, Riemer, Hans, "Die Wahlen vom 22. Februar 1953. (I)", *Die Zukunft* (Vienna, April 1953), p.5.

[16]"K.A." describes "Austria's Greatest Enterprise: A Visit at the Vöst Plant in Linz" in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (February 16, 1951), p.5: "The factory still has no tradition, no real stem of workers . . . Among the workers are many displaced persons, erstwhile businessmen, artisans and peasants, for whom the huge steel works are only a stopover. . . . The labor force also includes former Nazi intellectuals and officials who cannot find other jobs, who chafe under their fate and gather about them other disgruntled elements, similarly torn from their roots."

inseparably wedded to the Catholic right. Out of a total increase of 195,000 votes gained by the Socialists in 1953, over the previous elections, for example, only 25,000 (or little more than one fourth of the increase) came from Vienna; the rest was amassed in predominantly rural districts.[17] In part, this can again be traced to the sorry plight of the agricultural laborer and his disillusionment with the conservative party's apparent abandonment of some of its hallowed Christian-Social precepts. Nevertheless, the trend indicates a startling revision of the iron-clad political borders of the inter-war years when Vienna was a virtually isolated Socialist island, hemmed in by unshakeable Christian-Social peasant strongholds. The only limitation to the SPÖ's recapture of its post-World War I preeminence has been its divorce—on a formal basis at least—from the organized trade union movement, its real source of power. The Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, established by Russian sanction immediately after the capture of Vienna, has been politically "neutralized" by coalition agreement. With a membership of more than a million workers—an amazing one-seventh of the total population—the Federation is governed by a Presidium apportioned between the parties. Although Federation President Johannes Böhm is a Socialist, the absence of formal association deprives the Party of a tactically subordinated striking arm. But this is the only qualifying factor of the otherwise unprecedented show of strength by the Socialists since the war.

We mention the Socialists' postwar political prosperity in order to emphasize that, unlike other European brethren, the full-scale retreat of the SPÖ from previous theoretical premises has not been staged within the specter of dwindling mass support. The reasons are attributable to more deeply rooted factors.

One of these is the predominantly right-wing composition of post-war SPÖ leadership. Men like the late President Dr. Karl Renner and present Party Chairman Adolf Schärf had been identified with the right wing of the Party even before 1934. Other leaders—among them Editor Oscar Pollack of the *Arbeiter Zeitung* and Julius Deutsch, head of the pre-1934 *Schutzbund*—have seen their earlier fiery disposition modified greatly by the bitter experiences of a decade. "Prison, concentration camp, war, disease, and starvation had worn out their bodies, suffering had made them tired, and political disappointment had broken their spirits," deprecates the leader of the former Revolutionary Socialists. "Longing for a better life before they were too old to enjoy it, . . . they accepted the sacred ways of the morality-ridden world . . ."[18] This description, though tinged with exaggera-

[17]The biggest Socialist gains came in Upper Austria, with a net increase of 52,902 votes, and in Lower Austria with 30,160. Lesser gains were recorded in Salzburg (8,119), the Tyrol (16,653), Vorarlberg (5,269), Styria (27,878) and Burgenland (8,501). Despite the general increase in the voting population, the *Volkspartei* actually dropped below its 1951 figures in Lower Austria and Carinthia. From figures given by Riemer, *op. cit.*, p.94-95.

[18]Buttinger, *op. cit.*, p. 543.

tion born of disillusionment, gives a tangible clue to a man like Deutsch, who fled Austria in 1934, later served as Loyalist general during the Spanish Civil War, escaped to America, and finally returned to post-war Austria with a much more expansive predilection for living with the *status quo*.

For the Socialist, however, the most significant message of the new *status quo* has been the altered position of the Austrian working class, alias "downtrodden proletariat." The transformation of the whole structure of Austrian society since World War I is too lengthy a story for the purposes of this study; suffice it to say that by 1938, in the words of one author, "a social revolution had taken place, though it lacked the dramatic and catastrophic features that have made some less successful revolutions more famous."[19] Despite its authoritarian approach, the Nationalist-Socialist system maintained, although at times on a fictitious basis, the bulk of the social legislation already on record. With the worker thus firmly established on a substantially higher stratum of the social pyramid, the post-war program of the Socialist Party, apart from the task of general reconstruction, has been restricted to filling the few remaining gaps in social legislation, and to conserving jealously the gains already made.

It is only within this new social context that the Socialists' shift of emphasis can be understood. "Changed conditions" is the recurring *motif* of theoretical articulation—the phrase is repeated with an insistence bordering on desperation. "The Socialist Party of Austria is today as Marxist as ever," Oscar Pollak wrote in reply to critics of the "un-Marxist" language allegedly used at the 1950 Party Congress. But, he amplified:

> "We are fighting for the same Socialist goals, only under different circumstances: no longer as the *avant garde* of a miserable, exploited and politically deprived working class, but as leaders of a working class which, through its own struggle, its own organization, and its own power, has attained a huge portion of social security and political equality. We would be bad Marxists were we not to realize that the working class . . . is today fighting under conditions entirely different from those of a hundred years ago."[20]

With "changed conditions" as the principal premise, accordingly, the Austrian Socialists have proceeded upon a brick-by-brick dismantling of the old theoretical structures. The new emphasis not only reaffirms the possibility of co-existence with a dominant bourgeoisie, but stretches clear to a renunciation of *any* ideological responsibilities. Chairman Adolf Schärf evoked thunderous applause from the 1933 Party Congress with the assertion that "democratic socialism is confined by no dogmatism: this fact enables it . . . to conduct a policy guided solely by relevant considerations."[21]

The "relevant considerations" which have determined the elasticity of

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[19]Hiscocks, Richard, *The Rebirth of Austria* (London, 1953), p. 149

[20]Pollak, Oscar, "Die Sprache des Parteitages," *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (November 7, 1950), p.1-2.

[21]*Die Lage des demokratischen Sozialismus: Referat des Parteivorsitzenden Dr. Adolf Schärf auf dem Parteitag 1953* (Vienna, 1953), p. 13-14.

Austrian socialism are many in number and varied in nature. The foremost has been the necessity of operating in a coalition government—the traditional bugaboo which has haunted democratic Socialism since Eduard Bernstein's reformist innovations. For not only is participation in government—especially on a coalition basis—the very definition of compromise with its inevitable devastating effects upon ideology, but elevation into a coalition places the Socialist Party into a virtual goldfish bowl, making vulnerably co-responsible for not only its own mistakes, but also those of an ideologically antagonistic partner. Fear of such a situation explains the obvious reluctance on the part of continental socialist parties, notably that of France, to rush into any rulership-sharing schemes. On the part of the Austrian party, however, no such reluctance was possible.

Broadly speaking, the coalition went into effect as early as April 1945, when Dr. Karl Renner was appointed head of a provisional government which included four Socialist, four *Volkspartei,* and three Communist members. The coalition arrangement was formalized after the election of November 1945, when *Volkspartei* leader Leopold Figl headed a cabinet including Adolf Schärf as vice-chancellor and two other Socialists in important ministry posts.[22] With several changes—among them the transfer of the chancellorship from Figl to Julius Raab in 1953—this working arrangement has persisted to the present.

There were, from the beginning, a number of compelling reasons for a coalition. The barrage of problems which beset the resurrected Austrian Republic was so all-inclusive as to reject even the vaguest invitation to control by a single party; the unanimous approval of the Nationalization Law of 1947-8 serves as a primary example of both the need for and efficacy of the "national" rather than partisan approach. An even more important motive has been the necessity of presenting a single front in the face of continued occupation of the country, especially to the persistent and excessive demands of Soviet exploitation. Yet another healthy product of the coalition policy had been the unitary position in the long struggle for an Austrian State Treaty. Although the two parties differed in the extent to which they would appease the Soviets as a means toward this end, the policy of the two People's Party foreign ministers since the war has received solid backing by the Socialists.[23]

Nevertheless, there can be little doubt as to the purely provisional nature of this arrangement. Although both parties have drawn in some of their more extremist claws of the pre-war era, the *Burgfrieden* has not healed, but only obscured, the deep cleavages between them. The bitter memory of 1934 has been kept in partially suspended animation, and rises to the surface at the slightest provocation. This was evidenced by the vio-

[22]The two Socialists were Helmer and Maisel, Ministers of the Interior and Social Welfare, respectively.

[23]Witness, for instance, the statement by the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (December 22, 1952) p.2: "Austria's foreign policy is the policy of the entire government: it is bi-partisan in the fullest sense. The Socialist Party . . . has supported this policy with all the means at its disposal."

lent mutual recriminations of the presidential campaign of 1951, when, in retaliation against hints of *SPÖ*-Communist conspiracy by the *Volkspartei*, the Socialists exhibited the record of the ÖVP candidate, Dr. Heinrich Gleissner, a former *Heimwehr* leader and Dollfuss intimate.[24]

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the voices clamoring for separatism in both parties have grown with the successful settlement of acute economic and social problems and the gradual equalization of strength between the two coalition parties. "Much of the unfounded talk of a Crisis of Socialism would be disposed of (in a reversion to one-party rule) because it is in actuality a question of a crisis of our present form of democracy," one Socialist writer goes so far as to suggest. "Despite the fact that we do not have a majority in . . . government to apply our principles and should do our utmost to gain this majority, our members have no time for such an offensive because they are completely immersed in the administrative duties of the coalition."[25]

Yet, there has been one saving factor for the Socialist Party's coalition policy, namely the pronounced centrifugal trends in the ranks of its principal political adversary. A great many political observers have tended to brand the conservative People's Party as simply the old Christian Social Party with a new and more catch-all title, but this generalization does not fare too well under closer scrutiny. It is true that the *Volkspartei* has absorbed in a large measure the old pre-1934 elements: ex-Chancellor Leopold Figl, for example, is an old Dollfuss disciple "down to the ginger moustache," and served for a time as leader of the Peasant League (*Bauernbund*), which gave many of the old Christian-Social leaders their start in politics.[26] But largely because of an early Allied decision to allow a minimum of parties to operate, the *Volkspartei* has accommodated elements who traveled in different circles in the old days. It is with some justification that the Socialists derisively term the party "a heap of interests" (*Interessenhaufen*) which has to reconcile such clashing components as the peasants on one hand and industrialists on the other.[27]

Thus, while one wing of the Party is not averse to progressive social measures, the large influx of more conservative newcomers has considerably diluted this disposition. The *Volkspartei* realizes that any splintering effect would totaly disrupt the already precarious balance of power, and tries desperately to find a happy meeting ground for all adherents. Several dissident movements have in fact taken place. A so-called Youth Front (*Jugendfront*) was started several years ago by a group of young politicians impa-

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[24]Particularly unfortunate was an appeal issued by Carinthian Socialists to the voters who had previously supported the candidacy of right-winger Dr. Rudolf Breitner: "Breitner Electors! You cannot vote for your own executioners! Think of 1934! In February Dollfuss hanged Socialists, in July Fey and Gleissner hanged Nazis! Vote for Körner! Geyde, G.E.R., "The Austrian Scene," *Contemporary Review*, CLXXX, 1028 (1951), p.76.

[25]Friese, Heinz, "Die politische Willensbildung in der Demokratie: Koalitions- oder Mehrheitsregierung," *Die Zukunft* (August-September, 1953), p.247.

[26]Ennals, John, "Austria Forks Right," *New Statesman and Nation* XXX, 775 (1945), p.436.

[27]"Die ÖVP und die Gewerbetreibenden," *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (July 22, 1950), p.2.

tient with the People's Party's leadership, and merged with kindred spirits of other parties to form an "Action for Political Renewal."[28] There is also the more flamboyant case of Professor Dobretsberger, an ex-Minister and economist, whose "Democratic Union" eventually found its way to the Communist camp.[29] The 1953 elections also saw the appearance of an independent *Christlichsoziale Partei* which could do no better, however, than 3029 votes.[30]

This vulnerability has tended to emphasize the People's Party's trend to plain and unadorned conservatism with *laissez faire* overtones, and has made the Socialist position so much more secure. No longer is the Catholic left wing a serious source of contention for the laurels of social legislation, and competition between the parties has receded to such cut-and-dried issues as nationalized versus private enterprise (beyond and despite the nationalization already agreed to), public versus private housing, methods of fighting unemployment, agrarian reform etc. All of these indications lead even the most casual observer to conclude that the coalition is living on borrowed time. There have already been occasions when the coalition seemed on the verge of collapse; the latest came in the autumn of 1952 when irreconcilability over budgetary questions was followed by the resignation of the Figl cabinet and new elections.[31] But there is little doubt that the coalition has proven its worth to the country. "When we hold the position of our country before our eyes . . . we must say that the coalition system has already fulfilled its task," is the verdict of Adolf Schärf. "But I must also state that without a basic change in the world situation the need for co-operation between the two parties continues to exist . . ."[32]

Nevertheless, the necessity for co-government has not sweetened the pill of across-the-board compromise. The best example of the impact of operating in coalition upon the Socialist outlook is the Austrian nationalization project. In 1946 and 1947, the coalition government, upon unanimous approval by a preponderantly anti-Socialist parliament, agreed on the nationalization of banks and a number of key industries: coal, iron and steel production, the mining and smelting of other metals, the nitrogen works at Linz, certain sections of the machine and light-metal industries, locomotives and rolling stock, electrical industry, and electric power production.[33] Notwithstanding the fact that the decision was embraced by all parties as a nec-

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[28]The *Jugendfront* became particularly vocal after the loss by the Party and has gradually faded out of existence. See Hiscocks, *op. cit.*, p.64-65.

[29]Dobretsberger, a professor of economics at the University of Graz, has an imposing record of Communist front activities. He served with the commission which "investigated" American germ warfare in Korea in 1952. In the same year he was a prominent participant in the International Economic Conference at Moscow. See, for example, Weghorn, Dr. Erwin, "Die Probleme des Ost-West Handels auf der Internationalen Wirtschaftskonferenz in Moskau," *Europa Archiv* VII, 12 (Frankfurt, 1952), p.4936 n.

[30]Riemer, *op. cit.*, p.133.

[31]See Hiscocks, *op. cit.*, p.65.

[32]Schärf, Adolf, "Die Sozialisten und die Korruption," *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (September 6, 1952), p.1-2.

[33]For details see *Österreichs Grundindustrie Verstaatlicht* published by the Austrian Ministry of Transports and Nationalized Concerns (Vienna, 1951).

essary hypodermic infusion for a devastated economy, the project is generally considered a Socialist handiwork and has made slow headway against a bevy of sniping attacks from the right.

The tortuous progress of the nationalization project also appears to have exerted a distinct modifying effect upon the Party's program. Austrian Socialists no longer speak of full socialization—i.e. the transfer of the economy into some form of collective scheme; emphasis is now on "partial socialization," namely the socialization of certain undefined "key" concerns which would co-exist "peacefully and indeed advantageously with a wide belt of untampered-with private, independent enterprise."[34] But even this compromise with traditional Marxism, which, incidentally, is traced by the Socialists to the theoretical doorsteps of Otto Bauer, is subject to articulated modifications. Adolf Schärf, for example, freely estimates that socialization of the presently nationalized industries is a long way off.[35] And Karl Waldbrunner, the Socialist Minister of Transports and Nationalized Concerns, admits that "even among the Socialists themselves it is not always accepted as a guide to procedure. In many countries, socialization in the sense of ownership in favor of the people generally, is no longer the main objective"[36]

It is not surprising, therefore, that instead of enunciating great and sweeping *Umwälzungen* of society, the Socialists have limited their sights to more immediate and practical objectives. One of these is a concept which is perhaps the most symptomatic expression of the Socialists' categorical revolt from revolutionary Marxism: namely, the idea of *Mitbestimmung*, or "co-determination," by which the workers take an active part in the management of their particular concern. This concept, with its focus on "industrial democracy" as distinct from any form of authoritarian collectivization, was incorporated into the Works Council Law of March 1947 and represents the Socialists' proudest, and most jealously guarded, post-war accomplishment. "We want no economy of state bureaucracy," states the Austrian Socialist, "We want the active co-operation of the workers and employees, themselves. We want their co-determination, the 'functional' democracy. The latter is the real heart of social policy, the road to the democratization of the economic and social democracy. The human being must participate in decision."[38] And, although, some theoreticians again invoke the busy ghost of Otto Bauer to rationalize that "democratization" is only a fuelling station on the road to socialization,[39] this approach definitely has been minimized in recent Socialist literature.

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[34]Waldbrunner, Karl, *Socialization and Nationalization: Method and Extent* (Vienna, 1953), p.12.

[35]Schärf, *Die Lage des Demokratischen Sozialismus*, p.19.

[36]Waldbrunner, *op. cit.*, p.5.

[37]Details in *Schriftenreihe des österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbundes: Betriebsrätegesetz* (Vienna, 1951).

[38]"Mitbestimmung" *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (February 24, 1950), p.2.

[39]"When the SPD composed its first program of socialization after World War I" explained the official Socialist newspaper, "it was Otto Bauer's concept that an appeal to the workers as cooperating members must be the first step toward socialization. The Works Council Law was, in fact, promulgated in the name of future socialization." *Ibid.*

But, in addition to modification of theory, the coalition has imposed concessions in the practical field as well—compromises which have placed the Socialists in embarrassing positions vis-a-vis their own adherents. The most prominent of these has been a series of Wage and Price Agreements which represented an effort by the parties to deal with the ravages of a sky-rocketing inflation. The Socialists had been committed to a program of deflation and sought to beat prices down. The *Volkspartei,* on the other hand, dependent upon the political support of peasants and manufacturers, wanted higher farm and industrial prices. The compromise put a freeze on both prices and wages, but the precariousness of this arrangement is demonstrated by the fact that, in all, five separate agreements had to be reached. As the workers' actual purchasing power decreased relentlessly, the trade unions became restive, and the Socialist high command had to preach patience. And this is where the Austrian Communists came into the picture.

The story of Communist failure in Austria is essentially a story of the failure of Soviet tactics. The KPÖ (Kommunistische Partei Österreichs) entered Vienna as the usual camp-followers of the Red Army. Its leader was, and is, Ernst Fischer, a former Socialist who changed allegiance to the Soviet exchequer while in exile in Prague.[40] Fischer, who boasts strange geneological qualifications for his new role—he is the son of a high-ranking officer, grandson of a general, nephew of an imperial prime minister and son-in-law of an aristocratic industrialist—was immediately given a post in the Provisional Government. But then came free elections of November 1945 and the jolt from which the Communists have never recovered: they are the "permanent five-per-centers" as the Socialists call them.

The reasons for the Communist failure are obvious. There has never been a Communist tradition in Austria, largely because of the pre-war radicalism of the Socialists themselves. But even if the Communists expected to change this, their hopes were hopelessly bludgeoned by the Soviet occupation—an impact which is characteristically summed up by the Viennese joke: "We may survive another war, but another liberation—never!" This association with Ivan has reached the point where the function of the handful of Communist deputies in Parliament has been reduced to defending every measure of the Soviet occupation. One Communist leader went so far as to utter publicly that every statement by Molotov on Austria cost the Party 10,000 votes.[41]

Because of the minimal parliamentary representations, the chief battleground for the Communists has become the trade unions. Since 1947, the Communists have tried to induce the workers to resist the policies of the Federation of Trade Unions with arguments that their quarrel was not with

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[40]Fischer had been known only for his literary dabblings before 1934, Ernest Karl Winter recalls being present at negotiations in 1933 between Otto Bauer and Kurt von Schuschnigg for a possible coalition. When someone suggested Fischer as a candidate for the cabinet, Bauer rejected it with a sovereign wave of his hand. "A poet!" he said contemptuously. "Austria: Test for the Coalition," *The Nation* CLX, 211 (1945), p.145-146.

[41]Vandercook, John W., "Austria: Once Liberated, Twice Shy," *Harper's CLXXXXV,* 1169 (1947), p.269.

the great mass of Socialist workers, but only with their leadership. As the leading Communist periodical proclaimed:

> "In all the decisive political questions of the present, in all questions concerning . . . the battle of the working class, there exists no contradiction between the Communists and the great mass of Socialist workers and functionaries. But a basic and growing contradiction does exist between the small nucleus which more or less rules the SPÖ on one hand, and the Socialist workers and Communists on the other . . ."[42]

After the Moscow *coup* in Prague, the Communists organized "action committees" in the factories to mobilize workers under Communist control. The climax of this agitation came in September 1950, when the Communists saw their chance to exploit the general criticism of the Third Price-Wage Agreement. Two weeks of crisis and disorder followed: thousands of workers left their jobs throughout the country, and active terrorism was openly supported by the Soviet occupation forces. The overall Communist objective was clear. As one observer had forecast earlier: "If only large-scale strikes could develop into street demonstrations in which police or gendarmerie could be provoked into firing . . . , the ideal headlines for the Communists would have been provided: 'Traitor Socialists Shoot Down Starving Workers'."[43] But the overwhelming majority of the workers and the Government stood firm. By October 5, the *putsch* had collapsed ignominously. Even with time, initiative, and Soviet support in their favor, the Communists lost their first real trial of strength. Nevertheless, the abortive attempt has left a lingering fear with the Socialist high command. As Oskar Helmer, Socialist Minister of Interior, expressed it afterwards:

> "In order to break the terror of the Communist Party, we were, of course, compelled to activate the constabulary powers. You can believe me: the decision to send police and gendarmes against any workers—even under strict orders to provent casualties—was not an easy one for me to make. We are proud of the fact that we have won this battle without shedding blood . . .[44]

The early demise of Communist pretensions has given the Socialist Party a virtual monopoly of the left. There are those, in fact, who claim that a greater potential source of competition is the extreme right-wing Union of Independents (*Verband der Unabhängigen*), the third largest political party which is headed by Dr. Herbert A. Kraus, a young Salzburg publisher. Although the "Nazi" label applied by the Socialists to his group is justified to some extent, the party also plays host to a general motley of disgruntled elements including anti-clerical radicals and uprooted ethnic Germans. The fact that the extremism of this group has competed with the

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[42]"Die Sozialistische Partei Österreichs," *Weg und Ziel* (Vienna, April 1947), p.235.
[43]Gedye, G.E.R., "The Outlook in Austria," *Contemporary Review* CLXXVII, 4 (1950), p.201-202.
[44]*Arbeiter-Zeitung* (November 5, 1950), p.1

Socialists is brought out by the recent election results. There is little doubt that *V.D.U.* votes gave Socialist Theodor Körner the victory of the presidential run-off election of 1951; and *V.D.U.* gains in the Socialist strongholds, and vice-versa, in the 1953 plebiscite (despite an overall loss) again bear out the oft-proven interchangeability of left and radical right.[45]

Despite its apparent harmlessness, however, Communist agitation has had one important effect upon Socialist tactics. The Socialists have always been uneasy over the label of ideological communion with Bolshevism, liberally applied by the Catholic right before 1938. The present hatred by Austrians of anything even remotely connected with Soviet occupation has raised this fear to paranoic proportions. The Communists have strengthened this by frequent applications of the "kiss-of-death" technique. Their solemnly announced support for Socialist Theodor Korner for president in 1950, for example, was obviously an attempt to defeat him. This has made the Socialists steer clear of any issue tainted with KPÖ approval — a fact which has accelerated their shift to conservatism.

This tendency also explains why implacable opposition to the Kremlin forms the central *Weltanschauung* of the Party. It was expressed in the simple formula by Julius Deutsch at the International Socialist Congress at Stockholm in 1950: "The attitude toward war and peace is determined by political structure. Defense of democracy means the securing of peace; dictatorship means war."[46]

This decision for the West, spurred by the proximity of the "People's Democracies," has been subject to few of the reservations characteristic of other Socialist parties. Any intra-party differences that do exist center on means rather than objectives. For example, *ipso facto* rejection of the "Third Force" concept within the present international framework, as advocated by Oscar Pollak,[47] has not gone unchallenged. But most of the arguments for a "Third Force" are of the wistful "wouldn't-it-be-nice-if" variety. They would like to see a tactically independent and united Socialist Europe carry on the struggle against Soviet overlordship, but do not consider this a *sine qua non* of European defense.

A similar attitude creeps into contemplations of the other pressing European problems. The Austrian Socialists sympathize with their colleagues' qualms regarding a unified Europe without a Socialist majority, but they argue that unification must nevertheless take place.[48] And, despite a strong antipathy toward rearmament, especially on the part of the young-

[45]Reimer, Hans, "Die Wahlen vom 22. Februar 1953, (II)" *Die Zukunft* (May 1953), p.130.

[46]Cited by the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (June 6, 1950), p.2.

[47]See, for example, Pollak's editorial, "Kann man neutral sein?" *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (August 17, 1950), p.1-2, in which he reminds the Socialists of the disastrous consequences reaped by Socialist neutralism in 1938-39.

[48]"Our motto: 'Europe Unified, Democratic and Socialist' does not connote a hierarchy of simultaneous goals; it means, rather, a definite sequence of development. The question in its extreme form, i.e. no unification as long as all participating countries are not Socialist, has been negated by . . . the Austrian Socialist Party." "England und Europa," *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (June 16, 1950), p..

er members, the more influential leaders regard militarization as a lamentable necessity, brought on by Soviet militancy alone. Oscar Pollak, for one, castigated the German Social-Democrats' opposition to the European Defense Community because "every *'Ohne Uns'* policy in Germany or anywhere else is anti-European, every neutralism is directed against the peace, and every anti-American policy, whether or not it is intended as such, means aid to the Russians."[49]

This global outlook, which identifies the *SPÖ* with the extreme right wing of the Second International, is consistent with the Party's general shift of emphasis. But, the question arises, has retreat from Marx gone completely unchallenged? Has not this development, shared in various degrees by other Continental parties, produced the internal upheaval identified with Aneurin Bevan, Pietro Nenni, and potentially, Jules Moch, elsewhere? The answer to this question is largely in the negative, with one minor qualification.

It must be emphasized, first, that doctrinaire tolerance has never been a virtue of Austrian Socialism. Through the turbulent fluctuations of the pre-war era, the Party never managed to effect a conclusive reconciliation of its right and left wings. Neverthless, this difference rarely reached past the caucus rooms, and outspoken critics of the Party's prevailing program were usually disposed of in short order. The *SPÖ* of today has, paradoxically enough, applied this doctrinaire intolerance to defend the very absence of doctrine.

The formal post-war reconciliation of the Revolutionary Socialists with the survivors of the old Social-Democratic Party has already been discussed. But, if reconciliation was relatively painless, this was so only because the return of former left-wingers was relatively small. Those who did return found their influence steadily diminishing, as was demonstrated by the virtual isolation of the most respected spokesman for the left, the popular ex-Burgomaster of Vienna, Karl Seitz, before his death in 1950.[50] Tolerance of the left wing (and vice-versa) has generally faded as the necessary compromises with the coalition partner were concluded.

Since 1945, accordingly, there has been a gradual elimination of the negligible number of dissenters who have either withdrawn from the political picture entirely or gravitated toward impotent Communist ranks. The most prominent of these is Erwin Scharf, a Revolutionary Socialist who was appointed Joint Secretary-General in the intra-party compromise of 1945 (the Socialists claimed later that he assumed this post under orders of the Communists to split the party).[51] Scharf (not to be confused with Party

[49]"Nicht ohne uns," *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (February 10, 1952), p.2. There has been some debate on the subject of German rearmament, but it has not reached nearly the explosive proportions which has characterized the disagreement within other parties. The antagonists of German rearmament base their objections more upon a German military revival in particular, rather than rearmament in general. See, for example, Hindels, Josef, "Was bedeutet Deutschlands Wiederbewaffnung?" *Die Zunkunft* (June/July, 1954), p.176-180.

[50]Fisher, A. J., "Spotlight on Austria," *World Affairs* III,2 (1949), p.146-147.

[51]Adolf Schärf relates his suspicions of Scharf from the moment the latter returned to Vienna in the uniform of a Yugoslav Partisan, accompanied by Communists Honner

Chairman Adolf Schärf) fel into disfavor because he rejected the coalition policy, demanded a return to revolutionary socialism as opposed to the Fabianism of the old guard and generally pressed for a "clearer" definition of Socialist aims with a slogan plagiarized from Joseph Wirth: "The *antagonist* is on the left; the *enemy* is on the right."[52] For a time, there was an uneasy cat-and-mouse game with the other leaders. The Party practically barred him from speaking in public and finally expelled him in November 1948.[53] Scharf for a time headed his own Socialist Workers Party (*Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei*), but his attempts to imitate Comrade Nenni from south of the border failed miserably. After an inglorious joint election effort with the Communists as the "People's Opposition" (*Volksopposition*) in 1949, Scharf seems to have given up all pretense of ideological and tactical independence from the Communists.

The ouster of the Scharf group has restored to the SPÖ the discipline necessary to conduct a controversial coalition policy. The Communists appeal hopefully to former Revolutionary Socialists on a come-home-all-is-forgiven basis,[54] but, the effectiveness of this appeal is negated by the actual growth in SPÖ membership.

It appears, then, that the Austrian Socialist Party, while sharing the dilemma of its European brethren, shares few of the dilemma's consequences. Like other European Socialists, the Austrians have experienced the moral problem of reconciling a political *nouveau-richism* with the traditional dictates of the class struggle. This movement away from Marx, as we have seen, has been partly the product of its leaders who returned from prison or exile determined not to set out upon their wanderings again. It has been the product, also, of assuming the representation of the modern Austrian worker who does not wish to jeopardize his gains of social respectability and political participation. Finally, it has been a condition imposed by the necessity of sharing the reins of an entire country, not of a city or class, as was the case before. This moral dilemma is accentuated by the fact that the Austrian Socialist is too tradition-bound to acknowledge the proportion of his ideological retreat. He will never, for example, permit a formal divorce from Marxist philosophy, as urged by some members of the German Social-Democratic Party.

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and Fürnberg. He claims that Scharf was appointed Joint Secretary-General over his (Schärf's) objections. Schärf, Adolf, *Zwischen Demokratie und Volksdemokratie* (Vienna, 1950) p.63 ff. See also Kautsky, Benedikt, *Geistige Strömungen im österreichischen Sozialismus* (Vienna, 1953), p.24.

[52]Kendrick, Alexander, "Austria Has Rebirth Pains," *New Republic* CLX, 18 (1948), p.14.

[53]The official reason given by the Party was that Scharf had been guilty of "gross indiscipline." It charged that Scharf had published in a pamphlet extracts from documents which, as a former member of the Party executive, he should have returned to Party archives. *The Times* (London, November 2, 1948), p.3.

[54]"Austria's desperate position and the growing strength of the reactionary forces . . . make it mandatory that a close cooperation be established soon between Socialists and Communists," stated the leading Communist periodical. "We Communists will fight for this goal and we are certain that we will gain the support of all those 'fighting' Socialists who united with us in a common front in the years of fascism." "Sozialisten," *Weg und Ziel* (Vienna, March 1947), p.163.

Unlike its European counterparts, however, the Austrian Socialist Party has managed to avoid the pitfalls inherent in its new position. Having received a majority of the popular vote in the last national election, and trailing by a single parliamentary seat, it certainly has experienced no decrease in mass appeal. Aside from the relatively insignificant case of Erwin Scharf, there has been no internal cataclysm *à la* Aneurin Bevan. The only conceivable item on the debit side has been a perceptible estrangement of intellectuals. But even this observed trend is largely inconclusive, because the disillusioned coffee-house philosopher has nowhere else to turn. As we have noted, the Socialists enjoy a virtual monopoly of the left: the Communists have been merged into impotency.

Thus, the Austrian Socialist has had his cake and has been eating it until now. Whether he can continue to do so is highly problematic. The coalition obscures, but does not hide, the deeply-rooted antagonism of Austrian political life, and the entire post-war pattern may be disrupted with the lifting of external pressure. But the road leading back to Austro-Marxism is long and mutilated, and the traveller appears very tired, indeed.

University of Pennsylvania

JEWISH EDUCATION IN THE THIRD REICH

by E. C. Helmreich

THE German school system having definitely been established on a Christian basis, Jewish education was always a thing apart and in reality constitutes a separate subject in the history of German education. Historically the Jewish community was held to bear the chief responsibility for the education of Jews, and the state simply assisted. The amount of control increased over the years and with it the amount of state assistance. By the time Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933, Jewish schools and Jewish religious instruction had come to have a status similar if not exactly equal to that of the Christian confessions.[1]

Conditions of course varied in the different states. In some places schools receiving much of their support from the state were classed as communal schools, in others they were classed as public schools. Statistics as to numbers must therefore be interpreted,[2] but it is clear that the Jews had a well developed private school system, their own public Jewish Confessional schools in some states, and were always free to attend the Christian *Simultan* or Confessional schools if they wished. Where their numbers were sufficient in the latter schools, public authorities provided funds for Jewish religious instruction. In the public and private Jewish schools religion was of course a regular subject of instruction.

It is impossible to separate measures which affected Jewish education in general and those which applied directly to religious education. The whole educational picture was, of course, also affected by the broad complex of sordid measures which were taken against the Jews in the Third Reich. All

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[1]German public elementary schools were in most states organized on a confessional basis, that is, a school was either Protestant or Catholic. Such schools were staffed and attended by teachers and pupils of one confession. In some states and provinces—notably Baden, Hessen, Nassau, and Frankfurt am Main-Hanau—schools were organized on an interdenominational basis and were staffed and attended by teachers and pupils of both confessions. Only for religious instruction, which was a regular part of the curriculum in all schools, were the pupils divided into separate classes according to their religious affiliation. Various terms—*Simultan, Paritätische, Gemeinschafts*—were applied to these interdenominational schools. If other schools were not available, religious minorities could attend schools of the other confession; and, if their number warranted, special classes in religion were organized. Religion classes were as a rule taught by regular lay teachers, although in some localities it was the practice to employ the local clergy for this purpose. Often teachers belonging to a religious minority were appointed at schools, primarily to give religious instruction to a minority group, but they also taught certain other select subjects.

[2]The *Statisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* (1932), pp. 421-4, indicates there were 97 public Jewish Confessional elementary schools, of which 95 were in Prussia and 2 in Württemberg. There were 28,639 students attending these and various other public elementary schools; in addition there were 5,888 attending private elementary schools. Adolf Kober in his excellent article "Jewish Communities in Germany from the Age of Enlightenment to their Destruction by the Nazis" *Jewish Social Studies* (1947) 9:214 states: "Before 1933 the Jewish primary schools numbered about 120 in Prussia, 25 in Bavaria, 7 in Württemberg, one in Oldenburg (Birkenfeld) making a total of about 155 in the whole German Reich."

these can not be discussed here, nor will it be possible to give a complete history of Jewish education, for that would involve a discussion of such topics, among others, as the shift to more vocational training, the dissolution of Jewish Communities, and the effect of the destruction of the synagogs not only on Jewish religious life but on Jewish education. Historically it took many years for Jewish education to become a regular part of the German educational system, yet in the few years of the Third Reich it was to be separated out again. An outline of the leading events in this latter procedure is what concerns us here.

Preparatory Restrictions 1933-1935

On April 7, 1933, Hitler promulgated a law for the reorganization of the civil service which contained an Aryan paragraph. Non-Aryan civil servants could be pensioned off, unless they were officials before August 1, 1914, fought at the front for the Central Powers during World War I, or were fathers or sons of persons who had been killed in that conflict.[3] By supplementary ordinance it was decreed that this law did not apply to religious corporations, and it was specifically stated: "The law does not apply to Jewish teachers employed at public Jewish schools, or those who, on the basis of legal provisions, give religious instruction at other public schools. The same is true for Jewish honorary officials, who were named to these offices on the basis of special legal provisions."[4]

In a law of April 25, 1933, directed at the overcrowding of German schools and universities it was provided that at no school or in any faculty should the number of non-Aryan Germans as defined in the civil service law, exceed the number of Aryan Germans.[5] This law did not apply to elementary schools which were considered compulsory schools. Here again as was customary in Germany, ordinances amplified the original law, and it was decreed that non-Aryans were to be limited to 1.5 per cent of the entering classes at higher schools and the universities, and in no case were they to exceed 5 per cent of the total student body.[6] Foreign Jews were not to be counted in the quota, and the restrictions applied to both public and private schools, with the exception, of course, of Jewish private schools. With this legislation Germany returned to the old anti-Semitic technique and one which had been long practiced in Imperial Russia and unofficially at many American colleges and universities.

Except for this law on overcrowding at German higher schools and universities all the old laws remained in effect. New measures were of course anticipated and in Frankfurt, for example, it was ordered that until all things were settled (1) no Jewish instructor should teach German or history, (2) be a class leader for more than four years or (3) be appointed a class

[3]Werner Hoche, *Die Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler. Die Gesetze in Reich und Preussen seit dem 30 Januar 1933* (Berlin, 1933f.) 1:113-19.
[4]*Ibid.*, 2:p.66.
[5]*Ibid.*, 2:pp.365-68.
[6]*Ibid.*, 2:pp.368-70.

leader in classes where there were no Jews or only a very small number of them.[7] When some one suggested putting all Jews in one school the authorities stated this could not be done because there was no legal provision for doing so.[8]

Since Jewish teachers were under the same general regulations as their Christian colleagues, in the summer of 1933 they had to sign a declaration that neither by written nor by spoken word had they said anything publicly against National Socialism and its Führer.[9] This requirement held also for rabbis who were giving religious instruction at the schools on a part time basis. It was generally considered a form requirement and apparently caused no great difficulty. In line with previous regulations, on September 15, 1933, it was ordered that no Jew could receive permission to give private instruction, unless he had given such instruction before 1914, had been a front line soldier, or had lost a father or son in World War I.[10] Measures were taken, however, to dismiss Jewish teachers in many places. On October 9, 1933, for example, the Directors of the Jewish Community in Frankfort protested to the school authorities that the Jewish women teachers at the city elementary schools had been given their notices. They wanted Jewish religions instruction continued under paragraph 40 of the School Law of 1906. The school authorities replied that they would try as much as possible to give consideration to Jewish religious instruction in the curriculum. At present there were two men giving such instruction. Each one had twenty hours of teaching, and would be excused of other classes. In one school another teacher gave the religious instruction.[11] The dismissals took place and in January, 1934, except for the teachers at the purely Jewish schools, there were only two Jewish instructors in the Frankfurt elementary schools.[12]

Not only were Jewish teachers dismissed but in a decree of December 18, 1933, rabbis were removed from local school committees in Prussia.[13] Hitherto under Article 44 of the Prussian law of 1906 whenever there were 20 Jewish elementary school pupils, the rabbi with the longest service was added to the school committee. This provision paralleled one for adding Catholic or Protestant clergy to the local committees. Jews were now left without representatives on the local school committee unless by chance a lay representative won one of the other seats.

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[7]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. I. (May 17, 1933). Under the Third Reich many ordinances and directives were not published in the official journals, and it was often expressly stated that they were to be kept secret. These were regularly passed on to various administrative offices in mimeographed form. The archives of the Frankfurt Schulamt emerged intact from World War II, and the writer found copies of many of the unpublished administrative orders there.

[8]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. II (June 2, 1933).

[9]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 4, vol. II (July, 1933).

[10]*Zentralblatt für die Gesamte Unterrichts-Verwaltung in Preussen.* Herausgegeben in dem Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Kurst und Volksbildung, (1933), pp.250-1.

[11]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. I (Nov. 1, 1933).

[12]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. I (Jan. 13, 1934).

[13]Hoche, *Die Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler,* 5:799-800; Curt L. Heymann, "German Laws Against the Jews. A Complete and Factual Survey of the Legal Basis of Anti-Semitism" *Current History* 48 (138), 42.

On June 17, 1933, the Minister in Berlin issued a notice effective in all Prussia that Jews could be excused from classes on Saturday if they wished.[14] Further, if Jewish pupils did attend Saturday classes, on the request of parents they should be excused from writing and drawing assignments. Schools were not to be responsible for any missed work because of such excuses. In March 1934 Reichminister Rust issued an ordinance on this subject applicable to the whole Reich.[15] Jews and Adventists could on request be excused from Saturday classes or just for the hour of services. This time, however, it was ordered that if they chose to attend classes they had to take part in all regular instruction including drawing, writing, hand work, and activity instruction. The order also established uniform practice for Jewish holidays. Henceforth Jewish pupils could be excused two days at New Years (Rosh Hashana); one day at the Feast of Atonement (Yom Kippur); two days at the beginning and at the end of the Feast of Tabernacles (Sukkoth); two days at the beginning and end of Passover (Pesach) and two days at the Feast of Weeks or Pentecost (Shabnoth).

At schools Jewish children were not to be forced to use the "German Greeting" but it also was not to be denied to them.[16] There apparently was never an attempt made to enforce instruction in National Social Racial theories at purely Jewish Schools. This in itself set Jewish education apart from German education. On the other hand instruction in National Socialist ideology in non-Jewish schools could not be hindered by consideration of other points of view. School directors were to decide from instance to instance when Jewish students were to be excused from certain classes and school ceremonies.[17] By orders issued August-September, 1934, classes in National Socialist Education in Prussia were put on Saturday, and so Jewish students could be conveniently freed from them.[18]

Jewish pupils if attending Christian schools could of course always be excused from the regular religious classes and services. At purely Jewish schools they had their own religious practices. Although aimed primarily at the Christian schools, Minister Rust's decree of July 9, 1935,[19] that henceforth at higher schools no compulsion on the part of school officials might be exercised in regard to attendance of teachers and pupils at religious services, also affected purely Jewish schools, for Jewish public and private schools were of course subject to the regular school legislation of the period.

Increased Isolation, 1935-1938

Just as the summer of 1935 brought the inauguration of new restrictive

[14] *Zentralblatt für die Gesamte Unterrichts-Verwaltung in Preussen,* (1933), p.126.

[15] *Ibid.,* (1934), p.106; *Amtsblatt des Bayer. Staatsministeriums für Unterricht und Kultus,* (March 22, 1934).

[16] Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 1, vol. I (Sept. 15, 1933).

[17] Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T. No. 7, vol. I (July 31, 1934); *Amstblatt des Württembergischen Kultusministeriums* (1935), p.206.

[18] *Amtliches Schulblatt für den Regierungsbezirk Wiesbaden,* (Aug. 21, 1934; Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. I (Sept. 12, 1934).

[19] *Amtsblatt des Reichsministeriums für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung und der Unterrichtsverwaltungen der Länder* (1935), p.315; the decree was extended to Mittelschulen on Aug. 19, 1935 (*ibid.,* p.366).

measures on the Christian churches and on Christian education in the schools, it brought a more aggressive anti-Semitic policy. At the Party Congress at Nüremberg in September Hitler suddenly called a meeting of the Reichstag which went through the formality of passing a "Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor" and a "Reich Citizenship Law." Under these laws and the important supplementary decrees of November 14, Jews were denied German citizenship and placed under many restrictions.[20] Furthermore a Jew was defined as a person who was descended from three or four Jewish grandparents, or a person descended from two Jewish grandparents, provided he professed the Jewish faith or was married to a Jew. Persons with two racially full Jewish grandparents were classed as *Mischlinge* of the second degree. Such "mixed offspring," could with special permission marry Aryans and were at times freed from other restrictions placed on Jews.

The introduction of racial criteria of course increased the number officially classed as Jews within the Reich, but how much is not known for there never had been a count on this basis before, and there was none made until 1939. The total number of Jews by religion in 1933 (including the Jews of the Saar) was 502,799. Following the great exodus of the next years, by 1939, there were in the Old Reich 233,646 racial Jews. Of these 213,930 (91.5 per cent) were of Jewish faith, which would indicate that in the first six years of the Third Reich there had been a decrease of 288,869 Jews according to religious classification. Of the racial Jews 19,716 (8.5 per cent) were not of Jewish faith and were divided as follows: Lutherans 10,461; Roman Catholics 3,025; other Christian denominations 320; deists 2,859; no religion 2,712; no designation 339. Of the 52,005 *Mischlinge* of the first degree, only 5,177 (9.9 per cent) were Jews by religion; of the 32,669 *Mischlinge* of the second degree, only 392 (1.16 per cent) were of Jewish faith. Thus only about 10 per cent of children of mixed marriages were raised as Jews, the rest being affiliated with Christian denominations.[21] There were thus full racial Jews who were Christians and also *Mischlinge* who were Christians, and the Nazis in their ordinances sometimes distinguished between the groups. Most of the children of these Christian non-Aryans were of course attending Christian religion classes in the schools. Forcing these children out of the Christian schools into purely Jewish schools raised new problems.

A few days before the enactment of the Nüremberg laws, Minister Rust, on September 10, 1935, issued a directive on Racial Separation in Public Schools.[22] He had discovered that Jewish children were still attending pub-

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[20]Hoche, *Die Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler*, 15:49-54.

[21]These statistics are taken from Bruno Blau, "The Jewish Population of Germany," *Jewish Social Studies* (1950), 12:162-3.

[22]Copy of the directive, Frankfurt Schulamt Archives T No. 7, vol. I. Section 4 of Art. 2 of the First Decree on the Reich Citizenship Law of Nov. 14, 1935 stated: "The conditions of service of teachers in public Jewish schools remain unchanged until the forthcoming regulation of the Jewish school system" (Hoche: *Die Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler*, 15:50.

lic German schools. Starting with the school year of 1936 there was to be as complete a separation of races as possible, and administrative authorities were to report to him by November 14 on the situation in their districts. At the Higher schools he would deal with the situation by cutting the percentage quotas. At the compulsory elementary schools (*Pflichtschulen*) this was another matter. He did not want private Jewish schools, but expected to erect public Jewish schools wherever twenty children were available. He wanted to know how many such schools would be necessary and invited suggestions in regard to them. He anticipated that the Jewish parents would bear the burden of the schools, with the state and community furnishing subsidies. *Mischlinge* of the second degree (one-quarter Jews) were not to be affected by the separation of races.

Thus at a time when the campaign against Christian Confessional schools was being launched, Rust decided to erect Jewish Confessional schools. The policy of separation was soon underway, although it was not uniformly carried out. By December 1935 all the Jewish children not in the purely Jewish schools in Frankfurt were concentrated in two public schools. This, of course, made it necessary for some pupils to travel considerable distances and a rabbi made the request, which was turned down, that they be given free transportation on the street cars.[23] Another directive is at hand of July 2, 1937, which indicates that this policy of having public elementary Jewish schools was carried out in the next years. If it was not possible to have a completely separate Jewish school, classes of Jewish students gathered from several districts (*Sammelklassen*) were attached to regular schools and taught by Jewish teachers.[24] Jews could attend elective schools (Middle, Higher, Trade) according to the law on overcrowding of Higher schools. *Mischlinge* could attend any of the elective schools, for it was held that under the Nüremberg laws they did not come under the quota restrictions, although in case of overcrowding others were to be given preference. *Mischlinge* could also take the important *Abitur* examinations.

One of the first actions of the Jews after Hitler had come to power was to form in April, 1933, a National Organization of German Jews (*Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland*).[25] This National Organization, a coordinating body for the various Jewish organizations, did much to aid the founding of these new Jewish schools, for the state did not assume all the burden. Here again it is hard to distinguish between what was a public or private school, particularly if viewed from the American conception of what constitutes a public school. Thus the Israelitische Volkschule in Frankfurt,

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[23]*Frankfurt Schulamt Archives,* T No. 7, vol. I (Dec. 13, 1935).

[24]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. I (July 2, May 25, 1937). By May 1937 the Jewish elementary pupils in Frankfurt were concentrated in two private schools with 28 classes, 1125 pupils and 29 teachers; and into 3 classes with 109 pupils and 3 teachers attached to two German elementary schools.

[25]Adolf Kober, "Jewish Communities in Germany from the Age of Enlightenment to their Destruction by the Nazis", *Jewish Social Studies* (1947) 9:225f.; Elieser Ehrmann: "Jewish Education in Germany" *Jewish Education* (1939) 11:95. In 1939 the *Reichsvertretung* was reorganized as the *Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland* (*American Jewish Yearbook* (1939-1940) 41:p.265).

a private school, received funds from the Jewish community, from the city, and from the state. In 1937 the Frankfurt school authorities proposed that the city and state raise their subsidies to 15,000 R. M. and the Berlin officials agreed to do so for one year.[26]

In spite of many handicaps there was built up in the years 1935-8 an effective Jewish educational system. Many of the elementary schools added a ninth year devoted chiefly to vocational training, and this aspect of education was greatly expanded through many special establishments designed to prepare youth for emigration.[27] It has been estimated that "there were in Germany in the first half of 1938: 68 public Jewish primary schools, 72 private Jewish primary schools, which, with the intermediate and high schools, totaled about 160 Jewish schools of all grades. They were attended by 20,029 Jewish primary pupils and about 5,000 Jewish high school pupils. The *Reichsvertretung* or the Central Committee supported these schools according to their needs without discriminating on the basis of religious or philosophical orientation."[28] What proportion of private Jewish funds, as compared to "public" communal and state funds went to support the various schools it is impossible to say.

Alongside of the policy of segregating Jewish children there also went a policy of eliminating Jewish religious instruction from the public schools. The latter would quite naturally have been the result of the former, but the two did not always coincide, for in some places special Jewish classes (*Sammelklassen*) continued as annexes of the regular elementary schools. It was also a separate question in the higher schools for here there were always in these years a few Jewish students to be found under the quota system.

One of the first ordinances aimed directly at Jewish religious instruction was apparently issued in Württemberg and it came well before the Nüremberg Laws.[29] Here Minister Merganthaler, who was noted for his zeal in furthering National Socialist educational aims, on May 7, 1934 issued an ordinance ending Jewish religious instruction as a regular part of the curriculum at the public Higher and elementary schools. The Jewish Community could henceforth arrange to give such instruction privately to Jewish students but no public funds were to be allotted for this purpose.

It was not until July 31, 1936 that Bavaria took measures comparable to those in Württemberg. On that date regular Jewish religious instruction was barred from all Bavarian schools. It could be given privately, but there were henceforth to be no grades in Jewish religious instruction entered on the report cards. Nor could state or local public funds be spent for Jewish religious instruction. A supplementary decree of November made it clear that private religious instruction could not be given in school buildings, ex-

[26]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, E3 No. 1, vol. I (March 24, 1937).

[27]Rudolph Stahl: "Vocational Retraining of Jews in Nazi Germany 1933-1938" *Jewish Social Studies* (1939) 1:pp.169-94; Ehrmann: *loc. cit.*, p.96.

[28]Kober, *loc. cit.*, p. 229.

[29]"Verordnung des Kultusministeriums über die Aufhebung des israelitischen Religionsunterrichts vom 7 Mai 1934" *Amtsblatt des Württembergischen Kultusministeriums* (1934), p.88.

cept in schools attended only by Jewish pupils or in elementary schools which had special Jewish classes attached to them.[30]

Although the above decree applied only to Bavaria it was reprinted in the Official Journal of the Reichsministerium at Berlin, and its policy was apparently followed throughout Germany. At least in 1936 religious instruction ceased to be a regular subject of instruction at public elementary schools as far as the Frankfurt school authorities were concerned, which is indicative that the policy was being followed in Prussia.[31]

The small number of Jewish students at the higher schools made it difficult, of course, to keep regular religion classes going, and without a will to maintain them on the part of the authorities, they quite naturally were soon discontinued. By February 24, 1936, according to a report to Minister Rust, Jewish religious instruction was no longer given at any of the Higher schools in Prussia. Rust thereupon cancelled a Prussian ordinance of November 25, 1926, according to which the teacher who gave religious instruction was to be an ordinary member of the examining schools. In September 1936 the ban on religious instruction was extended to Middle schools. Rooms in school buildings at Higher and Middle schools were no longer to be made available for private Jewish religious instruction.[32]

Another measure affecting Jewish religious instruction more or less directly was the elimination of Hebrew from the curriculum of the higher schools. One of the first decrees banning it was apparently issued in Bavaria on December 21, 1936. This was followed at once by a decree by Minister Rust who ordered that starting with the school year 1937/8 no Hebrew was to be taught at the gymnasiums. It was to be left for the Universities to provide for future Oriental scholars. The Christian churches, however, were not of this opinion. They objected to the cancellation of Hebrew, and soon began to provide future ministerial candidates privately with instruction in Hebrew. This apparently met with some success, for a decree of August 14, 1941 pointed out that no recruiting should be permitted at Higher school for instruction in Hebrew, Aramaic, or Greek. School rooms should not be made available for such instruction, even if it was free and was given by Church authorities.[33]

These regulations affecting Hebrew instruction at gymnasiums did not affect Hebrew instruction at purely Jewish schools. In fact the increased emigration to Palestine after 1933 led to a renewed interest in studying He-

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[30]*Amtsblatt des Bayer. Staatsministeriums* (1936), pp.94,117.

[31]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T 7 No. 4, vol. II (a summary of measures dated April 5, 1943).

[32]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 4, vol. II (Sept. 4, 1936; *Amtsblatt des Reichsministeriums für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung der Unterrichtsverwaltungen der Länder* (1936), p. 163.

[33]The decree of Kultus Minister Boepple of Bavaria of Dec. 1936 is given, *ibid.*, (1937), p. 39; a copy of the decre of Aug. 14, 1941 (Min. Erl. E III a 1657, E III v.E I a) was obtained from the school arctives of Kempten, Bavaria; see also the section on Hebrew instruction in Alfred Homeyer: *Neuordnung des höheren Schulwesens. Sammlung der wichtigsten diesbezüglichen Gesetze, Erlasse, und Verfügungen seit Januar 1933* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1940).

brew. It has been estimated that in 1934 there were some 15,000 Hebrew students in all Germany.[34] A seminary for Hebrew teachers was founded at the end of 1935 with 30 students. The number of Hebrew students declined in the next years, in part because of the shortage of teachers, the lack of text books, or the opposition of many parents, but largely because of the great decline of the Jewish school population due to emigration.

Just as the Nazis did not meddle with Hebrew instruction at Jewish schools, neither did they attempt to interfere with or determine the content of Jewish religious instruction. In this regard the Jews were more fortunate than the Christian churches, although it should be recalled that even in respect to Christian instruction the Nazis never officially attempted to draw up specific curriculum plans. They relied upon more devious ways to infiltrate their ideas into religion classes.

Final Liquidation, 1938-1945

Immediately after the successful annexation of Austria the German government began to prepare further measures against the Jews. Existing German anti-Jewish legislation was practically introduced in one fell swoop to Austria.[35] By a decree of March 28, 1938, the Jewish communities were deprived of their status as public law corporations (*Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts*).[36] The communities were henceforth to be voluntary civil law associations, and Jews no longer automatically became community members but had specifically to enter their names. The new Jewish associations no longer had the right to levy communal taxes and have the state agencies collect them, nor was the property of the community any longer exempt from state taxes. This decree was one of a long series of discriminatory tax measures, and of course handicapped the Jewish communities in carrying on their collective activities. Minister Rust realized this and in a secret directive asked all district presidents to note how the Jewish schools were affected by the new measure and to report any difficulties to him.[37]

To name a few other decrees which followed in rapid succession will indicate that Hitler's anti-Semitism was being reactivated with a vengeance. On April 26, 1938 appeared a "Decree Regarding the Registration of Jewish Property"; on June 1, 1938, all Jewish schools were excluded from tax exemption; on July 6, 1938, a decree restricted Jews to a limited number of names of "Jewish Origin."[38] These measures were a cause for, and the later ones a reaction to the international conference which had been called on

[34]L. Spitzmann, "The Hebrew School Movement" *The Jewish People Past and Present* (New York, 1948f.), 2:127; on the difficulty of providing instruction in Hebrew see also Ehrmann: *loc. cit.*, p. 97f.

[35]Oscar Karbach; "The Liquidation of the Jewish Community of Vienna" *Jewish Social Studies* (1940) 2:pp.255-78.

[36]Hoche, *Die Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler*, 26:523; Bernard D. Weinryb, *Jewish Emancipation under Attack. Its Legal Recession Until the Present War* (New York, 1942), p.48; *American Jewish Yearbook* (1938-9) 40:p.196.

[37]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 6, vol. III (April 28, 1938).

[38]Pertinent sections of the ordinances are conveniently translated in Weinryb, *Jewish Emancipation under Attack*, pp.47-52.

the initiative of President Roosevelt to consider the problem of involuntary emigration from Germany. Thirty-one countries were represented at this conference which met at Evian, France, from July 6 to July 15, 1938.[39]

Germany did not cooperate with the Evian conference in making more liberal economic provisions for Jewish emigrants. On the other hand the Nazi officials were glad to have Jews leave the country under the severe economic restrictions which they imposed. At times they resorted to deportation which entailed even greater hardships. On November 7, 1938, Herschel Grynszpan, the son of a Polish-Jewish deportee, shot and seriously wounded Ernst vom Rath, third secretary of the German embassy in Paris.[40] Two days later the victim died, and his death was made the occasion of a violent pogrom throughout Germany. Preparations had certainly long been made for such an occasion. Nowhere did the police intervene. Synagogues were set to the torch, except in those places where the fire might damage Gentile property. Jewish stores were smashed and looted, and many Jews suffered physical violence and arrest.

On November 12 a meeting of important Nazi leaders was held under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Göring to survey the damage and to see "that the Jewish question be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or another." Göring as head of the Four Year plan was not happy over all the economic destruction. He was particularly concerned that Jewish firms would receive insurance payments from German Aryan firms for damage done. He could have cancelled the insurance payments, but since the German companies had reinsured with foreign concerns he did not want these foreign companies to escape making their payments. Glass breakage alone was estimated at $6,000,000, and Germany had to import practically all its glass from Belgium. In one night Germans had broken about half of a whole year's production of the Belgian glass industry. Discussion ranged far and wide and all the remarks and decisions can not be considered here. One observation by Goebbels, however, is pertinent and requires quotation:[41]

> I think it is imperative to give the Jews certain public parks, not the best ones—and tell them: "You may sit on these benches," these benches shall be marked "For Jews only." Besides they have no business in German parks. Furthermore, Jewish children are still allowed in German schools. That's impossible. It is out of the question that any boy should sit beside a Jewish boy in a German Gymnasium and receive lessons in German history. Jews ought to be eliminated completely from German schools; they may take care of their own education in their own communities.

Whether the conference reached any formal decision on Goebbels' proposal

[39]*Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945* (Washington, 1949f.), Series D, 5:p.894.

[40]Mark Wischnitzer, "Jewish Emigration from Germany 1933-1938" *Jewish Social Studies* (1940) 2:p.36.

[41]*Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (8 vols., 2 supp.; Washington, 1946-8) 4:p.433-4.

is not recorded, but three days later on November 15 Minister Rust issued an ordinance which echoed the propaganda minister's words.[42]

> After the ruthless murder of Paris, German teachers no longer can be expected to give instruction to Jewish pupils. It is also self-evident that German students find it unbearable to share classrooms with Jews.
>
> Racial segregation in schools has been carried out in general during the past years, but a small number of Jewish pupils have remained who can no longer be permitted to attend schools together with German boys and girls.
>
> Reserving additional regulations:
>
> 1. Jews are forbidden to attend German schools. They are permitted to attend Jewish schools only. In so far as it has not yet happened all Jewish school boys and girls still attending German schools are to be dismissed immediately.
> 2. Paragraph 5 of First Decree of the Reich Citizenship Law . . . of November 14, 1935, specifies who is Jewish.
> 3. This regulation extends to all schools under the supervision of the Reich Minister of Education, including continuation schools.

With this decree the complete isolation of Jews from the German elementary and Higher schools was inaugurated. It did not specifically apply to *Mischlinge* and these were not always removed from the elementary schools. It did affect particularly those racial Jews who were Christians and had thus far been permitted in general to attend the regular German schools. They now were forced to attend the Jewish schools. In Frankfurt-am-Main they were sent to the venerable Philanthropen school and figures for May 1939, list 3 Evangelical, 1 Catholic and 12 Deists (*Gottgläubig*) as being in attendance there.[43]

Rust's November 15th decree was but the start. In a further secret decree of December 17 he pointed out that Jews could not be left without all instruction and school authorities were to try to keep arrangements going.[44] If, however, it was not possible to get special rooms for "collected classes", these would have to be dissolved for it was impossible to instruct Jews in the same building with other German pupils. Jewish teachers who had heretofore received salaries from public authorities would continue to do so. Jewish teachers who had been taken into protective custody were going to be released by the police. Although he anticipated the future ending of state subsidies to private Jewish schools, this was not officially done until March 7, 1939.[45] Even this decree, however, did not necessarily end subsidies to Jewish private schools from local public funds.

With all Jewish students in special Jewish schools Rust undertook to

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[42]As translated from the *Völkischer Beobachter* in Weinryb: *Jewish Emancipation under Attack,* p.54f. Jews are also barred from German universities at this time (*Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,* 5:371f.

[43]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, h 2a No. 1, vol. I (summary of Feb. 28, 1941).

[44]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. I (Dec. 17, 1938).

[45]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, h 2a No. 1, vol. I (letter of May 2, 1939, to the Schulrat des Philanthropins).

make the Jewish Community more responsible for them. In an ordinance of August 14, 1939 (amplifying the citizenship law of July 4, 1939), he pointed out that it was a compulsory duty of the *Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland* to establish elementary Jewish schools only.[46] Erection of Middle, Higher, Trade and Vocational schools was optional according to need and available funds. At the Jewish elementary schools they could have special curriculum plans and might teach Hebrew. Teacher academies were to be permitted only as far as it was necessary to train Jewish teachers. Retired Jewish teachers could be employed in the schools; and if they refused to serve, their pensions would be stopped. By September 30, 1939 the *Reichsvereinigung* was to take over all public and private Jewish schools. Former public school buildings could be rented by them.

With this decree segregation of Jews into a separate school system under the supervision of the Jewish Community was virtually complete. With war conditions and continued enforcement of anti-Semitic measures it became more and more difficult to maintain the schools. The constant decrease in the number of pupils necessitated the closing of many schools. What had happened can be illustrated by some figures from the Frankfurt schools.[47] In January, 1934, there were two private Jewish elementary schools with 1902 pupils and in addition there were 548 children scattered through thirty-six other schools. In May, 1937, there were 1125 pupils in the two schools and 109 in three classes annexed to German elementary schools. By August 1941 the two elementary schools together had 700 pupils and had been placed in one building. Because of the departure (*Abwanderung*) of so many Jews during October-November, 1941, the number of pupils declined to 450 by February, 1942, and the *Reichsvereinigung* out of reasons of economy decided to combine the two Frankfurt Jewish elementary schools into one which was to be called the "Private Jewish Volkschule in Frankfurt-am-Main." Even this school had to find new quarters, for the army confiscated its old building for a hospital.

With the inauguration of the final terror which ultimately reduced the total Jewish population of Germany to about 19,000, the German Jewish educational system came to an end. The death-knell ordinance of Minister Rust was issued on June 7, 1942.[48]

> To the District President of Wiesbaden:
>
> In view of the development of the resettlement (*Aussiedlung*) of Jews in recent times the Minister of Interior . . . in agreement with the "Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland" has directed that all Jewish schools should be closed by June 30, 1942. Their members are to be informed that starting July 1, 1942 all schooling of Jewish children by paid or unpaid teachers is forbidden.

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[46]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. I, (Aug. 14, 1939).

[47]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. I (Jan. 13, 1934; May 25, 1937); h 2a No. 1, vol. I (Aug. 25, 1941); E 3 No. 1, vol. I, (Feb. 17, 1942). In April 1950 there were 16 Jewish pupils in the elementary schools of Frankfurt and 9 at the Higher schools.

[48]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, h 2a No. 1, vol. I (June 7, 1942).

I inform you of this. The ordinance is not to be made public.
As authorized.
(Signed) Holfeder

As a result of this order Jewish schools were closed throughout the Reich. But some problems remained. What was to be done with the *Mischlinge,* these unfortunates who were neither fish nor fowl, neither Jew nor Gentile. On July 2, 1942 Rust issued a long decree,[49] the content of which may be summarized as follows:

1. *Mischlinge* of the first degree are no longer to be admitted to Hauptschulen, Mittelschulen or higher schools. In exceptional cases they may be permitted to attend Trade and Vocational schools.
2. *Mischlinge* of the second degree can attend all the above schools as long as there is room and it does not cause disadvantages to pupils of German or related blood.
3. *Mischlinge* of first degree who are in the seventh class can stay until they have finished their final examinations (*Reifeprüfung*).
4. *Mischlinge* of first degree in fifth and sixth classes at Mittelschulen can attend until they receive their certificate of graduation or until the seventh grade of higher schools.
5. *Mischlinge* of first degree in classes one to four at Mittel or Higher schools can stay until they have completed their compulsory school attendance.
6. *Mischlinge* of first degree can finish their courses at Trade and Vocational schools.

A further ordinance of September 9, 1942, cleared up some ambiguities and specifically stated that *Mischlinge* of the first degree were to attend the regular elementary schools, but not the more advanced elective schools. They might also attend kindergarten.[50]

All these picayune gradations, of course, were difficult to administer and many a school authority closed his eyes when it came to applying the regulations. Cognizance of this situation was finally taken in Berlin when in an ordinance on April 5, 1944 it was admitted that there was no uniformity in testing the ancestry of *Mischlinge* of the first degree for purposes of enforcing the ordinance of July 1942.[51] Henceforth for the duration of the war no genealogical papers were to be required. Instead parents or guardians were simply to make a declaration that to the best of their knowledge the child was not descended from Jewish parents or grandparents. At elementary schools and compulsory classes of Vocational schools not even this declaration was to be required, on the basis that Jewish *Mischlinge* were subject to compulsory education. For the exclusion of Jews no declara-

[49]Homeyer, *Verordnung des höheren Schulwesens,* D4.
[50]Frankfurt Schulamt Archives, T No. 7, vol. I (Sept 9, 1942).
[51]*Deutsche Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung. Amtsblatt des Reichministeriums für Wissenschaft Erziehung und Volksbildung und der Unterrichtsverwaltungen der Länder* (1944), p.78.

tion would be necessary as the few scattered Jewish children were known.

With this final ordinance in regard to *Mischlinge* the history of Jewish education in the Third Reich is complete. Under Hitler's leadership the Germans put the clock back in many places, but nowhere more than in their treatment of Jews and Jewish education. It would be necessary to go back centuries and would require much research to discover—if it were possible—when there was not a single Jew in the regular Christian School System of Germany. This status the Nazis achieved almost overnight. But not only were the Jews isolated from the regular German schools; the separate Jewish educational system, which for a time was encouraged, was itself dissolved when the Nazis forbade all schooling of Jewish pupils by either paid or unpaid teachers.

Bowdoin College

THE GERMAN DIPLOMATS AND THE NAZI LEADERS, 1933-1939

by Donald C. Watt

When students of Nazi Germany heard that Professor Gordon Craig of Princeton University was to produce a short study of the relations between the German Foreign Ministry and the Nazi leadership, they looked forward with approval and interest to its appearance. The need for such a study had long been felt by those teaching and working in the period. There is now, in spite of the delay in production of the German diplomatic documents for the early Nazi period, a considerable amount of material available for such a study, in memoirs, non-German diplomatic documents, press materials, etc., and Mr. Craig's abilities were well-known from his excellent work on the Groener papers.[1] It is the more regrettable that his study which has now appeared as part of a general symposium on the diplomats of the inter-war years,[2] is a disappointment.

The main fault in this study arises from what can only be called the naïveté with which Mr. Craig has employed his main sources, the memoirs of the German diplomats. This is the more difficult to understand in view of the very strong criticism with which such memoirs, most notably those of Erich Kordt, of Ambassador Dirksen, and of Von Papen,[3] were greeted by English and American historians.[4] The memoirs of foreign diplomats in the German capital, though much less used, Mr. Craig treats with similar naïveté.[4a]

The problem of evaluating these memoirs is, it is true, a difficult one. Kordt's memoirs, for example, give a very full and plausible picture of many points in the relationship betweeen the German Foreign Service and the Nazi leaders, on which there is little other evidence. On many of these points his evidence may be taken as reliable. But his attitude to Ribbentrop is so hostile, and his urge to exonerate his hero, State Secretary von Weizsanecker,[5] and the Foreign Service generally, from complicity in Nazi policy so obvious, that his evidence on these points has to be treated with the greatest of care. Mr. Craig accepts, without question, for example, Kordt's statement that Hitler's decision to repudiate the military clauses of Ver-

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[1]Gordon A. Craig, "Reichwehr and National Socialism: the policy of Wilhelm Groener 1928-32," *Polit. Science Quart.* LXII (1948).

[2]Craig, Gordon A. and Gilbert, Felix, eds., "The German Foreign Service from Neurath to Ribbentrop," *The Diplomats 1918-1939,* Princeton 1953.

[3]Kordt, E., *Wahn und Wirklichkeit.* (Stuttgart, 1947); *Nicht aus den Akten.* (Stuttgart, 1950); Dirksen, H., *Moscow, Tokyo, London.* (London, 1951); von Papen, F., *Memoirs.* (London, 1953).

[4]Cf. Sir Lewis Namier, *In the Nazi Era* (London, 1953); E. M. Carroll in American *Polit. Science Review,* Vol. XLVI, No. 2, June 1952.

[4a]He relies extensively on the memoirs of François-Poncet, French Ambassador in Berlin, 1931-38. A. François-Poncet. *Souvenirs d'un Ambassade à Berlin,* (Paris, 1946), who was far from having been as hostile towards the Nazi leadership as his memoirs would have us believe.

[5]Ernst von Weizaecker, Director of Political Department in German Foreign Ministry, 1937-38, State Secretary, 1938-1943, Ambassador to the Vatican, 1943-45.

sailles was communicated to the Foreign Ministry so shortly before its implementation that the Foreign Ministry were unable to voice their opinion on its possible political consequences. When one considers the legal and military preparations needed to implement the law by which conscription was adopted, one of the corollaries of Hitler's action which was put into effect the same day, and the close relations obtaining between General Beck, the Chief of Army Staff, and State Secretary Bülow,[6] this statement can only be accepted with the gravest of reservations. It may be formally true; but its implications, that the repudiation of the military clauses of Versailles was planned without the knowledge and cognizance of the leaders of the Foreign Ministry, must be completely rejected. Equally from the fact that Kordt's description of the preliminaries to the reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 deals only with his briefing of Ribbentrop on the legal position of the Locarno Treaty, Mr. Craig assumes that the German memorandum justifying the re-occupation which Foreign Minister von Neurath handed to the principal foreign ambassadors on the morning of the re-occupation, March 7, was drafted in Ribbentrop's private office rather than in the Foreign Ministry. How men of the low standard of intelligence and ability Kordt ascribes to the members of this private office could have drafted so clever and well-constructed a memorandum is a question which Mr. Craig does not seem to have asked himself. And in the footnote in which he discusses the degree to which the Foreign Ministry knew of the plan to re-occupy the Rhineland, he has missed entirely the clear and detailed account given by General Hossbach, the Army representative on Hitler's personal staff, of Hitler's conversations with Ambassador von Hassell,[7] Neurath, and the Army leaders preceding the decision to re-occupy.[8] It is obvious from this that Neurath and Bülow at least, and most probably the other directors of the Foreign Ministry knew of the move some time in advance. The memorandum in question was most probably drafted by the head of the legal division. Frederich Gaus,[9] who also drafted the speech with which Ribbentrop defended Germany's action before the League Council on March 19, 1936.

More serious evidence of Mr. Craig's naïveté appears in his unquestioning use of the memoir writers as witnesses in their own cause. It is, for example, extremely dangerous to accept Dirksen's word that the German Foreign Ministry had no knowledge of the talks between Ribbentrop and the Japanese Military Attache in Berlin, Colonel Oshima, in late 1935 and 1936, which led eventually to the Anti-Comintern Pact, until April 1936 when Dirksen was warned of them in Tokyo and passed the warning back to his

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[6]Bernard von Bülow, State Secretary in German Foreign Ministry, 1939-36.

[7]von Hassell, Ulrich, Ambassador in Rome 1932-38.

[8]Hossbach, C. F., *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934-38,* (Hanover, 1949), p. 97. This omission is the more difficult to understand as Craig cites this book in the preceding footnote.

[9]Friederich Gaus, Director of Legal Department in Foreign Ministry, 1923-43, Under-State Secretary, 1939-43, Ambassador for Special assignments, 1943-45.

superiors in Berlin.[10] It is obvious that the Foreign Ministry would learn of these negotiations from Kordt, the man entrusted with the task of watching and reporting on Ribbentrop's activities long before April 1936. On this point Kordt's evidence can be accepted without a qualm, especially as these conversations were the subject of sensationalist reports in the Swiss and Russian Press throughout the last weeks of 1935.[11] An even more flagrant example is Mr. Craig's assertion, buttressed by an imposing reference to *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,* that the professional diplomat had previously declared the Anglo-German Naval Agreement which Ribbentrop concluded in June 1935 to be impossible of conclusion—an assertion which turns out on examination to be based on nothing more than a sentence in the final speech of Ribbentrop's Defence Counsel at Nuremberg, not exactly first-class historical evidence for so controversial a statement.[12]

Apart from these relatively less important errors, Mr. Craig's use of his sources has betrayed him into several major errors of dating, especially in his account and interpretation of German-Russian, German-Polish and German-Austrian relations in the years 1933-34, and into a serious misconstruction of the degree of the rights and functions of the Foreign Ministry. Mr. Craig's time-table is something like this. The summer of 1933 was filled with the disarmament negotiations at Geneva which led eventually to Germany's withdrawal from the League in October 1933. Up to this date Germany was on perfectly cordial terms with the powers of Europe. Italy was sympathetic to her, Russia anxious to preserve her ties with Germany, "in spite of certain signs of uneasiness," and a Concordat had been signed with the Papacy. Not until after this date did Hitler become interested in the possibility of a coup in Austria and begin the outright aid to the Austrian Nazis which ended in the Dollfuss murder and coup in 1934.[13] The decision to negotiate with the Poles was not taken until November 1933. Hitler's Speeches then "began to contain open references to the Bolshevist menace," and relations with Russia became cold. Nadolny,[14] dispatched as German Ambassador to Moscow after German withdrawal from the League, fought this new policy bitterly in personal interviews with Hitler and Neurath which resulted in his dismissal. It was not until the advent of Ribbentrop in the middle of 1934 that the Foreign Ministry had real reason for loss of morale or complaint of party interference.

This picture errs greatly in the impression it gives of the popularity of Germany up to the withdrawal from the League. The advent of Hitler to power had been greeted with alarm and dismay in both Paris and Warsaw, and a Polish force had remained for some time in a threatening position on

[10]Dirksen, p.184.

[11]Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten,* p. 124. In actual fact, German support for China was at its strongest in April 1936, with the signature on April 8, 1936 of an agreement by which the German Army supplied Chiang Kai-Shek with arms. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-45,* Series D, Vol. I. p. 768, f.n. 52a.

[12]*Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,* Supplement B, pp. 144-45.

[13]For this Craig relies on Papen.

[14]Rudolf Nadolny, Leader of German delegation to League of Nations, Ambassador to Moscow 1933-34.

the German frontier. The excesses which accompanied the general elections held in Germany in March 1933 were greeted with contempt and disgust in the world press, and a considerable boycott movement showed itself against German goods in the world markets. Further German Nazi supports for the Austrian Nazis began almost immediately after Hitler's accession to power. Habicht, a member of the German Reichstag had been appointed "Inspector of the Nazi Party in Austria" at an early stage. On March 18, Hans Frank, the Reich Commissar for Justice, spoke on the Munich radio, warning Austria against taking any action which might force Germany to intervene in Austrian affairs. In May, while on a visit to Vienna, Graz and Salzburg, Frank was expelled from Austria for making threatening speeches against the Austrian Government for alleged insults to his person.[15] When Neurath arrived in London in June 1933 for the World Economic Conference, he found public opinion almost unbelievably hostile to Germany, and German relations with Austria regarded as the main threat to world peace.[16] In August, the Austrian government was permitted by the British and Italian governments to increase her army by 8,000 men, and a joint Anglo-French démarche in Berlin was made, without having any effect whatever on the intensity of Nazi attacks on Austria.[17] At the same time, Dollfuss conferred secretly with Mussolini; and Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, protested strongly against the German intervention in Austria.[18] It is obvious that the German Foreign Ministry were informed on the scope and strength of Nazi activities in Austria, and the German Minister in Vienna, Prince Reuss, seems to have collaborated closely with the Austrian Nazis. On this subject as on others, Papan's testimony is worthless.

If German relations with Italy and the Western Powers were already in the summer of 1933 considerably colder than Mr. Craig would have us believe, German-Russian relations weer equally icy. The ratification of the protocol renewing the Treaty of Berlin, by the Reichstag in May 1933, was a comparatively empty gesture, and was followed immediately afterwards by the Soviet request that the Reichswehr installations in Russia be wound up.[19] The events of the Reichstag trial, and still more the release at the World Economic Conference on June 18, 1933, of a memorandum prepared by Hugenberg, the German Nationalist Minister of Economics, marking the Ukraine as a suitable area for German expansion and colonization, made the Russians break into a storm of diplomatic and press complaints. The German Military Mission sent to wind up the Reichswehr installations at the Soviet request, found the Russians at their most obstructive. In Septem-

[15] *United States Foreign Relations, 1933*, Vol. I, pp. 428-432, Dispatch of U. S. Minister in Austria, of May 18, 1933.

[16] *Nuremberg Documents*, Neurath-11. Letter of Neurath to Hindenburg of June 19, 1933. Cf. also Neurath, 12.

[17] *U.S.F.R. 1933*, Vol. I. pp. 433. Dispatch of U. S. Ambassador in Italy, of Aug. 10. Dispatch of U. S. Minister in Austria, of Aug. 19, 1933.

[18] Wiskemann, Elizabeth, *The Rome-Berlin Axis*, (London, 1949), p. 4.

[19] Hilger, G. and A. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies. German-Soviet Relations, 1918-1941*. (New York, 1953), p. 257.

ber 1933, although Bulow managed to extract Hitler's reluctant consent to an interview with the Russian Krestinski, who should have passed through Berlin on his return to Moscow, the latter changed his route in order to avoid Berlin. Seen in this light Nadolny's efforts to recreate the old accord with Russia appear not so much as gallant, if single-handed, efforts to stem a flowing tide, but rather as an unrealistic refusal to recognize that conditions had changed, impossible to anyone not possessed of Nadolny's arrogance, conceit and inflated estimate of his own abilities and importance.[20]

It is clear from this that the marked change in German-Polish relations between the war-scare of April 1933 and the Joint Declaration of January 1934 was not so much a cause as a consequence of the deterioration in German-Soviet relations. It is clear that Hitler had decided to play safe with Poland at an early stage after his accession to power. In flat contrast to the uninhibited activity permitted o he Nazi organizaions in Austria, their equivalents in Danzig issued very careful, moderate and conciliatory statements on ther attitude towards Poland. Reassuring phrases sprinkled Hitler's speeches and Neurath's interviews with Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin. Goering's account to Count Szembek in January 1935 of Hitler's interview with Schleicher immediately before the latter's resignation, in which Schleicher urged Hitler to build on a basis of a Franco-Russo-German *entente,* and on Hitler remarking immediately afterwards, "Und ich werde das Gegenteil machen," is probably apocryphal,[21] but it fits the general pattern of Germany's strategic position in 1933 very well. An alliance with Russia was only of use to Germany to restrain Poland from making an unilateral attack on Germany. If Germany were to put herself in a position where Poland was encouraged and supported in such an attack by the western powers, the Russian aliance would have been useless. If, by measures of rearmament, by pressure on Austria, by re-occupying the Rhineland, Germany had to risk trouble on her western frontier, security in the east was essential. Some stronger form of restraint on Poland than the threat from Russia had to be found, and anything that might lead to trouble with Poland be avoided. The overwhelming gains made by the Nazis in the Danzig elections of June 1933 made caution doubly necessary. It is significant that it was in Berlin, where he had retired immediately after the Nazi victory, that Dr. Rauschning, the leader of the Danzig Nazis, announced his intention of adopting a conciliatory policy towards Poland.[22]

It is obvious that the drop in morale in the German Foreign Service in 1934, noted by Mr. Craig, was not inspired by the advent of Ribbentrop, but by the much more cogent reason of Germany's diplomatic isolation at the

[20]It is impossible to imagine any Government servant in a state where the bureaucracy were not educated to ignore and despise the political leadership using language towards the political leader of the State, such as that Nadolny is reported to have used to Hitler. Cf. R. Rahn, *Ruheloses Leben,* (Düsseldorf, 1950), pp. 83-84. Hilger was a more placid account, apparently taken from a personal letter of Nadolny's. Hilger and Meyer, p.266.

[21]"And I will do the opposite," *Polish White Book,* Document No. 15, Memorandum by Count Szembek of 31 January 1935.

[22]*U.S.F.R. 1933,* Vol. I, pp. 450-51, Dispatch of U. S. Chargé d'Affaires in Germany, of June 3, 1933.

end of 1933. It was in fact, some time before the diplomats could take Ribbentrop seriously. Their discontent with the position into which Hitler's new foreign policy had led them was increased by the serious and increasing internal strain in Germany which finally broke out in the Roehm putsch in June. Thus the complaints which Dieckhoff[23] voiced to Dodd, the American Ambassador, in May 1934, centred on his discontent with Goebbels, the Jewish question and the growth of militarism in the country.[23a] And both Rahn and Blucher, visiting Berlin from their posts abroad, found their colleagues in a similar state.[24]

Nevertheless, in spite of the evidence that the Foreign Ministry was not being allowed to pursue the policy it had pursued in the pre-Hitlerian era, it is not safe to swallow the picture of the powerlessness and ignorance prevailing in the Foreign Ministry advanced by those of its members who stood in the Foreign Ministry advanced by those of its members who stood trial on war crime charges, after the war.[25] The most vociferous of these was Ernst von Weizsäcker who occupied the position of State Secretary under Ribbentrop from 1938-42, a position equivalent to that of the permanent head of the Foreign Office in Great Britain, without the restraint on his influence exercised in that country by the existence and activity of Parliament. According to these men and their sympathizers, the record of the leadership in the German Foreign Service in these years is one of continuous withdrawals under Nazi pressure from the control of foreign policy, until by 1938, Ribbentrop's accession excluded them in effect, from all but routine diplomacy. Any attempt to pin responsibility for the trend or excesses of Nazi policy upon the professional diplomats is useless if this picture is accepted as true, since policy was the responsibility of the usurping Nazis. The diplomats had been reduced to the role of a "technical apparatus," by which policy was executed, and no influence on the formation of policy was allowed them.[26]

This version of the undoubted winning of control by the Nazis over the personnel and policy of the German Foreign Service is based on several false and misleading assumptions. In the first place, it assumes both a period when the influence of the Foreign Service overrode that of all other governmental offices concerned in the formulation of foreign policy, and continuity in the leadership exerting that influence throughout the entire period. But the problems confronting Germany's rulers before Hitler's advent included Reparations, armaments, and the secret field of relations with Russia. Is it to be believed that the influence of the Reichbank and the

[23]Hans Heinz Dieckhoff. Director of Overseas Department in German Foreign Ministry, 1930-1936, Director of Political Department 1936-37. Ambassador in U. S. A. 1937-38. recalled 1938. Ambassador on Special Assignment 1938-43. Ambassador in Spain, 1943-45.

[23a]*Ambassador Dodd's Diary.* (London, 1941) Entry of May 24, 1934.

[24]Rahn, pp. 118-119. von Blucher, W., *Gesandter zwischen diktatur und Demokratie.*

[25]Extracts from these trials have been published in *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10* (Nuremberg, N. D.), Vols. XII-XIV, Case XI. U. S. v. von Weizaecker et alios. See also Ernst von Weizsaecker, *Errinerungen,* (Munich, 1950).

[26]This is the particular burden of Kordt's and Dirksen's memoirs.

Ministry of Economics never interfered with or overrode the advice of the Foreign Ministry on the first issue, or the Reichswehr that of the Foreign eign Service ever enjoyed the paramouncy in the field of foreign policy, even under the Cabinets of experts who ruled Germany in the last three years before Hitler's accession, which its junior protagonists would now have us believe. Further there was, in the first five years after Hitler's accession, a turn-over of about 75% in the leadership of the Foreign Service. If one assumes this leadership to have been composed of the heads of departments at home and the principal ambassadors abroad, one is left with the figure of ten ambassadors, six heads of departments and the State Secretary. By 1936, six of these had resigned or been dismissed, and three were dead. Another two went in 1938, with the Foreign Minister himself, and two more not allowed to return from their annual leaves in August 1939. One more died in 1941. The three remaining men, Ritter, head of the economic section, Gaus, head of the legal division, and Dieckhoff, served under Ribbentrop to the end, the first two in positions of such influence that Ritter was made to stand trial at Nüremberg, and Gaus to act as one of the principal witnesses against him.[27] Of all these, however, it should be noted that only three, Hassell, Trautmann and Nadolny can be said to have lost their positions over a direct conffict with their superiors.[28]

The Foreign Service's objections to the intervention of the new Nazi officies in the field of foreign policy appear to have rested on three heads. In the first place, there were objections of casts and professional snobbery.[28a]

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[27]This estimate is made up as follows:
(a) Ambassadors:
Hoesch. d. 1936. (London
Koster. d. 1936. (Paris)
Prittwitz. (Washington) Resigned 1933.
Voretsch. (Tokyo) Retired 1933.
Nadolny. (Moscow) Dismissed 1934.
Hassell. (Rome) Dismissed 1938.
Trautmann (Nanking) Recalled 1938. Not re-employed.
Moltke. (Warsaw) Not allowed to return to Warsaw Aug. 1939. Employed in Foreign Ministry until death in 1941.
Dirksen (Moscow, Tokyo and London) Not allowed to return to posts in August 1939
Welczeck (Madrid, Paris) Not re-employed.
(b) State Secretary Bülow. d. 1936.
(c) Directors of Departments in Foreign Ministry.
von Grönau. Retired 1933.
Koepke. Dismissed under Nuremberg Racial Laws. 1936.
Meyer.
Dieckhoff. Promoted Ambassador in Washington and Madrid.
Ritter. Promoted Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro 1938. Thereafter on special duties.
Gaus. Promoted Understate Secretary 1939. Ambassador on special duties 1943.

[28]Hassell was dismissed for his opposition to the Anti-Comintern Pact and through Ciano's dislike of him; Trautmann recalled for his resistance to the policy of backing Japan in the Far East; Nadolny dismissed on his opposition to Hitler's eastern policy.

[28a]The most continuous intervention from the Nazi leadership came from Goering, but the diplomats never speak of him with anything but respect. But then he was an officer in the Imperial Army, and a holder of the Pour leMérite.

Then, the new offices had no clearly defined competencies to distinguish one from the other, and served more as instruments to advance their leaders as and when opportunity offered. Thirdly, while, as has been argued above, the intervention of non-diplomats and non-diplomatic considerations into the field of foreign affairs was no newer in Germany, than in other countries, the behaviour and fields of intervention of the new Nazi offices were unpredictable, and the strength of their influence and position with Hitler only to be ascertained by trial. Thus Rosenberg's attempt to improve Anglo-German relations in May 1933 by a personal visit to London was a ridiculous failure. But the attempt in 1934 by his Foreign Trade Office to reverse German Foreign policy in the far east and secure a dominant trading position in Manchukuo in return for German recognition of this newly created state, cost the Foreign Service long and weary efforts to subdue and broke mainly on the unsavoury character and methods of their representative in the Far East, Ferdinand Heye.[29] The case of the so-called *Auslandsorganisation* of the Nazi Party, (AO), is a rather different one. That this office was the brain behind the organization of German "Fifth Column" activities is one of the great exploded myths of war propaganda. Mr. Craig, however, buttressed by such dubious sources as *The Nazi Conspiracy in Spain,* (by the Editor of the *Brown Book of the Hitler Terror*), still subscribes to it, regarding its biggest success as the inspiration of the revolt of the Spanish generals in July 1936. The AO was in fact a Party organization pure and simple, with the job of controlling and supervising local party organizations abroad, on the same lines as the supervision and control of the party exercised by the individual Gauleiters within Germany. Its greatest handicap lay in its inability for obvious legal and geographical reasons to discipline its local leadership, which was mostly drawn from the hot-headed freebooter, Otto Strasser, Roehm type purged in Germany in 1934, if not before. Its activities were an obvious target for local anti-Nazis, especially in those countries of the New World which aimed at assimilating their national minorities, and its existence certainly placed German foreign relations under a new and unprecedented kind of strain. But in the context of Nazi offices intervening in foreign affairs it is not very important.

The special position it occupied in Spain was, as can be traced in the published German diplomatic documents,[30] the result of the opportunism and speed of action of Bernhardt, a German businessman resident in Morocco, and Langenheim, the local AO leader. The Spanish Nationalists approached Hitler for aid and support through several other channels besides these men; Canaris, the Head of the Army Intelligence, the German Military attache in Lisbon, the German Consul in Seville, the German Airplane Industry's representative in Portugal, and the German Embassy in Paris were all involved. Count Welczeck, the German Ambassador in Paris

[29]For details see Dirksen. pp. 156-57. See also Rosenberg's complaints to Hitler on this incident in *Nuremberg Documents,* No. 003-PS—his short report of Oct. 1935 on the activities of the APA.

[30]*Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-45,* Series D, Vol. III.

had served previously in Madrid and was persona grata to the Spanish Right. The German Embassy was for some time the main channel of German contact with the Nationalist forces in Aragon and Northern Spain. Of all these, Bernhardt was the quickest off the mark; pushing ahead even of Langenheim; and the dominating position the AO earned in German trade with Nationalist Spain was the result of his own efforts, and had nothing to do with the role for which the AO was designed or which it fulfilled towards other countries.

It is the years of the Spanish Civil war which mark the first real decay in the Foreign Ministry's influence. In the first two of these years, 1936-37, Ribbentrop was in comparative eclipse. Mr. Craig makes much of the right enjoyed by both Ribbentrop and Papen to report direct to Hitler, as indicating the exclusion of the Foreign Ministry from two vital fields of German foreign Policy. This was nothing new in the practice of the German Foreign Ministry. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the German Ambassador in Moscow from 1922-28, only accepted his post on condition that he should be subordinate to, and report direct to the Reichs President only.[30a] In fact, the only evidence that the Foreign Ministry was excluded from German relations with Austria comes from Papen himself, and must be regarded with the gravest of suspicion. In Anglo-German relations, Ribbentrop left much of the work of the German Embassy in London to Woermann, his Counsellor. The only major move in this field in 1937, Halifax's visit to Hitler was the occasion of a complaint from Ribbentrop, that he had not been informed of the topics discussed.[31] Only one of the major invasions of the Foreign Ministry's prerogatives in this period, the signature of the Anti-Comintern pact came from Ribbentrop. The setting up of the organization of the Four-Year Plan under Goering, giving him powers of co-ordination and direction over all other Ministries, is of much greater importance, and the Foreign Ministry apparently had no representative at the meetings of German Civil Servants by which this organization was erected.[32] In the constant to-and-from of European statesmen and the gradual substitution of personal contact between politicians for diplomacy, which filled the years up to August 1939, Goering was one of the most assiduous of travellers, and an excellent, if unusual host. When Ribbentrop attempted to end the German Army's deliveries of arms to Chiang Kai-Shek in October 1937, it was Goering who ordered the cessation of deliveries, as it was Goering who ordered their secret resumption two days later.[33] Goering controlled the German end of Bernhardt's organization in Spain, and the delivery of arms to Franco. Goering (and Keppler) conducted the annexation of Austria,

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[30a]Hilger and Meyer, pp. 43.94.

[31]*D.G.F.P.*, Series D, Vol. I, No. 32, London Tel. 704 of Nov. 22, 1937.

[32]Protocols of these meetings are published in *Trials of the War Criminals*, Case XI, Vol. XII. Too much should not be made of this absence, which does not imply that Goering excluded Foreign Ministry officials deliberately, but only that for lack of participation, the Foreign Ministry had no direct share in the direction of the 4 Year Plan.

[33]*D.G.F.P.* Seres D, Vol. I, Nos. 499, 500, 504. Mackensen and Heyden-Rynsch Memoranda of Oct. 19, Heyden-Rynsch Memorandum of Oct. 22, 1937.

even after Ribbentrop's appointment as Foreign Minister, maintained friendly relations with Poland and Jugoslavia through the "hunting" interests, and played through his representative, Wohltat, an active part in the economic subjection of Eastern Europe. Compared with this massive intervention, the fact that the head of the AO, Bohle, remained subordinate to Hess even after he and his office had been incorporated into the Foreign Ministry is of minor importance. It was Goering and not Hess who in June and July 1938 urged Hungary to attack Czechoslovakia in the event of a German-Czech conflict, and Ribbentrop's hopes of success in the event of Britain and France supporting Czechoslovakia, were obviously buttressed on information from Goering.[34] The beginning of the Four-Year plan marked the beginning of Hitler's preparation for war. Pressure was resumed on Austria, the Spanish Civil War was eagerly utilized to distract French and British attention away from central Europe. Neurath's and the Army's unenthusiastic reception of Hitler's plans for war, as outlined in the Hossbach meeting of November 1937 determined him to replace them with a more sympathetic leadership. The removal of Blomberg and Fritsch, the recall of Hassell and the replacement of Neurath by Ribbentrop effectively broke the power of both Army and Foreign Ministry. What remained to the members of the German Foreign Service was the winning of influence on their new master.

It is from this point onwards, that the complaints of the German diplomats against the Nazi leadership ring weakest. Weizsäcker's charge, made at his trial, that the Foreign Ministry had been reduced to the role of a "technical apparatus" is quoted by Mr. Craig. But Weizsäcker advanced this defense only in his opening speech, at an early stage in his trial, being obviously very greatly alarmed by the execution of Ribbentrop on similar charges. At later stages in his trial, his defense differed considerably from this picture, in emphasizing all the various moves Weizsäcker had been able to undertake to soften or turn the edge of Ribbentrop's instructions. Actually by comparison with most foreign services out of Germany, the German Foreign Service had enjoyed an altogether unusual freedom of action, in that its head, Neurath, had himself been a career diplomat, trained in the traditions and practice of the Service, an expert technician rather than a politician. And both Neurath and Stresemann, his great predecessor, had operated with considerable freedom from the constraints of normal democratic domestic politics. Ribbentrop's appointment can be viewed as the formal re-establishment of control over the bureaucratic apparatus by the German political leadership. It is typical of Germany that the only German régime capable of regaining control of the bureaucracy should have been a system of plebiscitary dictatorship on the Nazi model, rather than a united democracy. But this regaining of control did have as its corollary the ending of a system in which the bureaucracy would as a matter of course act

[34]D.G.F.P., Series D, Vol. II, Nos. 248, and 284. For Ribbentrop's argument that Göring's air power should bring Germany victory in a war with England and France, see *ibid.*, No. 304.

behind the backs of its political leadership. From a purely constitutional standpoint the picture of a minister negotiating behind the backs of his officials, as Ribbentrop did with Japan, is infinitely preferable to that of a minister, with the connivance of his officials, negotiating behind the backs of his colleagues and the electorate from which he drew his power, as Stresemann and the German Army leaders did with Russia. Ribbentrop was at least answerable for his actions to the fount of political power in Germany, the Führer. It is no new thing in the history of foreign offices that its members should have to carry through a policy they disagreed with.

Moreover, the State Secretary himself did have many opportunities for influencing Ribbentrop, and made no little use of them. Throughout the summer of 1938 he fought hard to substitute his own policy of measures designed to secure the "chemical dissolution" of Czechoslovakia for the plans Goering advocated of a direct military attack.[35] What part his efforts played in restraining the hotheads is difficult to tell; but the plan for a sudden attack was not carried out. Moreover, the suggestion that Chamberlain should make a direct approach to Hitler was originally inspired by Weizsäcker.[36] His judges pronounced him guilty on the charge of complicity in the march on Prague of March 1939, which brought the "chemical dissolution" to an end. He was successful in controlling the plans for a naval demonstration off Danzig in June 1939.[37] As the head of the German Foreign Service he had the same kind of influence on the formulation and execution of policy as the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in Britain, if not more. He could not resist direct orders, nor contradict explicit decisions. But in the formulation of such orders and decisions, he could advise and inform, tone down instructions, commit private indiscretions to foreign diplomats, and employ a whole range of channels to obstruct and manipulate the policy of his chief. His influence was weakened by Ribbentrop's possession of and reliance on sources of information from outside the Foreign Service, over which he could exercise no control. But there is little doubt that, as the judgment stated at his trial, "Weizsäcker was neither deceived nor misled concerning the programme (of Nazi aggression) although in certain instances he may not have been advised of the actually scheduled time-table."

If Weizsäcker, whom Ribbentrop distrusted, had these opportunities of influencing Ribbentrop, Ritter and Gaus, who were given his confidence and taken into his personal entourage, had many more. Mr. Craig accepts the picture painted by Kordt and others, of Ribbentrop as a nincompoop, and his personal staff as a collection of power-hungry self-seekers. In this, misled perhaps by the pitiable display Ribbentrop made at Nürnberg,[38]

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[35]*D.G.F.P.*, Series D, Vol. II. Nos. 259, 288, 304, 329, 331, 374, and 409. The phrase is Weizsaecker's own, See No. 304.

[36]Cf. *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, Third Series, Vol. II, No. 775, and Appendix IV, No. (iv), and p.690, f.n.3.

[37]Details in *Trials of the War Criminals*, Case XI, Vol. XIV, pp. 556-57.

[38]Craig quotes several times from the diary of the U. S. Army psychologist in whose care the 21 major War Criminals were placed during their trial, G. M. Gilbert, *Nuremberg Diary*, (New York, 1947), an interesting collection of reminiscences and anecdotes told by

RELIGIOUS PERSECUTIONS IN CAPTIVE ROMANIA

by Raoul Bossy

ROMANIA has a record of twenty centuries of turbulent and dramatic history. She has been the victim of many invasions and the scene of numerous migrations. Her people have waged countless battles to preserve their individual character and their freedom. They have often been compelled to yield to the thrust of mightier powers and to submit to foreign rule. The only misfortunes they were spared in their tragic past were religious wars and persecutions.

The overwhelming majority of Romanians belong to the Eastern or Greek Orthodox Church, which is strongly national and has always been the official Church of the State. But many Transylvanian Romanians are Uniates or Greek Catholics, that is, Catholics of the Byzantine rite. Members of the Roman Catholic Church in Romania belong mostly to the German and Hungarian minorities. There are also important Protestant communities, such as Lutherans (mostly Transylvanian Saxons), Calvinists or Presbyterians (among the Hungarians and Szeklers), Baptists, Adventists, Evangelists and Pentecostal Christians, as well as the other Christian and non-Christian denominations, Armenians, Jews, Moslems. The greatest freedom and autonomy was always enjoyed by all these different creeds in a country in which religious matters were never involved in political platforms nor caused controversies in a basically tolerant population. The Orthodox Church of the majority and the Uniate Church, with its considerable following in Transylvania, worked harmoniously along parallel lines, the latter forming a link between Orthodox and Catholics. The Protestant Churches have at all times benefited by the same liberty and so have all other faiths. Even under Nazi duress, there was no interference with the free exercise of the Jewish faith.

It was left to the Communist régime in Romania to sow the germs of this new and hitherto unknown plague, religious persecution. "Dialectic materialism," which the Communists boast is at the root of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, cannot tolerate the co-existence of spiritual life, impenetrable to the party's guidance or control. This last bastion of individual freedom, this one and only defense against the state's impact and constraint, must therefore be suppressed. A methodical and relentless struggle is being pursued by the Communist administration in Romania, after a pattern followed in all captive countries under the Soviet yoke, against all Churches alike, whether Christian, Moslem or Jewish. Our endeavor, in the following analysis, will be to demonstrate this equality of ill-treatment to which all denominations are subjected in the "Romanian People's Republic" and the particular tactics used for the subjection of each.

Persecutions against the Orthodox Church

The Communist régime in Romania, following Soviet policies, planned

the total subjugation of the Eastern Orthodox Church by converting the clergy into a tool of the administration. In this field, as in others, it proceeded systematically, in accordance with previously well-laid plans.

The first concern of the Communist government was to secure the compliance of the entire Orthodox clergy, from the highest prelate to the most humble village curate. It was hoped that the prestige of the Church might thus be used on behalf of the government's aims without resorting, if possible, to spectacular legislative measures that could not fail to dismay public opinion.

A first step in this direction was an appeal addressed to the clergy, inviting them to adhere politically to the new dispensation. The "Union of Democratic Priests," set up on governmental initiative, failed to gain much of a following, however, in spite of high-sounding promises and the presence of one of the principal promoters of the organization, Rev. Burducea (a former member of the fascist "Iron Guard," now a refugee abroad), as Minister of Cults in the Groza administration. In fact, the clergy as a whole, showed a marked aloofness to political blandishments.

Faced with the fruitlessness of their action, with the dismal failure of their efforts to eradicate religion, as well as with the growing reluctance of clergymen to let themselves be involved in political maneuvers, the authorities decided to take direct steps, curbing resistance by the most drastic means. A way had to be found to get rid of even the highest prelates.

The initial phase was marked by mass purges of the Orthodox hierarchy and priesthood, similar to the purges carried out in all other groups (army, civil servants, teachers, and so on). At first, investigations were started against some, obliging the victims to resign their pastorates, as was the case with Archbishop Irineu Mihălcescu, Metropolitan of Moldavia, and with Bishop Parthenius Ciopron, head of the army chaplains, who ranked as a general, the latter being assigned an enforced domicile at the Neamtz Monastery. At the same time, 115 army chaplains were also compelled to tender their resignations. Later, three archbishops appear to have been disposed of in a somewhat mysterious way: Patriarch Nicodemus, the above mentioned Metropolitan Irineu Mihălcescu of Moldavia, and Bishop Grigore Leu of Roman all died suddenly at short intervals, after having openly resisted the government. Thirteen bishops and archbishops were deprived of their sees and were finally arrested or kept under police custody. The Rt. Rev. Policarp Moruşcă, Bishop of the Romanian Orthodox of the United States and Canada, was prevented from returning to his diocese in Cleveland, Ohio, kept under custody in Craiva (near Alba-Julia) and now, it is believed, is imprisoned. The administration then proceeded to fill the vacant key positions with apparently sure and devoted elements, thus securing control of ecclesiastical leadership.

Purges were also carried out all along the line of clergymen reaching down to curates in the remotest hamlets. A special concentration camp was set up in the vicinity of Ploeşti for Orthodox priests, ousted from their parishes for their refusal to cooperate with the Communist régime. Some

500 priests have already been interned. Sometimes liquidation of resisting clergymen takes a more serious turn. One instance is that of Father Chirilă, the parson of Crăsnăşeni (district of Fălciu), who was arrested on the night of July 18, 1952, and has disappeared without trace.

The second phase was marked by the introduction of a new legal régime, which gave the Romanian Orthodox Church the modified standing that tallied with Communist interests. It was initiated in March 1947 with two bills submitted to parliament by the current Minister of Cults, Radu Roşculetz (a member of the Liberal dissident group under the leadership of George Tătărescu), one of which concerned the pensioning of priests, the other a redistribution of sees and new rules for the episcopal conventions.

The first became law (No. 166/1947) without delay. It provided an age limit of seventy years for all clergy. Exceptions might be made, upon proposal from the Minister of Cults, in favor of such prelates as "have had an exceptional activity." Clearly, this provision gave the government a free hand to suppress, with a show of legality, any resistance in high places. And indeed the Metropolitan of Oltenia, the Rt. Rev. Nifon Criveanu, the Bishop of Roman, The Rt. Rev. Lucian Triteanu, the Bishop of the Lower Danube, the Rt. Rev. Cosma Petrovici, and Bishop Gheronte, of Constantza, were dismissed almost immediately and eventually interned in 1947.

Then, in view of episcopal and metropolitan elections scheduled for November 1947, the second bill was carried through and put into effect. Up until then episcopal assemblies had been constituted of delegates elected by the parishioners for a three-year period. Now, under the terms of the new law, these assemblies were to consist of a *dejure* majority, for they had to include members of parliament, ministers of state and under-secretaries belonging to the diocese. Thus, both in these assemblies and in the National Church Congress, which likewise had to be comprised of members of parliament and of the government, the régime in effect obtained a free hand.

The significance of the episcopal elections was clearly underlined by the Communist press. *Universul* (Bucharest) of August 28, 1948, for instance, stated:

> The conduct of the country's destinies falling into the hands of the party of the working class and of the democratic parties and organizations, special attention was given to the renewal of the upper hierarchy of the Church, in the elections that took place in November 1947.

In this way, key positions were entrusted to mere tools of the administration who were quite unknown to the clergy and their congregations.

New rules were provided for the general régime of cults in the decree issued by the Presidium of the National Assembly of the Romanian People's Republic, published in the Official Bulletin (*Monitorul Oficial*) of August 4, 1948, and which affected all Churches alike. The new law, although asserting from the very outset that it "guarantees freedom of conscience and religion" (Article 1), in fact goes on to curtail drastically manifestations of

this freedom, striking at the Church's organization, abolishing its traditional influence on education and subjecting its activities to a rigorous administrative and police supervision. Though the Orthodox faith is practiced by the overwhelming majority of Romanians and has deep roots in the spiritual life of the people, this Church has had to suffer the same limitations and controls as the other denominations in its executive management and functions. Article 22, which provided that "for the creation and functioning of dioceses an average of 750,000 faithful shall be reckoned for each such diocese," gave the government a legal basis for a new distribution of bishoprics. And, indeed, this measure was carried out by decree No. 244, published in the official Bulletin No. 217, of September 18, 1948, which abolished the Metropolitan See of Suceava and the Episcopal See of Maramuresh and replaced them by a single diocese: the Archbishopric of Suceava and Maramuresh. A second decree, published in the Official Bulletin of February 5, 1949, set forth the new bases for the "economic and administrative organization of the Orthodox cult," and, at the same time, proceeded to a redistribution of dioceses. As a result of these decrees, following a reshuffling of bishoprics, the Episcopal Sees of Huși (established in 1598), of Caransebesh, and of Maramuresh were in fact abolished. Finally, articles 58, 59 and 60 of the Law on Cults abolished the Military Episcopate of Alba-Julia (the central headquarters of army chaplains). Furthermore, this law set up in great detail a strict control over the entire activity of both hierarchy and clergy. Its provisions were to be put into effect by the Ministry of Cults and by local authorities.

This new organization could not, for obvious reasons, stop short of suppressing the educational role of the Orthodox Church. All its religious institutions for instruction were closed; namely: 2,300 elementary schools, 24 high schools, 8 chapters' schools, 13 theological seminaries, 1 academy of sacred music, 3 divinity schools, and their premises were put at the disposal of Communist organizations. Meanwhile, a way was sought to enforce the measures hitherto either ignored or passed over by the clergy. The former Vice-Premier, Vasile Luca, established "short-order schools for priests" in 1948 in Predeal, and in 1951 in Bucharest, where the students were selected exclusively from among trusted Communists. Owing to their political adherence and their very poor cultural background they are presumably receptive to any instruction imparted to them. They are taught that there is a common basis between the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the principles of the Church. Emphasis is laid not on indoctrination but on winning the goodwill of priests toward the régime. The Predeal school is under the direction of a theologian from Moscow, Bogomilov, whose lectures are in perfect accord with Communist ideals. The mission assigned to the graduates is to undermine religion from within the Church itself. It is reported that the first graduate of this new theological college, Mihail Avramescu, was immediately appointed to an important parish in Bucharest (Biserica Alba) in order to attract as many young priests as possible.

All hospitals belonging to the Orthodox Church were also taken over

by the state and are now being operated by Communists. Among them, the famous Brancoveneasa and Coltzea Hospitals in Bucharest, the St. Spiridion Hospital in Jassy and the Madona Dudu Hospital in Craiova.

By the suppression of four out of its eighteen dioceses, by the heavy blow struck at theological education, by the arrests of priests and their replacement with men devoted to the régime, the Orthodox Church was left in a sorry state. It is being gradually turned into an instrument of propaganda and, finally, into a mere tool of the administration's basic policy: the ultimate communization of the country. It seems logical to expect that the third phase which must necessarily follow will be marked by the endeavors of the Communist rulers to assign to the Orthodox Church a place similar to that which it holds in Soviet Russia.

Certain available indications allow the assumption that the official policy of the régime toward the Orthodox Church has entered a new and considerably harsher stage. Already in 1949 the Minister of Cults, Stanciu Stoian, saw fit to appoint a Communist worker named Dobrogan as personnel director of his department, emphasizing the significance of his choice as a necessary step in order to eradicate "the most reactionary spirit" of the clergy. At the opening of the courses of the University of Bucharest's Theological Institute on January 30, 1949, the official addresses stressed the Institute's main task as being to offer a new training and orientation, pastoral and social, to the younger generation of clergymen so as to guide them "in the service of the people and of peace." Special courses of missionary guidance were inaugurated which all priests were invited to attend. As *Universul* pointed out on February 26, 1949:

> The need for these courses has been felt lately, because a new and proper conduct of the clergy has become necessary in all directions in which popular democracy seeks to raise the masses of the people.

The innovation aroused grave concern and fear among the clergy, particularly since an examination had to be passed at the close of the courses, in order, as *Universul,* of the same day, put it, "to qualify and evaluate the graduates, so as to call some to higher posts and to reduce others to lower places." In an article entitled "Religious Liberties" the party's leading paper *Scânteia,* (Bucharest) of February 22, 1948, clearly indicated that

> the Romanian clergy has to follow the example of the Orthodox clergy in the Soviet Union, as the party of the working class cannot remain indifferent to the various prejudices and mystic views sowed in the ranks of the workers by the bourgeois landowning régime.

Efforts are being made meanwhile by the authorities to hinder religious life in every possible way. They strive by all means, for instance, to prevent parents from having their new-born children baptized. Taxes on funerals are increased if a religious service is included, so as to discourage families from providing Christian burials for their deceased. Children are taught in schools that crossing one's self is an act of superstition which must be avoid-

ed as an outmoded bourgeois practice. Christmas and Easter must no longer be celebrated. All stores are ordered to proceed with stock-taking and to draw up inventories during Christmas and Easter days, the operation requiring the constant presence of a party delegate who sees to it that employees are present. All plants and offices have to work throughout the Christmas season. An official announcement issued by the Ministry of Public Education on December 12, 1952, fixed the "winter vacation" for all schools from December 30 to January 11, thus wilfuly ignoring the Christian tradition of Christmas school holidays. Christmas trees are now called "winter trees." Some people avoid being seen in church, as records of attendance are often made and they fear consequences. Soldiers are ordered never to go to church and are not allowed to marry in church. In order to have the right to read Mass, rectors have to attend a three-months' course of "re-education," to belong to a clergy union and to parade with the members of his union on the Communist commemoration days of May 9, August 23, November 7, etc.

On June 23, 1949, the government instituted a "Society for the spreading of science and culture," which has branches in all the larger cities, with the main purpose of campaigning for atheism. All teaching staffs throughout the country have been instructed by the Ministry of Public Education to follow the advice of this organization in carrying out the anti-religious campaign. The campaign was launched in Bucharest, in January 1951 with a series of lectures on "The origin of man and the false story of the creation in the Bible." Travelling exhibitions were also organized with the purpose of "revealing scientifically" the history and development of the human race. At the National Sciences Museum in Bucharest, a special section has been opened to show the different stages of life, from the simple cell to the highest developed organism, its purpose being to invalidate the teachings of the Book of Genesis. The campaign is carried out in villages by the so-called "circles of general culture," thus named to conceal their real aim to the peasants, staunch in their Christian belief. All the propaganda material is imported from Soviet Russia.

None the less, in spite of persecutions systematically planned by the Communist administration, the mass of the Romanian people remain deeply religious. A spiritual rebirth is even noticeable among Orthodox congregations. Patriarch Justinian himself, though sponsored by the party, acknowledged, in his pastoral of February 27, 1949, the "religious thirst of the people." There can be no doubt that a very strong spiritual force inspires the resistance of the Orthodox clergy as a whole. Through Orthodox and other denominational channels abroad, it is learned that an intense underground movement is going on among the Romanian clergy and that Patriarch Justinian, notwithstanding his pro-Communist attitude, appears not to be hostile to this movement. This fact has also leaked out in a Roman Catholic periodical, *La Documentation Catholique*, (Paris) of July 29, 1951, which stated that Patriarch Justinian is currently under a cloud for having resisted demands of the Communist régime. The paper adds

that, though he seemed to start as a trusty tool of the present administration, the Patriarch has become suspect and has acquired, at the same time, a modicum of sympathy among the Orthodox clergy of Romania who had been deeply hostile to him in the beginning.

Whatever may be the truth of the matter, one thing appears certain: when Romania is liberated, the Orthodox Church, although weakened by persecution, will be one of the very few remaining pillars on which to rebuild the moral structure of the country.

Persecutions against the Uniate Church

Under Habsburg rule, part of the Romanian Orthodox clergy in Transylvania was tempted by promises of political advantage to join the Catholic Church, while maintaining the traditional Byzantine rite. They had, in fact, been given the assurance that Romanians would acquire the status of a fourth cohabitating nation of Transylvania (along with the Germans, Hungarians and Szeklers), a right hitherto denied to them, although they represented the majority of the population of the province. This, as well as the hope of securing the Vatican's protection against governmental encroachments on their autonomous life, induced delegates from a considerable number of Orthodox parishes to proclaim on October 24, 1698, the union of their communities with the See of Rome—hence the name of "Uniates" or "Greek Catholics"—and to recognize the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Pope. Unfortunately, of all the promises given to Uniates and of all the hopes they cherished, the only one to be actually realized was the privilege of opening Romanian schools. Nevertheless, after 250 years, the Uniate Church had taken deep roots among an important sector of the Romanian population of Transylvania, and many of its followers have played a prominent role in the cultural and political life of the country. According to the figures of 1938, there were some one and a half million Uniates in Romania, with 1725 Greek Catholic churches served by 1,594 priests, 34 canons and 75 prelates. On the strength of the Concordat, concluded on May 10, 1927, between the Kingdom of Romania and the Holy See, the Uniates had five dioceses (Fagaraş-Alba Julia, Gherla-Cluj, Oradia Mare, Lugoj, Maramuresh). They had also 143 religious houses, 377 educational institutes and 111 charitable and welfare institutions.

As an unhappy sentiment had always lingered among Romanians because of the religious breach in their unity, the Communists took advantage of this situation to seek to destroy the Uniate Church by cutting of its links with the Vatican and bringing it back into the bosom of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Hence the first Catholic group to become the target of Communist persecution in the Romanian People's Republic were the Uniates, and their union with the Roman See was branded as "anti-national and anti-historical."

The centennial of the meeting of the Field of Liberty, near Blaj, where Transylvanian Romanians of both denominations gathered on May 15, 1848, to demand the recognition of their rights as a nation, was considered

a favorable occasion to launch a formal appeal inviting all Greek Catholics to return to the Orthodox Church. The appeal said:

> Today when the Romanian People's Republic guarantees equal rights —political, cultural and religious—to all, no matter what their creed or race may be, to persist in the spiritual disunity which stemmed from the grave jeopardy in which the Romanians of Transylvania found themselves in 1700, means to desert the united front of the new destinies that our working people are creating for themselves in the dawn of the future.'

The appeal was renewed on June 6, 1948, the day when the new Patriarch Justinian Marina was enthroned. The newly elected Patriarch stated, stated in his address to the Uniate clergy:

> What separates us at this time? Nothing but the faithful submission you still give to Rome. Give back this loyalty to the Church of our nation, the Church of our forefathers and of yours . . . The widest prospects open before us and before our future activity, as soon as we no longer work in isolation . . .

These appeals were given the widest publicity, while the Uniate hierarchy, desirous to maintain its bonds with Rome, were prevented from arguing against these views and from openly submitting its own theses. At the same time, a method similar to that employed in the case of the Orthodox clergy was used: an attempt to replace the Uniate Church's personnel with members belonging to the parties of the government bloc, ready to follow the example of Galician Greek Catholics who, in April 1946, had decided to join the Russian Orthodox Church.

When the Rev. Ion Suciu, Vicar of the Blaj Metropolitan See, resorted to sermons and canonical visits in order to preach resistance in his diocese, an administrative decree suspended him from his office on September 3, 1948. He was later imprisoned to prevent him from getting in touch with his clerical subordinates. The canons Tamaian, Barbul and Ghilea, of Oradea, were arrested on the same grounds, and tortured by the police. Bishop Iuliu Hossu of Cluj, was confined to his house and thirty priests and laymen who attempted to call on him were jailed.

The authorities then distributed throughout Transylvania so-called "delegation" forms, to be signed in blank by members of the Greek Catholic clergy. These were to designate the names of two churchmen for each district who, though they might be unknown to the signatories themselves were to represent the latter at a meeting convened in Cluj on October 1, 1948, a meeting whose purpose was, as the document stated, "the return of the Greek Catholic Church to the Orthodox Church."

In order to obtain these blank signatures, the authorities are said to have resorted to acts ranging from promises of material advantages to direct threats. Numerous arrests followed. In the note of protest he handed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 2, 1948, the Apostolic Nuncio in Bucharest stated:

> The priests were in many instances brought by force into the offices of the state security police, intimidated, threatened with imprisonment, with separation from their families, with deportation and even with death. Those who resisted the initial acts of violence were thrown in underground cells, ill-treated, subjected to exhausting questioning, and finally set free only when, broken down by the inhuman treatment of their jailors, they consented to sign.

By these means as well as by promises of benefits to those who would comply with its wishes, the administration managed to get the signatures of 423 priests, who thus delegated 38 ecclesiastics, selected by the government, to represent them at the Cluj meeting.

Such was the situation when the Congress met in Cluj, on October 1, 1948, to decide the return of the Uniate clergy and faithful to the Orthodox Church. On that day, in the hall of the George Baritiu school in Cluj, 38 prelates, canons and priests, delegates of the more than 400 Greek Catholic churchmen of Transylvania, the Banat, Crişana and Maramuresh, met in order to pronounce upon and put into effect the transfer to the Orthodox Church. It is significant that the number of delegates (38) was the same as that of the archpriests (protopopes) who came together in Alba-Julia on October 7, 1698, to draw up the manifesto proclaiming the union with Rome.

> According to *Universul* of October 15, 1948, the Congress, after several hours taken up with the elucidation of the realities of the situation resolved unanimously and with great enthusiasm . . . the re-entry into the bosom of the Romanian Orthodox Church and the definite severance of the ties with Papal Rome.

Debates were presided over by Archpriest Trajan Balascu, who launched an appeal to all Greek Catholics in the country, out of which the following sentences may be quoted:

> Aware of the ways of destiny, which herald a shining future for our people, we have, trembling with divine awe, approached the issue of the imperious need to reclaim the spiritual unity of the Romanian nation . . . We, the undersigned, churchmen answerable before God and the conscience of our people, met together in divine spiritual concourse, upon this first day of October 1948 . . . and resolve and effect our return into the bosom of our mother, the Orthodox Church. With unlimited love for you, clerics and laymen of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church, we bessech you to follow our example, and we most earnestly urge you to do likewise in all confidence, thus showing yourselves to be true and worthy servants of the people and real sons of God.

There follow 423 signatures of Uniate priests who passed over to Orthodoxy.

On the following day, the delegation arrived in Bucharest and was met at the station by the clergy of the capital, headed by the higher dignitaries of the Patriarchate. They were accompanied to the patriarch by an imposing escort. After listening to the reading of the decisions taken in Cluj, the

Patriarch officially registered their rupture with Rome and drew up the following Synodal Act:

> Today, Sunday, October 3, in the year of the Redemption 1948, we, the members of the permanent Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church . . . have assembled . . . to receive in a solemn meeting the delegation of the 38 archpriests and priests of the Greek Catholic Uniate Church . . . The proclamation made on October 1, 1948, in Cluj by the same delegation, in the name of 430 Greek Catholic archpriests, priests and canons from Transylvania, the Banat, Crişana and Maramuresh was read, a proclamation by which the return of the Greek Catholic communities to the fold of the Romanian Orthodox Church and the breach of all relations with the Church of Rome was decided. . . . It is with unspeakable joy that we acknowledge this return and we order that all those who express the desire of returning to the fold of the Orthodox Church and of breaking their ties with the Church of Rome be also received in our Church . . .
>
> The delegates who signed the proclamation were: the Archpriests Trajan Belascu, Aurel Drumboiu, Nicolae Jangalau, the Priests P. Vascu, V. Moldovan, Z. Hentia, P. Madincea, Laurentiu Pop, I. Onişor, I. Christea, P. Pop, Z. Borzea, Alexandru Stupariu, E. Colceriu, S. Santoma, E. Mureşan, Cornel Cernescu, T. Ploscariu, I. Vatu, C. Puşcaşu, V. Trajan Pop, Mircea Filip, Cornel Pop, Roman Nemeş, V. Ienciu, Octavian Gherasim, Sabin Trutia, Vincent Toruţiu, A. Coman, G. Zagrai, I. Florea, I. Andraşiu, V. Negrea, V. Pleşug, Alexandru Farcaşiu, I. Pop, and D. Glodean.

On October 2, 1948, Mgr. Gerard Patrick O'Hara, Apostolic Nuncio in Bucharest, protested, by verbal note under No. 2130/1948, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs against these proceedings. The Ministry answered this note two days later, describing the Nuncio's protest as "an interference in the domestic affairs of the Romanian People's Republic and an attempt to attack freedom of religion" and stating that "it rejects the manifest calumnies contained in the note," adding that "these defamatory assertions are a new proof of the antagonistic attitude systematically adopted by the Apostolic Nunciaure toward the Romanian People's Republic and toward its reforms and realizations in the democratic fields." The reply further noted that "the Apostolic Nunciature, being but the diplomatic representative of Vatican City, cannot take upon itself to speak on behalf of the entire Christian world, as it does in its protest." Finally, after denouncing "the attempted blackmail contained in the threat that the alleged violations of religious freedom in the Romanian People's Republic will presently alienate the world's public opinion," the reply stressed that "this step is in line with the campaign carried on by imperialist circles and their agents against the democratic achievements of the Romanian People's Republic," and concluded: "The government rejects in the most definite manner the Nunciature's note . . . both as to its form and as to its contents, considering it constitutes an act of provocation against the Romanian State and people."

October 21, 1948, was appointed as the day for the celebration in Alba Julia of the reintegration of the Romanian Church of Transylvania. On that occasion a motion was voted wherein those present stated:

> Today . . . when two and a half centuries have elapsed since, on this very spot, in this old Romanian Belgrade (Alba-Julia), a part of our forefathers, deceived by fallacious promises, broke the religious union of Transylvania and joined the Pope of Rome, we, the people and clergy representing all the Greek Catholics of Transylvania, the Banat, Crișana and Maramuresh, united in this metropolis of Transylvania to solemnly celebrate the spiritual restoration of our people, with a clear conscience of our responsibilities toward history, our people and God, declare:
>
> (a) we break forever the ties—whatever their nature may be—with the Vatican and with the Rome of the Popes;
>
> (b) we unite ourselves, out of the depths of our souls, with the Romanian Orthodox Church, whose teachings of the faith and instructions of the canons we solemnly intend to follow;
>
> (c) we submit ourselves, with our whole filial devotion, to all the decisions of our Romanian Orthodox Church.
>
> Starting from today, all Romanians are united for all times in faith, united in the constant service of our people, in the faithful obedience to the precepts of the new life of our beloved RPR.
>
> We express our gratitude to the Presidium of the Romanian People's Republic and the government of the country for the liberty granted to all the sons of our people, a liberty thanks to which it was possible to restore the Romanian Church in her integrity.

It was also decided that, from now on, the Cathedral of the Holy Trinity in Alba-Julia would be named "Cathedral of the Unification of the Romanian Church of Transylvania." The ceremony ended with a speech by Dr. Coriolan Tatar, in the name of the former Uniate laymen.

Persecutions then started against those Uniates who did not want to follow the decisions taken in Cluj and Alba-Julia. Prelates opposed to the reintegration were arrested. Thus, during the night of October 27, 1948, Bishop Suciu was once again apprehended. The following night, Bishop Valerius Trajan Frențiu, of Oradea, together with his secretary, P. Foișor, was apprehended. Bishop Frențiu, an old man of 74, was seriously ill at that time. The arrest of other prelates followed shortly: Bishop Ion Bălan, of Lugoj, Julius Rațiu, Vicar of Timișoara, Curator Ladislaus Taglasiu, Archpriest Ion Doliman, of Arad, Canon Nicholas Branzeu, of Lugoj, and Rev. Joseph Verzog. At the same time, Bishop Hossu and the Rev. Aftenie were likewise arrested by the police, as well as Bishop Alexandru Russu soon thereafter. Most of these were held in the village of Dragoslavele. A total of some 600 arrests were made. One of them had a tragic end: Father Hieronimus Susman was surrounded by the police while preaching in the village of Asnip (in the vicinity of Aiud) and, as he attempted to escape, was shot down.

Uniate churches were, of course, handed to the Orthodox clergy and

Greek Catholic convents were closed, their precincts being ruthlessly evacuated. Such was the fate of the congregation of the Order of the Immaculate Virgin and of the Institute of the Assumptionist Fathers in Blaj, of the Institute of he Basilian Order in Bixad (in the district of Satu-Mare), of the Monastery of the Annunciation in Edera (district of Prahova), as well as of numerous other convents in Bucharest, Sibiu, Cluj, Aiud, Sovata, Beiuș, Oradea Nicula, Moiseiu, Prislop, Obreja, Drăgești, Decănești, Gruiulung, Juc, Sanislău.

Still later, the Bishops Julius Hossu, Alexandru Russu, Valerius Frențiu, Vasile Aftenie and Ioan Bălan were transferred from Dragoslave to the Orthodox Monastery of Căldărușani and eventually imprisoned. The last two died in prison in 1950.

In order to force the consent of the smaller ex-Uniate clergy the decision was made to pay the salaries only of Greek Catholic churchmen who embraced the Orthodox faith. Finally, in order to end the *de-jure* existence of the Uniate Church, the decree No. 358 of December 1, 1948, issued by the Presidium of the Great Assembly, declared null and void all dioceses, chapters and religious communities and institutions of the Greek Catholic Church (Article 1). The decree also provided (Article 2) that all properties pass immediately to the state, with the exception of parish buildings which were conceded to the now reunited Orthodox Church. Several ex-Uniate priests became eventually Orthodox Bishops (the Bishop of Roman, for instance, is a former Greek Orthodox archpriest).

Thus ended the Uniate Church in Romania, which the Habsburgs had hoped to use for their own purposes as had the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania as a means of assimilating the Romanians in the Maygar Kingdom, but which had frustrated these hopes thanks to its very distinctive vitality and its very nationalist and patriotic character.

Persecutions of the Roman Catholic Church

Striving to eliminate every organized resistance against its policies of indoctrinating the nation with Communist principles, the Romanian People's Republic, in accordance with Soviet methods, waged a relentless fight against the Roman Catholic Church. By its international character and its strong links with the Western world through Vatican channels, Catholicism certainly represents a real danger of "leakage" for a Communist state.

After having suppressed the Uniate or Greek Catholic Church by its reincorporation with the Romanian Orthodox Church in 1948, the Communist régime has directed its activities to transforming on a large scale the Catholic Church of Latin rite into a "national" Church, severing all ties with the Vatican.

The Roman Catholic Church in Romania numbers over one million followers, mostly belonging to the German and Hungarian minorities and living in Transylvania and the Banat. The Concordat concluded by Romania with the Holy See on May 10, 1927, established six dioceses for

this Church: Bucharest, Alba-Julia, Jassy, Oradea Mare, Satu-Mare and Timişoara. The Communist government abolished the Concordat on July 19, 1948, and issued, on August 3 of the same year, a decree entitled "General régime of Cults," which reduced the number of the Catholic dioceses to two: Bucharest and Alba-Julia, as 750,000 were henceforth required in order to constitute an Episcopal See. Moreover, during the following November, three bishops were pensioned and thus deprived of any office: Mgr. Alexandru Cisar of Bucharest, Mgr. Aaron Marton, of Alba-Julia, and Mgr. Ion Scheffler, of Satu-Mare. To the now vacant sees of Bucharest and Alba-Julia were appointed Mgr. Anton Durcovici, former Bishop in Jassy, and Mgr. Augustine Pacha, former Biship in Timişoara. The latter now had to supervise and administer 683 parishes with about 800 priests of the secular clergy and over 250 regular clergy (monks and nuns).

In June 1949 a series of arrests was made among Roman Catholic prelates: first Mgr. Durcovici, then Mgr. Marton and, eventually, Mgr. Cisar and Mgr. Scheffler. They were interned in Orăştie and Baia de Criş, in Transylvania. Mgr. Cisar died last year. The only one who was spared at first was 80 year old Mgr. Pacha, who was seriously ill. But, as soon as he had recovered and refused to comply with the government's request to form a "national" Romanian Catholic Church, he was arrested too, in September 1951, and condemned to 18 years of imprisonment. Thus, in less than two years, the whole Latin Episcopate had been suppressed.

After the elimination of the bishops, the Communist administration proceeded to concentrate its attack on the numerous Orders and Congregations of Latin rite, in order to undermine further the Catholic resistance. A decree on education, issued on August 3, 1948, deprived them of all their schools, and religious teaching was forbidden throughout the country. Then came the final blow when a decree of July 29, 1949, simply abolished them. Article 1 provided that:

> The formation and organization of Roman Catholic Orders and Congregations and of all institutions depending on them will no longer function within the territory of the Romanian People's Republic, whether as incorporated or unincorporated societies:
>
> (a) Congregation of the Brothers of the Christian Schools
> (b) Piarist's Order
> (c) Congregation of Our Lady of Sion
> (d) Congregation Sancta Maria
> (e) Order of Saint Ursula
> (f) Order of Saint Ursula of the Roman Union
> (g) Congregation of the Sisters of Our Lady
> (h) Order of the Misericordia
> (i) Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent of Paul
> (l) Congregation of the Poor Franciscan Sisters of the Holy Family
> (m) Congregation of the Sisters
> (n) Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of St. Francis of Assisi

(o) Congregation of the Social Sisters
(p) Congregation of the Franciscan Sisters of the Lily
(q) Congregation of the Benedictine Sisters of S. Lioba.

The next morning, the superior of each of the monasteries received a telegram requesting him to attend a meeting at the Ministry of Cults on August 3, 1949. As soon as they assembled, the Minister, Stoian Stanciu, declared that the decree was irrevocable and that, should any opposition or resistance be met, police forces would be used in order to enforce its provisions.

On August 30, 1949, an order was issued by which all monasteries and converts were to be completely evacuated before midnight. Police agents, headed by one Clement Frimu, were charged with the speedy execution of this order. They invaded the precincts of monasteries and molested the inmates, preventing them from removing their belongings and permitting them to take with them only one change of clothing. All religious convents and institutions were thus closed and evacuated, their premises being turned over to the Communist authorities.

On the morning of April 27, 1950, the administration convened a large assembly at Târgul-Muresh, to be attended by a great number of Catholic priests and laymen, members of the parish councils of the dioceses of the Latin rite, as well as by a certain number of Orthodox headed by Professor Petre Constantinescu-Iași. They were asked, all of them, to sign the Stockholm appeal for peace and to agree to work for "the enrollment of the Roman Catholic Church of Romania within the Romanian People's Republic." The pressure on them was so great that a considerable number of them finally gave in and registered with the so-called "Catholic Committee for Action," whose task was to collect signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal and to advocate the placing of the Catholic Church of Romania in the framework of the Romanian People's Republic. The principal supporter of this committee was Andrei Agota, whose pro-Communist statements impressed all present. As a result, this Catholic priest was suspended *ex divinis* by the Holy See and eventually excommunicated. On the other hand, Mgr. Boga, Vicar of the Catholic diocese of Alba-Julia, considered to be the head of the Catholic hierarchy in the absence of any bishop, definitely rejected the proposal made to him to endorse the decisions taken at the Târgul- Muresh Congress. He was immediately arrested, together with his secretary, on May 12, 1950. Mgr. Glaser, administrator of the now suppressed Jassy diocese, not only adopted the same attitude but even ordered all his subordinate priests to read publicly in their churches on Ascension Day (May 18) a pastoral of his, in which he branded the Târgul-Muresh Congress as a purely Communist action and strictly prohibited any Catholic from adhering to it. Nobody, he added, should put his name on the Communist appeal forged in Stockholm. The police succeeded in preventing this pastoral from being read in several parishes. A curate in Bacau, who had followed the orders of his ecclesiastical superior and actually read the pastoral, was arrested on the spot. As for Mgr. Glaser, he was arrested and brutally tortured. He died of heart failure on May 25, 1950, and his corpse disappeared, apparently to forestall a religious funeral.

Having thus got rid of the main opponents to the decisions taken at the Târgul-Muresh Congress, the Communist régime considered now the "Catholic Committee for Action" as the qualified representative of the Roman Catholic Church in Romania and entered into negotiations with a view toward drafting a new "Statute for the Organization, Direction and Functioning of the Roman Catholic Cult in the Romanian People's Republic," on the lines pre-established by the government and the "progressive priests." The text submitted for approval on July 4, 1950, contained the following significant articles:

> Article 2: The Roman Pontiff is the supreme ecclesiastical authority in all matters concerning faith, morals, dogmas and spiritual jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Cult. In regard to all other matters, the Roman Catholic Church of the Romanian People's Republic is self-governing, subject to the country's laws and to the rights of the State.
>
> Article 5: The establishment, modification and suppression of dioceses are effectuated by the Church in accordance with the laws of the country.
>
> Article 9: The head of the Roman Catholic Church in the Romanian People's Republic is the Archbishop of Bucharest, who is the Metropolitan of the country's Roman Catholic Church.
>
> Article 13: The right to appoint the Metropolitan and the Bishop belongs to the Holy See, but only on the proposal forwarded by the Roman Catholic Church of the Romanian People's Republic, after approval by the government.
>
> Article 14: Before taking over their office, the archbishop and bishop will have to take an oath of loyalty to the Romanian People's Republic.
>
> Article 31: Within the sphere of their spiritual activities, the bishops will appeal to the parsons—and they, in turn, will request their congregations—to respect the prerogatives of the State . . . and to make their contribution to the rebirth of the country and the lifting of the standard of living of the people, etc.

The last article (39) stated that, for all important and vital matters included in the Statute, the approval of the government was indispensable. Furthermore, the decree approving the statute established that the Catholic hierarchy could have relations with the Holy See only through the channels of the Ministry of Cults and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus preventing any direct communication with the Vatican.

The Catholic Committee for Action published a manifesto on July 28, 1950, advocating the acceptance of the Statute by all Catholics and charging the heads of the Church with opposition to the "legal order" and with being the "accomplices of the Anglo-Saxons, the real enemies of peace." As this document did not produce the results expected by the Committee, they decided to convene a new congress, larger than the first one, in Gheorgheni, Transylvania, to which were invited "all peace-loving priests and laymen." The congress was held on September 6, 1950, and 120 priests and 150 laymen were present. The meeting was presided over by the ex-

communicated Catholic priest Andrei Agotha, chairman of the Committee. They voted a final motion which expressed the wish to establish legal relations between State and Church, thus cooperating for the setting up of peace and social progress, and thanked the government for its goodwill. Another general congress was requested in order to emphasize the acceptance of the Statute by the Romanian Catholic Church. "The realization of ecclesiastical autonomy," it concluded, "will forestall any attempt at foreign interference with the Church's management, aiming at using it as a tool in the hands of the warmongers."

Priests were found who, disobeying the orders of the Catholic hierarchy, favored the Communist régime's policy, and put themselves at its disposal for the implementation of its scheme. Thus, a group of so-called "progressive" Catholic priests signed a message directed to the Permanent Committee of the Romanian People's Republic for the Defense of Peace, in which they voiced their agreement with the decisions taken by the World Congress for Peace at Warsaw. It read as follows:

> The Roman Catholic clergy, united with all Christians, animated by the sacred ideals of peace, agrees wholeheartedly with the steps taken at the World Congress of Peace held in Warsaw, joins with the Christian initiative of the other denominations in the Romanian People's Republic and gives its enthusiastic support to the law for peace recently voted by the Great National Assembly of the Romanian People's Republic. The Catholic Committee for Action invites with Christian fervor all priests and faithful of our beloved country to follow the same way as all other cults . . .

Then, on March 15, 1951, following a vast propaganda campaign launched by the Catholic Committee for Action in all main Catholic centers of the country and reaching its peak in the regional assemblies held in Timişoara, Oradea, Târgul-Muresh, Braşov and Bucharest, a conclusive congress took place in Cluj. The 224 attendants, priests as well as laymen, were to represent the 601 Roman Catholic parishes of Romania, whose elected delegates they were supposed to be. After Mass was read by Mgr. Joseph Pop, a mitred abbot, Father Gregory Fodor, chairman of the congress, gave an opening speech in which he made the following statement regarding collaboration between the Church and State:

> . . . We, the priests and the faithful of Romania cannot remain behind the Catholics of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, who have succeeded in finding the right way for an harmonious collaboration between the Church and the State, a collaboration which serves the sacred cause of peace . . . Those which use the name of the Church for dishonest purposes of political reaction cannot be considered true representatives of the Romanian Roman-Catholic Church.

Other speakers took the floor, among them the excommunicated Roman Catholic priest Andrei Agotha, who did not miss this opportunity to protest loudly against the policies of the "bloodthirsty American imperialists"

and to extoll the pacific activities of the World Peace Council; and Mihai Kulcsar, also a Roman Catholic priest, who expressed "the ardent wish of all honest priests to reach an understanding with the State." The final resolution ran as follows:

> "The Roman-Catholic Statute [General Assembly] of the Romanian People's Republic expresses its gratitude to the Government of the Romanian People's Republic, who has granted them, with magnanimous benevolence, the privilege of continuing their secular activities, and this at the very moment when the enemies of peace are trying by all means to provoke a new world war, far more terrible than any of those we had to bear up under in the past, and while the working people of our country are making the utmost effort and practicing self-denial in order to build up a future of peace, well-being, progress and social justice for all honest men and women . . . We greet with joy the decision taken by the World Peace Council . . . The Statute's General Assembly is sincerely convinced it is serving the cause of peace by enabling the Roman-Catholic Church of the Romanian People's Republic to incorporate itself within the legal order of the country . . . The Assembly states therefore that the real interests of peace and of our Church compel us to cooperate in view of the setting up of a social order which would establish peace, well-being, cultural progress and brotherhood among the working people . . . For this purpose, the Statute's General Assembly, in accordance with its ancient rights, entrusts the Executive Council with the holy mission of proceeding without delay to incorporate the Catholic Church within the legal order of the State, thus fulfilling the ardent wish of all peace-loving Roman Catholics of our country.

Following approval of this final resolution, the Assembly elected a permanent executive council of 24 members (14 priests and 10 laymen), headed by Father Gregory Fodor and Dr. Joseph Delner. These drafted the following declaration, to be signed by all Roman Catholic priests:

> . . . We ask to be allowed to collaborate with the authorities of the Romanian People's Republic in accordance with the principles laid out in the project for the organization, direction and functioning of the Roman Catholic Church in the Romanian People's Republic and in accordance also with the Status Catholicus Transilvaniae . . .

As a means of winning the adherence of as many Catholic priests as possible, the government acted very generously towards those who signed the above mentioned declaration: they were paid a good salary and even received subsidies for the repair of their churches. The opponents faced arrests and trials. All key posts in the hierarchy were entrusted to ecclesiastics considered as favorable to the régime.

Thus, on April 5, 1951, Canon Trajan Iovanelli was appointed Vicar Capitular of the Bucharest Roman Catholic diocese, to replace the arrested Mgr. Schubert. On June 3 the Vatican declared that this appointment was considered as not valid and threatened to excommunicate the prelate for accepting it. Mgr. Andrei Horn-Despina was appointed chancellor of the

same diocese and, eventually, was also excommunicated by the Vatican. Other ecclesiastics who received dignities from the Communist government were Andrei Agotha, Gregory Fodor, Joseph Torog, Mihai Kulcsar and Mitred Abbot Joseph Pop.

Among the resistant priests who had to suffer persecutions because of their refusal to serve the régime were Stefan Tataru, Matei Ghiuzan Dimitrie Pascal, Iosif Duman. They were all arrested together with Hildebrand Frollo, president of the men's section of the Catholic Action. Other arrests followed: in February 1951, Mgr. Boros and Schubert, vicars of Timişoara and Bucharest, Rev. Waltner, Heber and Schwartz, all from Timişoara; on March 8, 1951, Father Clemente Gatti, parson of the Italian Church in Bucharest; on March 10, 1951, the curates Petz, Clofanda, Vamosin, Bachmeyer, Mihoc, from the Jassy diocese, Maghiar, Borz, from the Oradea diocese; Imre Samdar, Czumbel, Bela Gajdaczi, from the Alba Julia diocese; on April 24, 1951, three nuns: Mother Superior Hildegarde and Sisters Judith and Christina; on May 11, 1951, Rev. Baltheiser from Bucharest. Most of these were tried, together with Bishop Augustine Pacha, in August 1951, convicted of "spying in favor of the Vatican and of U.S.A. and of having attempted to set up a Christian Social party in order to overthrow the present régime with the help of the Americans." The trial lasted six days and the prisoners seemed overanxious to plead guilty. The 23 witnesses were all provided by the Public Prosecutor and confirmed the self-accusations of the prisoners, while the defense admitted the guilt of their clients, barely adding, as attenuating circumstance, that they had acted "under instigation and instruction from their superiors." The sentence of September 17, 1951, meant conviction and imprisonment for Mgr. Schubert, Mgr. Boros, and others. Mgr. Pacha, though 80 years old, was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment, Father Gatti to 15 years, Father Joseph Walter to 15 years, Father Ion Heber to 12 years and Father Schiopa to 10 years. To complete the mockery, Radio Bucharest arranged a radio transmission lasting 30 minutes, after the trial, so as to have all the convicted clergymen repeat their self-accusations to their invisible listeners and confirm all the various charges brought against them. Moreover, an assembly of so-called representatives of all denominations was convened in Braşov (now called Stalin) to vote the following resolution:

> . . . The Vatican's infamous action, its underground battle against the sublime ideals of humanity and against the security of our country, has aroused general contempt among all honest people. We condemn these criminal actions as a permanent danger to peace and, particularly, to the security of our country.

Well informed Catholic sources report that the position of the Roman Catholic Church in Romania is growing steadily worse. There is also great confusion among the faithful, who, for lack of contact with the outside free world, are no longer in a position to distinguish priests who went astray from those who have remained loyal to the principles of the Church.

Persecution against the Protestant Churches

The Communist régime in Romania has not only attacked the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, but also the Protestant. The education reform law of August 3, 1948, abolished, without discrimination, all denominational schools. The law on cults, of August 4, 1948, put the same controls and regulations upon every manifestation of religious life, whatever the creed. Lastly, the decree of November 3, 1948, by nationalizing all health and sanitary institutions, invaded and took over a very broad and important field of activity that had hitherto belonged to the various churches.

The Protestant Churches also had to contend with harsh persecutions. The Lutheran bishop of Sibiu, Rev. Staeder, was deprived of his high office and arrested. An unknown pastor was appointed by the régime to replace him. A great number of the faithful of this Church, belonging to the German minority, were deported to the USSR.

The following denominations were compelled to proceed to a "reorganization" and "federalization": The Seventh Day Adventists, with 587 communities; the Baptist, with 814 communities; the Evangelical Christians, with 165 communities; the Pentecostal Christians, with 447 communities.

Their new "Statute" was approved by the government in December 1950. The heads of these "Federalized Neo-Protestant Cults" had previously to promise in writing that their Churches would use the rights extended to them to work loyally for the prosperity of the Romanian People's Republic. The four federalized Churches also had to commit themselves to breaking off connections with foreign countries, "which might endanger the existence of the State, the interests of the people and the democratic structure of the Romanian People's Republic," and to take immediate strong measures against any member of their clergy who would use religion for activities to the prejudice of the State.

Persecutions of the Armenian, Jewish and Moslem denominations

The leaders of the Armenian Church in Romania also had to suffer persecution and hardships. In January 1951, the Rev. Clement Horen, rector of the Armenian Church in Bucharest, was arrested and his whereabouts are now unknown.

The Jews adhering to Zionism were regarded as potential enemies of the Communist régime. The Jewish sect that follows the Spanish ritual was banished by the administration and its adherents obliged to join the Oriental sect. Many of them, after prolonged harsh treatment, were allowed to emigrate to Israel, but all their properties, money and personal belongings, were confiscated. Their leaders, however, were not permitted to leave the country. Zionists were labelled by all propaganda organs as agents of American imperialism.

In March 1951, Mr. Marco Benveniste, former president of the Romanian Zionists, and Mr. Jacques Kummer, another Zionist leader, were arrested and put under indictment for alleged collaboration with the "spying services" of the Western powers. The following June it was reported

that several other chiefs of the Zionist movement were deported to the USSR.

The Jews are now being "reorganized" with all their denominational shades, and united into a federation of the Jewish faith, enjoying material support for the maintenance of the head of that faith, of the entire clergy and of their press organ.

Most of the religious leaders of the Moslem minority in Romania, living in the Dobrogea province, have been arrested for refusing to obey the regulations imposed by the government in its "Status for all religious cults." Best known among those arrested is Muedin Abdul Hamid of Tropaisar, Dobrogea, who is now detained in the sinister Aiud prison.

The Moslems have a state-supported Muftiate in Constantza and a theological seminary in Medgidia, but it is not known whether they are still operating.

Conclusion

From the above analysis it may be seen that no one particular religion is the target of Communism attention in Romania, but that the régime treats them all alike and seeks to destroy them all, one after the other. This destruction will most probably be achieved by a less spectacular, and therefore much more dangerous, way than simple suppression by the authorities. Each one of the denominations will have to submit, under duress, to the process of "reorganizaton," on lines set up by the administration, and of "integration" or "incorporation" within the framework of the Communist state. As the real leaders of the Churches, whether Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant, have been arrested and liquidated, and the key-positions in their organizations entrusted to persons trusted by the government, the Communist scheme has so far been carried out. The most significant proof of this situation is the fact that the present highest hierarchy of all creeds has cooperated with the administration in its "campaign for peace" as well as in its electoral campaign. At the conference staged in Bucharest on November 24, 1953, in order to stress the support given by all religious leaders to the government's policies, the following prelates took an active part and addressed the meeting:

For the Orthodox Church: Patriarch Justinian, Metropolitan Nicolae Bălan, Bishop Sebastian Rusan.

For the Roman Catholic Church: Mgr. Karoly Adorjan, Vicar of the Roman Catholic Bishopric of Alba-Julia, Mgr. Trajan Iovanelli, Vicar of the Catholic diocese of Bucharest.

For the Protestant Churches: Dr. Friedrich Müller, Lutheran Bishop, Dr. Janos Vasarhilys, Presbyterian Bishop, Dr. Adalbert Kiss, Bishop of the Unitarian Church, Gyorgy Arvai, Superintendent of the Evangelical Church, Ion Rusu, representative of the Anabaptist Church, Dumitru Florea, president of the Adventist Church, G. H. Bradin, president of the Pentecostal Assemblies, G. H. Oprea, delegate of the Christian Cult of the Gospel.

For the Serbian Orthodox Church: Stefan Tomitch, Vicar of the Serbian Church in Romania.

For the Christian Cult of Ancient Rite: Metropolitan T. Kocialski.

for the Armenian Church: Bishop Vasken Balgian.

For the Jewish Faith: Dr. Moses Rosen, chief rabbi.

For the Moslem Communities: Mufti Mehmed Yakub.

The tenor of the speeches reported at this conference was mainly an endorsement of the régime's activities, with emphasis on the "fight for peace." It was a pitiful spectacle: a conclave of churchmen of all cereds agreeing upon just one point, to concur in obeying the final injunction contained in the chairman's keynote address: "We call upon you to give your votes to the candidates of the Front of Popular Democracy." The attendants pledged themselves, of course, to follow this order.

This situation would discourage all hopes for the future were it not known that behind these alleged churchmen, completely shattered by unheard of terror and violence, and in spite of the abject utterances they are compelled to make millions of men and women still cherish the eternal principles of religion and anxiously await the day when they will be free to proclaim them openly again.

New York City

THE PROJECTED AUSTRIAN CENTRAL PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE

by Arthur J. May

If plans now moving forward are translated into realities, Vienna will become more than ever a paradise for scholars. Central in the current thinking is a new Austrian Public Records Office to accommodate the immense and richly diversified documentary possessions of the Austrian State, which at present are scattered and gravely imperiled by the ravages of the elements in unsuitable housing. Such a Public Records Office would crown the process of consolidating the Austrian records carried on for several centuries by archival administrators who have been pioneers in many directions.

It is not too much to say that in terms of content every phase of human interest and endeavor, whether of diplomacy or administration, economics or social evolution, cultural progress or religion, can be studied in the Austrian archival resources. In point of time, the records range over a thousand years, the oldest document carrying the date of 816, the most recent 1945, the year of the proclamation of the Second Austrian Republic. So far as geographical area is concerned, the documents embrace all of Europe—being particularly extensive of course for the region bounded by Antwerp and Lwów, Palermo and Orsova—as well as large sections of Africa, Asia and the Americas. Lined up side by side, the vast array of documents would require nearly fifty miles of shelves.

As matters stand, these Austrian treasures are distributed in four widely separated buildings and nearby warehouses, none of them at all adequate for their purposes by present-day standards. Perhaps the collection of greatest interest is that of the Austrian Imperial Family, Court and State Archives which include the diplomatic papers and contain much of value for religious history. The Military and Naval Archives, and the Financial Archives, along with the records of the Imperial Exchequer, form distinct classifications; the General Administrative Archives, covering administration and transportation in all their ramifications, are also the depository for other public documents which do not logically belong in one of the other groupings. To illustrate the monumental character of the treasures, the collection first mentioned alone embraces upwards of 200 categories of documents arranged in more than 150,000 bundles, together with some 70,000 other papers as well as seals, obituary notices and related holdings.

In 1945 the Austrian Public Record Office (*Österreichs Staatsarchiv*) was established, the successor of the *Reicharchiv Wien,* a war-time creation which brought the several collections of archives under unfied administration. Antiquated and unsafe storage facilities, cramped quarters for study, the growing use of the resources by scholars and other investigators from all over the western world, and mounting accumulations of document

pointed unerringly to the need for a central archive building to preserve the records adequately and to make them more readily accessible for study.

Under the leadership of Univ. Professor Leo Santifaller, general director of the *Staatsarchiv* from 1945 to 1955, and Hofrat Doktor Gebhard Rath, director of the Imperial Family, Court and State Archives, preliminary plans have been devised for a great central repository to contain not only the documentary resources, but also the books belonging to the several archives, altogether in excess of 200,000 volumes. With the blessing of the State Department, Dr. Lester K. Born of the Library of Congress staff examined the archival buildings in September of 1951 and in his report confirmed the appraisal of the Austrian officials on the menace to the documents in their present environment, the inefficiency of arrangements and the imperative need of a central depository, up-to-date in every respect.

After thorough study of several sites for the projected building, the Austrian authorities have decided that, all things considered, the area of one of the war-time anti-aircraft towers would be the most satisfactory location. The tower itself would serve as the core of the structure, with wings stretching away on either side; in the event of war, the records would be placed in the tower for safekeeping rather than being carted off to castles in rural Austria and other havens of refuge as was the case during the Second World War. (Fortunately, the losses and the damage to the documents were held to a minimum.) Alternative designs for the proposed building have been prepared by architects; the final choice will depend upon the funds that will be available. So that the Viennese edifice may incorporate the latest and most progressive thinking in archival architecture and equipment, detailed studies of the best archival structures in the United States and Europe are underway.

The imaginative vision of the Austrian authorities extends, happily, beyond the physical facilities of the Public Recorders Office. They are bent upon making this institution of ever greater significance to the world of scholarship and to the general public. At present the number of private investigators stands in inverse proportion to the wealth of documentary riches.

As one feature of the day, a Central Institute for Archival Research is contemplated. This Institute, which would have quarters in the Public Records Office and would be maintained by the Austrian government, would facilitate the researches of men and women of all lands. In keeping with well-established tradition, expert archivists would assist and counsel qualified investigators in uncovering materials which they require. (Out of experience, the present writer can testify to the exact knowledge of the resources, beyond the printed catalogs, and to the spirit of helpfulness displayed by the archival personnel of all grades.) Besides, specialists in the intricate techniques connected with the study of documentary materials would place their wisdom and experience at the service of students. Going beyond that, officials in the Records Office would suggest themes suitable for investigation, even to the extent of preparing lists of possible research

subjects and forwarding them to universities in the United States and elsewhere. The possibilities for cooperative research undertakings on a wide range of subjects, medieval and modern, would be almost inexhaustible, and would be pursued in ideal scholarly surroundings. Articles of distinguished learning might be published in the *Mitteilungen des Österreiches Staatsarchivs,* a journal of about 500 pages that has appeared annually since 1948.

It is also intended that the Institute for Research should present lectures and discussions primarily for scholars, though open, on occasion, to the interested public. As another means of encouraging broader interest in the facilities and the opportunities of the Records Office, the Institute would diffuse information through the press, the radio and eventually television. Much greater attention than hitherto has been possible would be devoted to exhibitions of the magnificent resources of the Records Office.

The work of popular education as well as the regular courses of instruction would be carried on by Austrian experts, speaking both the German and the English languages. Carefully selected students, foreign and Austrian, would be invited to attend the courses; not improbably, certain American students holding Fulbright grants or other forms of scholarly aid would wish to take advantage of the unusual opportunities afforded by the Institute of Research.

Technical training of archivists would also be undertaken by the Institute. So that students might be acquainted with the varied procedures of archival administration, instruction by Austrian experts would be supplemented by lectures and discussions conducted by technicians from other countries. Modest living quarters for a limited group of scholars and students from the United States and elsewhere are envisaged—a dire necessity in overcrowded Vienna. Set in the very heart of Europe, amidst the splendid Viennese traditions in the things of the mind and spirit, the new Public Records Office and the associated Research Institute might very well grow into a unique mecca for scholars of all lands.

Under a resolution of September 30, 1952, the Austrian ministry is pledged to bear as much of the cost of erecting the central Public Records Office as the straitened national treasury will permit. For the rest, the Austrian sponsors are counting upon the generosity and far-sightedness of private American foundations, alert to the desperate urgency and to the alluring potentialities of this enterprise.

The University of Rochester

NOTES

After several efforts to establish a center of East European studies in Austria had met apparently insurmountable difficulties, due in part to the divisions of the country between the occupying powers, and the initiators had been forced to admit defeat, an Institute Research in Problems of the Danube Area (Forschungsinstitut für Fragen des Donauraumes) has finally been established in Salzburg. The Institute publishes a *Mitteilungsblatt,* with short *Berichte* and a current bibliography. The aims of the Institute are modest but focussed: "The scientific treatment of international political questions . . . in the Danubian area." One gathers the impression that the burden of the research, as at present envisaged, will be upon the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the periods when the political and economic questions of the potential unity of the Danubian area either came to a crisis or were at least brought out in some sharp outlines. How extensive a program the Institute intends to carry out is not yet clear. No announcement of specific projects. so far as I am aware, has yet been made. The address of the Institute is Salzburg, Imberstrasse 22.

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The February 1955 issue of the *Library of Congress Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions* (Vol. 12, No. 2) carries (pp. 80-101) an article "Slavica and Hungarica" by Paul L. Horecky, Isaac Goldberg and Bela T. Kardos descriptive of recent LC acquisitions from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. These acquisitions cover not only current publications in the fields of arts and letters but reach into the pre-war area where some important and rare classics have been obtained. One concludes that these lists are only exemplary and not inclusive. The matter of LC buying in these fields has been of interest to specialists for many years, and not always with satisfaction. The present statement of policy would seem to presage sounder acquisition in the future. It is certain that many important publications have been irrevocably missed in the past, which a national library, such as the LC should be, should have obtained.

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Two members of the Board of Editors of the JOURNAL have changed their place of professional attachment in recent months. Professor Philip E. Mosely, until recently Director of the Russian Institute of Columbia University, has accepted the position of Director of Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations of New York City. He will supervise the Council's program of research and publication. Professor Otakar Odložilík, since 1949 Visiting Professor of History at Columbia University, has accepted appointment as Professor of Modern History at the University of Pennsylvania.

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Alliance College, Cambridge Springs, Pa. announces a Mickiewicz Festival, July 28-31, 1955, with emphasis upon the music, poetry, folklore and the dances of Poland. Alliance College, of which Dr. Arthur P. Coleman is president, is sponsored by the Polish National Alliance.

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The regional historical associations in the United States have, as a

general rule, rather focussed their interest on the history of these regions, leaving to the national association the task of the larger coverage. There is noticeable at present a tendency to reconsider this limited view of the function of the local groups, and to apportion a part of the annual program to the scholars interested in the broader horizons. An example of this laudable tendency is the November 10, 1955 European History Breakfast Conference at the annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association, to be held at Memphis, Tennessee. This Breakfast Conference, it is hoped, will mark the organization of a permanent European History Section within the Southern Historical Association. Professor John L. Snell of Tulane University is acting as secretary of the Conference and anyone interested in participating is asked to communicate with him.

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The Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano (President, Alberto M. Ghisalberti), will hold its 34th Congress October 20 to 23, 1955, at Venice. There will be two principal themes of the Congress: "Il Veneto e il Risorgimento Italiano," and "L'economia degli Stati Italiani prima dell'Unità e l'economia dello Stato unitario." These themes will be discussed in plenary sessions, and separate communications, presented beforehand, will be discussed in separate meetings. The administrative secretariat for the Congress is to be addressed presso la Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Venezie, Palazzo Pisani, Campo S. Stefano 2811, Venezia.

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On May 28 and 29, in Chicago, the memorial statue of Thomas G. Masaryk placed at the west end of the Midway, near the campus of the University of Chicago, was dedicated in ceremonies organized by a Memorial Dedication Committee of Czechs and Slovaks of Chicago and environs.

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The March-April issue of *Látóhatár* (Ohmstrasse 14, Munich) is dedicated to Professor Oscar Jászi on his eightieth birthday. It contains tributes to him from liberal Hungarian colleagues and disciples and by Hubert Ripka ("T G. Masaryk and Jászi"), and an appreciation by Michael L. Hoffman, the German correspondent of the *New York Times,* a former student of Jászi's at Oberlin College. A chapter from Jászi's memoirs, which he is now writing, and a bibliography of his works, are also included, *Vivat centum annos.*

BOOK REVIEWS

WITTRAM, REINHARD, *Baltische Geschichte: Die Ostseelande Livland, Estland, Kurland 1180-1918*. Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1953. Pp. 323. DM26.

As former professor of history at the Riga Herder Institute and as one-time editor of the *Baltische Monatshefte*, Wittram is well qualified to narrate the long history of the German community in the East Baltic area. This, it is soon made clear, is not a history of the "Baltic States" as such. The native stocks—Esths, Livs and Kurs, and their later descendants—come into the story fitfully as part of the setting of the main theme. So it is also with the 'outsiders' successively interested in the area—Lithuanians, Danes, Swedes, Poles, and Russians, especially the first three. The Russians, it turns out, do receive quite a bit of attention, for half the volume is devoted to the period since the Great Northern War.

The writer, very laudably, keeps reminding the reader of those ties, feudal, political, and religious, which up to the seventeenth century kept this eastern outpost, formally at least, in contact with the German homeland. The narrative is uniformly meaty and informative, though at times the proportion is ruffled by passages dwelling on loyalties to the German tradition. The account is thus retarded during such topics as: consequences of the Livonian Order's liquidation in the 1560's; Dorpat University's eminence during the "German" period; Czardom's long dependence on the Balt community for much 'technical assistance' personnel; and the German community's spirited rearguard defense after the 1870's against encroaching russification.

It is in connection with the latter that the author best reveals his loyalty to the Baltic heritage. He finds that Alexander II was too weak to stand against the forces of nationalism, as these were transforming the Russian polity into a "national state." The complaint comes a bit unexpectedly from one who has investigated (in *Nationalismus und Säkularisation*, 1949) several aspects of modern nationalism and its centralizing drives. The role played by the Baltic landed gentry in the decades-long controversy over emancipation is given the best possible interpretation—for them; this holds also for the part they played in the social disturbances in 1904-05.

Readers outside Germany at least will be struck by the failure to give any account of the two decades leading to 1939-40 when Hitler finally called home the Baltic German community. The reader who has patiently followed the author for six centuries will feel let down as the narrative closes sharply with 1918. The author certainly knows first hand much of the story of the years following and would have much to tell (even if some sources may be denied him by political exigencies of the present). Twice previously he has supplied detailed chronological notations, running to many pages, on these missing decades in volumes covering substantially the same ground as does this narrative, though with more spirited approaches—once in 1939 when German interest in the *Volksdeutsche* was very lively and again in 1943 (bombings delayed publication until 1945) after the *Wehrmacht* had brought under German control many neighboring lands and raised anew hopes also for the future of the old Baltic lands.

On the side of craftsmanship there is much to recommend this volume. The bibliography, predominantly of German titles, is extensive. Its arrangement, however, is neither convenient nor, as intended, any effective substitute for good footnoting. Alfred Bilmanis' *History of Latvia* doubtless appeared too late for inclusion among the general works. The index of names is detailed and helpful (the

name of the founding duke of Kurland has bedeviled the editors; it is not listed in the index, and on pages 108 and 109 the spellings are both Goddert and Gotthard, and Ketteler and Kettler). Most commendable is the series of seven maps on free separate sheets in black and white, showing many regional and local boundaries. There is roughly one map for each century and pages 313-23 provide cartographical discussions on each map by the draftsman, Heinrich Laakmann. The final result is the mutual enhancement of the scholarship of the historian and of the political geographer.

In brief, here is the German side of the story ably told in a volume that merits a place on the working shelf of every student of Baltic history.

New York University OSCAR J. FALNES

HORACE G. LUNT, ed. *Harvard Slavic Studies*, Vol. II. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. pp. 390. $6.00.

This is the second volume of a new, important series, started about a year ago. By comparison with Volume I the number of contributions has been more than doubled, but of the twenty-one essays many are quite short. There is enough diversity. The whole Slavic world is covered, and its relations with Byzantium receive a good deal of attention. This is as it should be, the volume being dedicated, on the occasion of his 60th birthday, to that great scholar, Francis Dvornik, author of *Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome au IX^e siècle*, and numerous other works. (At the end of the volume under review there is an impressive list of Dvornik's publications).

The volume opens fittingly with Dimitri Obolensky's appreciation of Father Dvornik. Six other studies are more or less related to Dvornik's own field. Milton V. Anastos discusses political theory in the *Vitae* of SS. Constantine and Methodius. Roman Jakobson writes about some of the "minor" Russian and Czech sources for the early history of the Slavic Church. Otaker Odložilík in "From Velehrad to Olomouc" raises and solves some problems in the early history of Moravia. André Grabar discusses an aspect of Byzantine political theory in his "God and the 'Family of Princes' Presided Over by the Byzantine Emperor," while Ihor Ševčenko in "A Neglected Byzantine Source of Muscovite Political Ideology" shows the influence of the writings of Agapetus in Muscovite Russia. Relations between the Slav world (and Serbia in particular) and Mount Athos are the subject of George C. Soulis's "Tsar Stephen Dusan and Mount Athos." To this group of essays may also be added Prof. Milenko S. Filipović's study of "Folk Religion Among the Orthodox Population in Eastern Yugoslavia."

We are again in the medieval period in Stanisław Kot's "Old International Insults and Praises," a rich and curious collection of sayings embodying the views held by this or that nation of its neighbors and other nations. Professor Kot has devoted special attention to peoples east of the Elbe.

More than half of the essays deal with literary subjects. Of the four devoted to Russian literature, two (the late Nikolai Trubetzkoy's "Introduction to the History of Old Russian Literature" and Dmitry Čiževsky's "On the Question of Genres in Old Russian Literature") fall in line with the Byzantine-Slavic theme of this Dvornik *Festgabe*. And their authors obviously share Dvornik's estimate of the high cultural level of Kiev Russia. The other two deal with modern literature. In "Grammatici Certant: Puškin's 'Aleksandrijskij stolp'" Wacław Lednicki, while arguing convincingly and eruditely against Professor Henri Grégoire about a minor point in a poem by Pushkin, touches upon some questions of greater importance.

In "The Style of a Leskovian *Skaz*" Hugh McLean makes a number of interesting and pointed observations, even though some of his conclusions from the style to the meaning are open to doubt. Jury Šerech discusses the early, Ukrainian, phase in the literary activity of Feofan Prokopovič, rejecting some of the views commonly accepted by Russian literary historians. Polish literature is represented by Jan Lechoń's sensitive essay on Stefan Zeromski, while Czech literature is dealt with in Milada Součková's "The First Stirrings of Modern Czech Literature" and René Wellek's "Modern Czech Criticism and Literary Scholarship" where some interesting light is shed on movements paralleling Russian Formalism and Anglo-Saxon New Criticism. The remaining four literary papers belong to the domain of comparative literature; they deal with minor but interesting topics: Richard Burgi writes about Pushkin's borrowings from the *Deipnosophists;* Wiktor Weintraub traces the form of Norwid's "Spartacus" back to the *Onegin* stańza; Rudolf Sturm examines the role of America in the life and poetry of Josef Sládek; and Albert B. Lord establishes parallels between the Greek novel of *Digenis Akritas* and Serbocroatian epic.

The volume as a whole is both a worthy tribute to Father Dvornik and a valuable contribution to the Slavic (and Byzantine-Slavic) studies in this country.

University of California GLEB STRUVE

MURAWSKI, KLAUS EBERHARD, *Zwischen Tannenberg und Thorn, Die Geschichte des deutschen Ordens unter dem Hochmeister Konrad von Erlichshausen, 1441-1449.* Göttinger Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft, Heft 10/11, Veröffentlichungen der Hist. Kommission f. Ost-und Westpreussische Landforschung Nr. 3, 1953. Pp. 482. $6.00.

For the Teutonic Knights, the early years of the 15th century marked the beginning of a period of constant decline. When Lithuania accepted Christianity at the end of the 14th century, this order of military monks lost its reason for existence. Until then the Order had enjoyed a wide reputation throughout all of Europe for its supposed great mission of christianizing Lithuania, and for this purpose it received steady assistance, not only from the Germans but from other countries as well. With the conversion of Lithuania military aid stopped. The Order never recovered from its defeat at Tannenburg, for now there were no pagans to conquer, no crusade to lead, and therefore no more assistance from the rest of Europe. Humiliated, the Order became an ordinary state like its neighbors. The lofty mission which it had so pompously and insistently proclaimed was gone, but its interior structure remained the same. This provoked great confusion within the state and, finally, open revolt of various nobles and towns, who broke away and submitted to the suzerainty of the King of Poland, who was also Grand Duke of Lithuania. The Order had become an anachronism, unable to hold the respect of its own citizens who now demanded freedoms and rights of their own. Under such circumstances The Order's unchanged "regulae" were hypocritical, or, in any case, meaningless; and this automatically led to internal disintegration.

The typical German doctoral thesis deals with one specific problem. But Mr. Murawski is different: this work is the survey of a whole period in history. The portion of the story of the Teutonic Order's decline upon which he focuses his attention is the comparatively short rule of Konrad von Erlichshausen, Grand Master from 1441 to 1449. Mr. Murawski touches upon many problems, discussing them in separate sections. One by one he explains the circumstances determining the Order's existence at the time of Erlichshausen's ascent to power, reviews the Grand

Master's actions and decisions concerning these problems, and describes the various conflicts within the Order. The author also considers the Erlichshausen family tree, the Order's internal structure, its relations with the Empire and the Church, its trade policies and relations with its neighbors.

The author considers Erlichshausen a great statesman with vast plans to revive the Order's declining power. Erlichshausen tried to fulfill this design both by internal reform and by a solid international policy. He managed to restore the Knights' discipline and thus, at least to some degree, regain lost prestige for the order. However, he failed to lay a foundation for future improvements; the reforms he made were not on a large enough scale to prevent the steadily increasing disagreements between elements within the state, which later, after his death, were to be the cause of serious conflicts.

The author's treatment of ideas is methodical and facile. Everywhere his method is analytical and his conclusions based on numerous quotations from a large bibliography. However, his conclusions are not far-reaching; his discussion often deteriorates into a mere cataloguing of facts.

Mr. Murawski dedicates his thesis to the cause of proving the eternal German character of "East Germany." Nowhere does he note that the territory under discussion was in fact nothing more than a colony, separated from the German mother country by Slavic lands, a state founded by the Order in the territory of the Prussian tribe. The colonial nature of this state is clearly seen from the dissertation's context. Mr. Murawski does show that this state possessed an entirely different way of life from that of contemporary Germany itelf. Its rulers were military monks, immigrants from various German lands, who were not of local descent. This characteristic is common to all colonial territories. The author is concerned only with these ruling knights; he almost ignores the other social classes, except for a few words when explaining the Order's political ventures. Burghers and country nobles are mentioned only in connection with their activities against the Order, and the peasants are never mentioned at all. Cultural and national relationships are not discussed. The author disagrees with the conclusion that the enslaved former inhabitants of the Order's territory were, for the most part, systematically exterminated; however, he offers no justification for his opinion. Otherwise there is little originality in the presentation. The work is hardly more than a review of the official policies of the Teutonic Order during the period from 1441 to 1449.

Toronto, Canada A. Sapoka

Hassinger, Erich, *Brandenburg-Preussen, Russland und Schweden, 1700-1713* (Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes, München, II) Munich: Isar Verlag, 1953. Pp. 319. DM 24.00.

Professor Hassinger's book constitutes a painstaking investigation of the diplomacy of Northern Europe in the early eighteenth century. Although Poland does not figure in the title, she plays a prominent part—as object, if not as agent, of northern diplomacy.

Today's interest in that particular phase of history is not accidental. Not only the emergence of Russia as an active European factor accounts for it—a step logically following the sixteenth-century entrance of Russia into the political calculations of European nations. Another not less important reason is succinctly given by Hassinger in the first paragraphs of his book, where he calls our attention to the beginnings of the classical age of the European balance-of-power policy and

its underlying rationalism. It is the break-down and fulfillment of that age, which now lies fully in retrospect, that invites exhaustive historical evaluations.

Wisely, Hassinger begins his study with a description of the main and often little known, actors—Ilgen, Keyserlingk, Michael Radziejowski, Jan Szembek, as well as the Prussian, Saxon, and Swedish kings; for men as well as general forces were at work. We might, however, wish for fuller and more lively portrayals. Only the unfortunate Patkul, whom Hassinger never fails to depict as an incompetent schemer, leaves a vivid but perhaps unjustifiedly sinister impression upon the reader.

The author proceeds to describe, in strict chronological sequence, the diplomatic negotiations of the northern courts during the Northern War and circumspectly connects them with the diplomacy of the war of the Spanish succession. Prussia holds the center of the stage. Her policy, aiming at the consolidation of her as yet separate possessions, is clearly exposed, and so is her failure to fish successfully in troubled water. Yet, her hesitancy and vacillation appear justified. for gains consistent with necessary sacrifices could hardly have been secured; nor was a less passive policy, regardless of the personal inclinations and weaknesses of Frederick I, compatible with the diplomatic climate in the age of rationalism. Poland is treated with sympathy. Her enforced passivity despite the feverish activity of many parties is correlated not only with internal corruption, chauvinism, and weakness, but also with the general European setting and the ambitions of her neighbors—especially Russia, which, already in Peter's time, saw in the perpetuation of Poland's ills a lever for future aggrandizement.

Hassinger's book brings out the contrast between these powers and Sweden and Russia. The adventurous spirit of an earlier age prevailed in the former country, an attitude unaffected by western restraints in the latter. No longer can the often-heard thesis be defended that Peter was fighting a defensive war on the Baltic. The displacement of Sweden by Russia as dominant power of Northern Europe was, however, not viewed by the West as so fundamental a change in the power distribution as it may appear today.

The intricacies of diplomatic history do not lend themselves in present days to arousing general interest. Tastes have changed. But a book like Hassinger's, owing to its conscientious scholarship and detailed treatment, is a monument to, and illustrates the spirit of, an age which constituted an important chapter in Western Civilization.

University of Delaware WALTHER KIRCHNER

DABINNUS, GEORG, *Die ländliche Bevölkerung Pommerellens im Jahre 1772 mit Einschluss des Danziger Landgebietes im Jahre 1793*. Wissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Ost-Mitteleuropas, no. 6. Marburg/-Lahn:: Johann Gottfried Herder-Institute, 1953. Pp. 158.

Numerous books and articles have been written on the subject of the partitions of Poland. In a recent study published by the Johann Gottfried Herder-Institute, a leading East-Central European research center in Germany, Mr. Georg Dabinnus sets out to analyze the structure of the population of Pomerania at the time of the First Partition in 1772, and of Danzig in 1793. His main thesis is that Pomerania and Danzig were predominantly German, that their occupation was in fact a return to Prussia, and that the population welcomed the incorporation which re-established law and order.

Dabinnus bases his study of the population on two Prussian censuses of 1772

and 1793 which according to the author had not been used by previous historians. Seen in this light, *Die ländliche Bevölkerung Pommerellens* fills an important gap in our knowledge of the period and should be welcomed as such. This work is a veritable mine of information and the author's minute analysis of statistical data is highly interesting, though his love of detail is sometimes carried too far.

On the other hand the general approach of the author—a political thesis, the *Deutschtum* of Pomerania—renders his general conclusions of a somewhat dubious value. In the opening paragraph Dabinnus speaks of 1772 as the year which saw restoration of Pomerania to Prussia after three hundred years of "foreign" rule. He elaborates his thesis in a broad historical survey which is hardly objective. Dabinnus emphasizes all facts which can be used to stress the German character of Pomerania while he tones down or simply leaves out the others. Thus we find no reference to the massacre of the Danzig population by the Teutonic Knights in 1308-09, and he describes their subsequent occupation of the province vaguely and unsatisfactorily. Dabinnus stresses the fact that King Casimir the Great of Poland renounced his rights to Pomerania in 1343, implying that the cession was final and irrevocable. He does not add, however, that the Poles were never reconciled with the loss and that the two successors of Casimir, Louis of Hungary and Jagiello of Lithuania, had to engage themselves, as a condition of their coronation, to recover Pomerania for Poland. He does not mention the unfailing loyalty of Danzig to the Polish Crown in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as Danzig's resistance to incorporation into Prussia. Dabinnus presents an interesting analysis of the structure, administration, and government of Pomerania under the Polish crown, but his own analysis does not bear out his remark that Pomerania was never a Polish province, properly speaking. When the author says that Pomerania welcomed Prussian rule as a return of law and order, he simply repeats Frederick the Great's arguments justifying the partition, which, as the late Professor Robert H. Lord has said, made Frederick appear for once ridiculous.

The two Prussian censuses contained a question on the origin, or *Abstammung*, of the inhabitants of Pomerania and Danzig, and the criterion used to determine it was the name of the person and sometimes his religion. Dabinnus points out very correctly on page 27 that the feeling of national consciousness in the eighteenth century was very different from what it is today; but the question arises as to how far one can use the eighteenth century statistics to prove a twentieth century case of nationality. On page 51 we find a table which divides the Pomeranian nobility into five groups—German, German-origin, Kaschub, Polish, foreign and unknown. It is clear that this table does not prove that five distinct *nationalities* made up the nobility of the province of Pomerania. In the context of the book, however, the author uses this table and several others to prove the dominance of a Germanic element which the reader is apt to identify as a German *national* group. Dabinnus' constant reference to the *Kaschuben* as distinct from the Poles—whatever the original racial or linguistic distinction may be—is strangely reminiscent of the Nazi "discovery" of a *oralen Volk* in the Tatra Mountains during the German occupation of Poland in the Second World War.

Dabinnus' use of two hitherto unexplored censuses, together with much interesting material carefully arranged and well documented makes his study undoubtedly a contribution to our knowledge of Pomerania in the last years of the eighteenth century. On the other hand, his use of eighteenth century data to promote a nationalist thesis of a distinctly twentieth century flavor is unwarranted, and lowers considerably the value of the publication.

Indiana University PIOTR S. WANDYCZ

FEJTÖ, FRANÇOIS, *Un Habsbourg révolutionnaire Joseph II. Portrait d'un despote éclairé*. Paris: Plon. 1953. Pp. 356. Fr. 800.

There was no grain of truth in the persistent rumors that Joseph II did not die but was kidnapped by opponents of his policy and imprisoned in a remote castle or convent. On February 22, 1790, his mortal remains, not a faked body, were buried in the vaults of the Capuchin monastery in Vienna.

Joseph's program of reform, though emasculated by his younger brother and successor, Leopold II, and even more drastically by Leopold's son Francis I, was never altogether abandoned. The second to last ruler of the Danubian Empire, Francis Joseph, as his double name indicated, inherited both the soulless conservativism of Francis I and the enlightened philosophy of Joseph II, and experimented with them according to the circumstances. During his long reign (1848-1916), Josephinism served either as a bogey to justify rigid protective measures, or as a decoy by which the Court endeavored to attract the progressive elements from among the various segments of the population of the monarchy.

François Fejtö has written a sympathetic portrait intended for those readers who prefer a documented biography to the novel or to light sketches written in gossipy style. No effort was made by the author to mask his ambition to produce a pleasant and readable account of his hero's life. Guided by the desire to find the middle way between a well-proportioned biography and an analytical study, he gave ample space to Joseph's intimate life, not hesitating to glance occasionally into the modestly furnished imperial bedroom. Some passages devoted to the description of Joseph's personality were written with discretion and reserve; in other places details were inserted into the narrative which originated in Court gossip or in ungracious reports by foreign observers or diplomats. The chapter on Joseph's first wife, Isabella of Parma, can be mentioned as the finest example of the portrayal of the illustrious personalities surrounding the monarch. Few readers will fail to appreciate the author's effort to explain satisfactorily the complicated relationship between Maria Theresa and her first-born son.

In his treatment of Joseph's ideas and deeds Fejtö did not focus his attention on the "hereditary lands," a term which was often used to cover both the Alpine provinces and the lands of the Bohemian Crown. Concrete examples to illustrate Joseph's designs and the reaction against him have been taken most often from either Hungary or from Belgium. In those two territories the dislike of Joseph's policy was stronger and more articulate than in the central zone of the Habsburg domains closely attached to Vienna by the administrative reforms of Maria Theresa. From Hungary and from Belgium the decisive campaign against the bold innovator was launched when he became hopelessly involved in a war with Turkey.

Although the author sides more with Joseph than with his foes, the prominence given in his story to Hungary and Belgium causes not only disproportions but also occasional distortions. Social and economic conditions in Bohemia differed in many ways from the pattern prevailing in Hungary, and in discussing them a very clear distinction must be made. The author has not pointed out this distinction carefully. It is difficult indeed to state in connection with the inhabitants of the Alpine provinces or even of the lands of the Bohemian Crown the severe sentence with which he concludes the twenty-first chapter: "Le peuple n'aimait pas Joseph." It was the common folk and a considerable portion of the middle class that sincerely mourned Joseph's death or even refused to believe that he had really died.

The author is widely read, and some sections of his book are based on unpublished documents. But there are also gaps in his bibliography which the re-

viewer finds hard to pass over in silence. Let us mention at least two Americana Robert J. Kerner's detailed monograph, *Bohemia in the Eighteenth Century* (1932) and the first volume of a biography of Francis I, *Francis the Good, the Education of an Emperor, 1768-1792,* by W. C. Langsam. Two books in German indicate by their very titles how useful they would have been in elucidation of Joseph's program: Edward Winter, *Der Josefinismus und seine Geschichte* (1953), and a less comprehensive but equally stimulating monograph by Fritz Valjavec, *Der Josephinismus* (1944).

Columbia University OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

LEDNICKI, WACŁAW, *Russia, Poland and the West.* New York: Roy Publishers, 1954. Pp. 419. $5.00.

In contemplating the comprehensive volume of Professor Lednicki it is important to bear in mind its subtitle: "Essays in Literary and Cultural History." The book is in fact a series of brilliant, penetrating, and thoroughly documented studies in comparative literature. The Russian side is represented by such outstanding figures as Chaadaev, Pushkin, Lermontov, Tyutchev, and Blok, while the crucial role of the Polish protagonist is played by Mickiewicz.

The author modestly claims that his book is only a discussion, a purely speculative work, and that comparativism proves little and seldom leads to concrete results. Yet, in his experienced and skilful hands, the comparative method becomes a highly efficient instrument which brings into focus the ancient Russo-Polish conflict conceived as the antithesis of the chief Eastern and Western historical trends and principles.

In the phrase of the greatest modern Russian poet, Alexander Blok, art, life and politics are inseparable, and thus Lednicki, proceeding from an analysis of literary texts, is able to illumine the complex aspects and dark recesses of the age-old Russo- Polish antimony with inescapable cogency. However, Blok speaks not only of the "indivisibility" of these elements, but of their "immiscibility" and of their inherent contradictions "irreconcilable and demanding reconciliation."

It is to these contradictions that Lednicki devotes his searching attention showing how the Polish problem preoccupied Russian minds, disturbing them as a profound moral issue. Numerous expressions of this preoccupation are cited. Thus, e.g., Prince P. A. Vyazemsky considered the partitions of Poland the "original sin of Russian policy" and felt that it was "impossible to avoid the fatal consequences of this crime." The mysterious Russian Polonophil of Pushkin's unfinished poem, identified by Lednicki as Chaadaev, "tenderly loved the foreign people" and after the fall of Warsaw in 1831 "wept woefully like the Jew over Jerusalem." Grand Duke Constantine in his correspondence with his brother Tsar Nicholas I gave a powerful and passionate criticism, from the legal, political and moral points of view, of the partition. And quite recently the Russian historian J. Fedotov wrote of "the historical sin committed—for a whole century—against the soul of the Polish nation" and pointed out that "it is precisely to Poland that the Russian Empire is indebted for its fame as 'the prison of nations'." The reaction of many Russians to Pushkin's anti-Polish and anti-European poems also falls within this category.

A different interest in Poland was manifested by Dostoevsky to whom more than half of the present volume is devoted. Lednicki sheds much light on the Russian novelist by confronting i.a. *The House of the Dead,* with the memoirs of Dostoevsky's Polish fellow-prisoner S. Tokarzewski, entitled *Seven Years of Pen*

Servitude. The view is also advanced that in some passages of Dostoevsky's works the influence of Mickiewicz is discernible.

One may add that in his first lecture at the Collège de France, on December 22, 1840, Mickiewicz, newly appointed professor of Slavic literature, also took up the Russo-Polish problem: "The modern history of the Slavs is closely linked with that of the Western nations of Europe. . . . Everywhere the Russian eagle meets with the Polish, always the hurrah of the Russians alternates with the battle cry of the Poles. And if we strain our ears to the voice of the distant past, even there is repeated the echo of the same struggle of the two hosts . . . the echo of an age-old struggle which one Russian, Prince Vyazemsky, has called an "endless Thebaid! What is the object of this struggle? Who will win? The future will show."

Professor Lednicki also uses the expression "Russian-Polish Thebaid." His book attempts to answer the question posed by Mickiewicz.

Russia, Poland and the West worthily sums up thirty years of Professor Lednicki's work dedicated to the exploration of Russian-Polish relations in the literary, cultural and political fields, and is a weighty addition to the impressive list of his publications in many languages. It is a book which may stimulate discussion among scholars in the Russian field who might not subscribe to all of Profesor Lednicki's interpretations and conclusions. However, he has greatly contributed to our knowledge of Russia and his sincerity, idealism, and profound scholarship cannot be doubted.

The date 1807 under Blok's portrait is an obvious oversight.

Columbia University LUDWIK KRZYŻANOWSKI

ACKERKNECHT, ERWIN H., *Rudolf Virchow: Doctor, Statesman, Anthropologist*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953. Pp. xv, 304. $5.00.

By the time he was eighteen in 1839 Rudolf Virchow had formulated a characteristic nineteenth century goal, to obtain an "all-around knowledge of nature, from the deity down to the stone." Virchow the man admitted to two other urges, to share knowledge with his fellow men and to use knowledge—and politics—to realize another typical nineteenth century ambition, to enable the poor to "enjoy on earth a happier life and not have to wait for the joys of paradise." Motivated by a religious faith in science and stimulated by an occasional whiff of snuff, sleeping five hours or less at night, and taking almost no time from his work for hobbies or sports, this son of por Pomeranian parents calmly bull-dozed his way through eighty-one years of life.

As a medical pioneer, Virchow in 1847 identified, described, and named the disease known since as leukemia; between 1852 and 1855 he formulated the conclusion that a live cell can be produced only by another live cell, a formulation which was basic to the development of cellular pathology and other studies; in 1863 he described the life cycle of trichinae, and characteristically launched a campaign for governmental meat inspection. Meanwhile, as a scientist and as a member of the city council of Berlin, Virchow planned a new sewage system for the capital of Bismarckian Germany, converting it from an overgrown town of outdoor privies into a model of water closet sanitation. In the 1860's he outfitted hospital trains and became a recognized planner of hospital buildings, insisting that they combine treatment of patients with medical education and original research. Beginning in the 1840's, when he studied famine-bred typhus in Upper Silesia, Virchow won renown for his reports on epidemics, always calling attention to the

part played in them by such non-pathological factors as food conditions, housing, working conditions, and hours of labor.

For Virchow, medicine was a "social science" and the doctor was obligated to play a part in politics. "As a natural scientist I can be but a republican," he wrote in the revolutionary year 1848. By 1861 he was willing to temporize with monarchical government, but as a founder and member of the Progressive Party he remained throughout the sixties an outspoken opponent of Bismarck's policies. Won over by Bismarck's anti-Catholic policy in the seventies long enough to justify the name the *Kulturkampf,* Virchow again opposed Bismarck during the 1880's. Like other German liberals, he staked his hopes upon the ill-fated Frederick III, whose autopsy he performed in 1888. Perhaps the event symbolized the death of his political ideals in Germany; henceforth Virchow devoted most of his efforts to anthropological studies and organizational activities. As an anthropologist he will be best remembered as an associate and defender of Schliemann and for his 1876 survey of the racial features of almost seven million German school children (31.8 per cent were "true" blonds; 54.15 per cent were mixed; but neither contemporary nor twentieth century racists were bothered by scientific statistics).

Professor Ackerknecht's own unusual training as doctor, anthropologist, and historian has enabled him to recognize not only Virchow's talents, contributions, and personal worth, but also his debts to other scientists and his personal failings. Ackernecht is generally enthusiastic about his subject, but he regrets that Virchow's political views were not even more radical than they were, and he tells how Virchow prematurely described the remains of Neanderthal man as those of a gouty old contemporary; how he cautioned his own pupil, Ernst Haeckel, against too ready acceptance of Darwinian evolutionary hypotheses as scientifically proven laws; and how he questioned the early tubercular findings of his friend, Robert Koch. A challenging and important nineteenth century figure has found a capable biographer.

Tulane University JOHN L. SNELL

ANDERSON, EUGENE, N., *The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858-1864.* Lincoln, Nebraska: The University of Nebraska Press, 1954. Pp. 450. $5.00.

The social and political conflict in Prussia during the late fifties and early sixties of the last century undoubtedly constitutes one of the most crucial events in modern German history. It ranks in importance with the fateful events of 1848 and with the Prussian reforms early in the century, and must be compared, for its significance, with 1832 in British history. Much more was involved in the conflict than constitutional problems, more even than the issue of the character of and the control over the Prussian army. What was at stake was, basically, whether the state machine should continue to be in the hands of a reactionary bureaucracy and aristocracy or whether new social and economic forces would be able to penetrate the state apparatus and eventually to gain political control over it. The outcome of the conflict broke the backbone of the Prussian and, indirectly, as events were to show, of the German bourgeoisie. It decided for the next two generations the victory of nationalism over liberalism whenever the two conflicted with each other. Especially for an American reading public the story of the conflict offers one of the best avenues to a better understanding of the tragedy of Geman liberalism and the character and problems of German history and politics during the last century.

Professor Anderson's book is not a history of the conflict; he uses a topical approach. The work is divided into two parts: "The Issues" (How the conflict arose

—Caste and privilege—The police state—Militarism—National unification—The constitution) and "The Organization and Strength of the Participants," which deals, among other things, with the election system, the liberal parties, the conservative party, the attitude of the government toward the elections, and the election statistics of 1862 and 1863. Within the framework which the author has set for himself, namely, to give an analysis of the social and institutional forces in Prussia which shaped the conflict, there is much in the book that is useful and worthwhile. Much painstaking research in contemporary sources has gone into this solid work, which is well written, even if at times somewhat pedestrian. The approach and organization of the book take away much of the dynamics and the dramatic elements of the conflict, emasculate it, so to speak. They also cannot help blurring the chronological sequence. However, the features of the Prussian police state, the issues involved in the military reform, are well described and keenly analyzed. The character of the king, his intellectual limitations, his lack of understanding of liberalism, the contradictions of "constitutional absolutism" are ably discussed. The reader also gets a well rounded picture of Roon's personality and position, and of the conservative party and its "ideology." Very impressive is the description of the government's pressure in the 1862 and, particularly, 1863 elections. The treatment of the liberal parties and their body of ideas is less satisfactory. The main position of the liberals, their tactical and fundamental dilemmas, their distrust of the common people, their acquiescence over, even satisfaction with, the three-classes-suffrage law, are all discussed in the various chapters of the book, but there is missing a synthesis which would bring the problem of Prussian—and of German—liberalism into sharper focus. Also the differences in the liberal camp appear to this reviewer of greater importance and significance than the author seems to think —even if one keeps in mind that his work does not intend to make a specific contribution to the intellectual history of the period. One wonders also whether Professor Anderson does not make too light of Lassalle and the problems of the worker, just beginning to cast their shadow during those crucial years. The careful analysis of the election results of 1862 and 1863, based on government statistics which the author discovered in the Prussian archives during his research in the early thirties, is very enlightening and useful.

In his conclusions Professor Anderson rightly points out that "Contemporaries, both middle class and aristocratic, regarded the nobility as predominantly Conservative; but one cannot infer that the conflict between Conservatism and Liberalism altogether expressed a struggle between the noble and the middle class" (p. 434). One regrets that there is nowhere in the book an attempt made to analyze the composition of the liberal nobility. Were the aristocrats, who became liberals, joining the camp for economic reasons or out of a feudal opposition to absolutism and bureaucracy? To what degree were the liberal nobles former government officials? Even if no quantitative estimate is possible, a casual analysis of this kind could well be expected within the framework and from the approach Professor Anderson uses.

It is rather unfortunate that the author limits his work to the period ending in 1864, "since the story of Bismarck's crushing defeat of the liberals by his *Realpolitik* after 1864 is well known" (p. IX). Admittedly the conflict was already decided in 1864—if the liberals ever had a chance. By concentrating on the period prior to 1864 he cannot give adequate discussion of the tension between liberalism and nationalism. But in the relationship between these two forces lies one, if not *the* testing ground for the moral strength of the liberal creed.

The translations of the many quotations from German sources, presumably mostly by the author himself, are quite satisfactory, even if Bismarck's prose loses some of its lustre. This reviewer could discover only one minor error of no consequence: the German *Tropf* does not mean "drop," but "simpleton" (p. 396). The book has no index, really not indispensable in view of the organization of the material; but the absence of a bibliography is to be regretted. While the author has done an excellent job with his sources, there is hardly any reference to more recent literature, e.g. H. Rosenberg, Kaminski, S. Newman, Heffter, Srbik, Eyck, L. Dehio (only one of his several essays is mentioned).

The story of the Prussian conflict—in the broader framework of the history of German unification, of Prussian and German militarism, of German political theory and practice—still needs to be told in a book in the English language. Such a book will find much useful, and partly indispensable, spadework done in the work under review.

Cornell College ERIC C. KOLLMAN

HUBATSCH, WALTHER, *Eckpfeiler Europas. Probleme des Preussenlandes in geschichtlichter Sicht.* Heidelberg: Quelle and Meyer, 1953, Pp. 141. DM 7.80.

The thesis and purpose of this little group of essays come out clearly in the last paragraph:

> The German claim to our land between the Oder and Memel is incontestable and is strengthened by the work of civilization which the Germans have done in that area, work which is European in its import. The repeated rebuilding after collapse and catastrophe attests to the importance of the area, as does the keeping of it as a spiritual central point for the peoples of eastern and middle Europe. Therein lay in the course of centuries and in the midst of constant change the historical mission of the German East (p. 138).

Professor Hubatsch (Göttingen) is eager to aid the return of Prussia to Germany and apparently believes that an appreciation of the historic role of Prussia in the East can advance this end. From the first essay, which covers the work of the Teutonic Order in building Prussia, through the last, which deals with the European importance of the Prussian problem after 1945, he is at pains to emphasize the value of the German East to Western Europe and to Christian culture. He dissociates the long process of settlement and colonization under the Order and later under the Prussian state from national imperialism, for he regards the movement eastward as historically unique and one of coexistence. "This living side by side did not lead to difficulties but showed itself in a kind of growing together which in the European East achieved a coöperation and dependence upon one another" (p. 129). Professor Hubatsch goes so far as to say that the danger of the collapse of European civilization increases in proportion to the decrease of the certainty that the peoples of Europe may live on their inherited land. Thus he wishes to see the Germans from the East returned to their homes, but he believes this return must be for sound reasons and in peace; that is, not through nationalism and revisionism upheld by force, but for cultural reasons and in coöperation with the peoples of the East: "New forms of European coexistence can arise even in Middle East Europe if we look to history and learn from it not hate but peace" (p. 136), and he appears to believe it possible that Russian policy will not always retain the stand of 1945, but will one day give Poland a free hand to negotiate.

It is not necessary to apply scholarly criticism to these essays; they represent popular summaries of the author's interpretations of historical materials. But one

has two lines of reaction to their burden. One may agree with their argument for the reunification of Germany and may applaud the wish that the settlement be historically conditioned, reasonable and peaceful. The other reaction is that of questioning the possibility of recapturing that older coexistence which, if it ever existed, belonged to another age. The writer cannot see that these essays will easily affect the westward urge which now seems to emanate from the East and which has its own cultural impetus.

University of Nebraska PAULINE R. ANDERSON

POBÓG-MALINOWSKI, WŁADYSŁAW, *Najnowsza Historia Polityczna Polski, 1864-1945*. Paris: Imprimerie de la S.N.I.E., 1953. Pp. 398.

Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, author of several monographic studies, has published the first volume of his ambitious project, a political history of Poland from 1864 to 1945. It is worth mentioning that the publication was financed by subscriptions from emigré Poles from all over the world. The first volume covers the period from the downfall of the insurrection of 1863-64 to the beginning of 1919, or the first four months or so of the independent Poland.

The author starts with an analysis of the aftermath of the rising, and describes at some length the Tsarist policies in the Congress Kingdom of Poland, then renamed "Vistula Land." This section is one of the most detailed in the whole book. Generally speaking, the author is best when he deals with political events in Russian Poland. His analysis is less thorough and convincing when he shifts to Western Poland, to Pomerania, Poznania and Silesia. As a rule, the author is not always careful enough when describing the Russian background of Polish events. On page 148 he writes: "In November 1904 the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet rebelled. . . . Somewhat earlier, in March 1904, a brother of the Emperor, Grand Duke Sergius, . . . was assassinated in Moscow. . . ." Leaving aside the questionable, rather unhistorical presentation of two events of completely different political weight, Grand Duke Sergius was not a brother but an uncle of Tsar Nicholas II.

Another example of this sort of rather chaotic presentation may be found on page 47; the author, analyzing the influence which Russian political thought had on Polish youth, enumerates the main publicists whose writings affected the young Poles: "Pisarev and Dobrolubov, Lavrov, Bakunin, Chernyshevsky." The enumeration is thoroughly unchronological, confused, and hence, misleading. There are several passages of a similar kind.

As far as the treatment of Poland's political history is concerned, Malinowski often tends to be partisan. Throughout his work the author pays much more attention to Joseph Piłsudski, to the ideas and activities of his group and tends to neglect Roman Dmowski and the National Democractic party, a political force of approximately equal weight and importance. Piłsudski's activities during the revolutionary period 1904-1906 especially receive a disproportionately large amount of space. Malinowski's glorification of the revolution would be understandable, perhaps, if it were written immediately after the events, but it is hardly comprehensible today, half a century later, when our knowledge of most of the motives involved has completely altered our perspective.

The activities of Dmowski's National Committee in Paris are, as a rule, either overlooked, or harshly criticized by Malinowski, who seems to be bent on playing down most of the positive achievements of the Committee, like, for instance, the preparation of Poland's case for the coming Peace Conference. Piłsudski is Malinowski's hero. The present writer is far from underestimating the value of

Piłsudski's contribution to the rise of reborn Poland. On the other hand, it would be difficult to deny that the country's freedom was the work of both Piłsudski and Dmowski, these two bitterly antagonistic, yet largely complementary statesmen. They fought each other, but their work was essentially along parallel lines. This lack of balance and historical synthesis is a serious shortcoming of this otherwise factual and conscientious book, which is a valuable contribution to the historiography of modern Poland.

In a way the book is a story of two Polish generations. It is a story of the fathers who began their lives as romanticists and, after the catastrophe of 1864, disillusioned with the idea of armed struggle for their country's independence, turned toward what was to be known as "organic work." They became emphatically, even noisily "positivists" or "realists." The latter part of the book becomes the story of the sons who, having started as worshippers of the "organic work," became so fed up with the everyday spade work that they decided to turn again toward more active or even dramatic ways of helping their country. This mood was exploited in a masterly way by Piłsudski in his work during the period 1908-1914, when he organized his squads of "Sharpshooters." The pages describing his relentless work for the creation of the nucleus of the Polish Armed Forces are among the best in the whole book. Here the author is carried away by his own enthusiasm for the idea of armed struggle for Poland's independence, the struggle in which he took part as a soldier of Piłsudski's legions.

Some minor factual errors do not detract from its essential value as an indispensable reference book for any student of recent Polish history. It is to be hoped that the author will overcome the financial difficulties facing any emigré writer and that the promised second volume, covering the period 1919-1945, will appear in the near future.

Boston College M. K. Dziewanowski

Vucinich, Wayne S., *Serbia between East and West: The Events of 1903-1908.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954. Pp. x, 305. $4.75.

At the beginning of the five-year period covered by this book the little kingdom of Serbia was an object of European derision. Not only did the behavior of King Alexander Obrenovich and his Queen Draga discredit the country in the eyes of Europe, but "the general instability of Serbia hampered normal economic, political and cultural development. The unpopular royal régime brought the country to the verge of ruin. Dissatisfaction was wide-spread and permeated all social strata." In foreign affairs Serbia was a diplomatic satellite and virtually an economic appendage of Austria-Hungary. Mutual jealousies prevented sincere friendship with her Balkan neighbors Bulgaria and Montenegro.

Paradoxically enough, the first step in the direction of progress was the authentically Balkan butchery of Alexander and Draga, well and fully described by the author, who shows clearly that the conspirators merely wished to rid the country of the Obrenoviches and had prepared no concrete program of their own to replace that of the defunct régime. But it happened that the new king, Peter Karageorgevich, was a constitutional monarch by conviction as well as by necessity, and under his rule Serbia became a liberal and democratic state, at least by Balkan standards. Now, at last, it became plain that if the South Slavs were to be liberated and united the nucleus or Piedmont would be the Serbia of Peter Karageorgevich and not the Montenegro of Nikola Petrovich-Nyegush.

The Macedonian problem erupted with the "Ilinden Uprising," whose fiftieth

anniversary was commemorated in the Belgrade *Politika* last summer with a front-page article interpreting it in Marxian terms, and the great powers attempted to institute "reforms" in Macedonia. Serbian *chetniks* fought Bulgarian *komitajis* and the IMRO, while their governments signed short-lived treaties of friendship and alliance, and Nikola of Montenegro advocated the policy of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." Austria announced that no territorial expansion by Serbia would be tolerated, and stirred up the Albanian tribesmen against the Serbs. Imperial Russia apparently could not yet decide whether to patronize Serbia or Bulgaria and was in no position to intervene effectively on either side since she was being defeated by Japan in the Far East and was in temporary eclipse thereafter. The story of these stormy years in Serbian history is concluded by a chapter dealing with the Austrian project of a Sanjak railway and the Serbian counter-project of a Danube-Adriatic line, thus setting the stage for the Turkish revolution, the Buchlau bargain and the Bosnian crisis.

The book largely supersedes older treatments of the subject. Based mainly on Serbian sources, some of them rare, it draws also upon materials in Russian, Bulgarian and Czech as well as in the western languages. It will be indispensable to students of the field.

Dartmouth College JOHN CLINTON ADAMS

HEYER, FRIEDRICH, *Die orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917-1945*. Osteuropa und der deutsche Osten, III. Köln, Braunsfeld: Rudolph Müller, 1953. Pp. 258. DM 18.60.

It is no easy task to write a critical history of the Ukrainian Church during the last 40 years, of the period covering two world wars, the great Russian Revolution, the Soviet persecutions and the underground activities.

The religious life, forbidden and persecuted by the Communists, was in anarchy. The Revolution in the Czarist Empire developed in the non-Russian territories into a series of national revolutions in search of not only political independence, but also of an independence of the Church and religious life from Russian domination. The required sources for this stormy period are lacking; those which exist are scanty and fragmentary, written from the viewpoint of one party and obscuring other facets of the picture. Only a highly competent East European researcher will seek out the absconded tendency of each of the interested parties.

Friedrich Heyer, of the Muenster University in Germany, has undertaken this gigantic task of writing the history of the Ukrainian Church in this stormy period. After some introductory remarks on the Orthodox and Catholic Churches before 1917, the author portrays the efforts of the Ukrainian people and their national governments to liberate the Orthodox Church from Russian domination and to establish a Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, amidst very trying circumstances. All the bishops in the Ukraine were Russians and decidedly opposed to this movement. The Ukrainian priests and faithful were forced to employ revolutionary methods to gain their ends and were condemned by Russian Orthodox writers as schismatics.

The establishment of the atheistic Communist Government in Ukraine forced Church life in three directions: The Ukrainian Autocephalic Church, the Ukrainian Synodal Church (Obnovlency) and the Russian Patriarchal Church, which defended the status quo. The first victim of religious persecution and liquidation was the Ukrainian Autocephalic Church; the Obnovlency and Tichonivcy followed.

The author also sketches the fate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Po-

land, the rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Church during World War II, and the destruction of both Ukrainian Churches (Orthodox and Catholic) after the war carried on by the Russian Communists; according to the Kremlin's will, the Russian Patriarchal Church must be the religious master of the Ukraine.

Mr. Heyer has assembled mostly Russian sources, which influence his conclusions strongly; the non-Russian source dealing with the Church problems of this period escape his attention—for example, he has omitted such a fundamental source as the *White Book on Religious Persecutions in Ukraine* (Rome, 1953), and others. Consequently, several factual mistakes are found in the work: the Cholm diocesis was not created in 1912 (p. 11, 12); The Russian Government of Alexander II never favored Ukrainians (p. 29); the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was not federated with the Russian in 1919 (p. 70); Commissar Skrypnyk, Lenin's old collaborator, was never a nationalist who joined the Bolsheviks (p. 78); the godless organization in Ukraine, having 12% membership in the USSR, could not be the strongest in the Soviet Union, assuming that the population of Ukraine is around 20% of the entire USSR population; the name of the Lemberg Catholic Metropolitan arrested by the Russians was Joseph Slipy and not Slepoj.

On almost every page the author expresses favor for the Russian Church in Ukraine, and openly disfavors the endeavors of the Ukrainian people for their own hierarchy and for the right to pray in their own language in accordance with the old Ukrainian traditions. The author finds martyrs only among the Russian priests murdered by the Communists, but not among the hundreds of clergymen of the Ukrainian Church. The influence of the Russian sources upon this author is amply evident. But the author is critical of the German church policy in Ukraine which he condemns as only slightly less hostile to Christianity than is the Kremlin's policy.

Despite all these defects Heyer's work is of value, because it is the first and only book treating this matter in full. The history of the Ukrainian Church in that stormy period is almost unknown; official documents of the time are almost nonexistent, and even private memoirs were for the most part destroyed.

The author has amassed a great number of printed and unpublished materials which give a chronological guide for future researchers, who, using more non-Russian sources and the statements of several hundreds of eyewitnesses to and participants in these events, will be able to write a history of the Ukrainian Church making clear different points of view. Perhaps it will be possible to write a more complete work in view of the available sources.

New York, New York N. D. CHUBATY

SEABURY, PAUL, *The Wilhelmstrasse. A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Régime.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954. Pp. 217. $3.00.

This book suffers under the inflated claims made in its title and its prefaces. The former gives the impression that it is a study of the German diplomats and Foreign Ministry under the Nazi régime, (1933-45). The latter, by talking of the unique opportunity offered by the total exposure of Nazi records after the German defeat—records which passed into the hands of researchers—gives the impression that it is based on a full study of the German Foreign Ministry—not of the diplomatic service as such, but only of those members who served in Berlin—after February, 1938, of Ribbentrop's period as Foreign Minister, and of his struggles for power with other Nazi leaders, based on such documentation as has so far been published, whether at war crimes trials or elsewhere. It claims also to be an in-

stitutional study; but it suffers from a lack of diagrams or organizational charts, and from a failure to place the German Foreign Ministry in the general perspective of German bureaucracy or of the Nazi organs of power.

To say this is not to detract from the essential merits of the book which is based on considerable research and gives the non-specialist a picture of developments on one sector of the struggle for power within the Nazi leadership, of the position of those bureaucrats whose collaboration with Nazism made it possible, and of the atmosphere and methods of German government under Nazism which is not easily discoverable elsewhere. To the specialist, on the other hand, the work is a little disappointing. Mr. Seabury deals fairly adequately with State Secretary von Weizsaecker, the leading civil agent under Ribbentrop. And he explodes the mythology which has grown up around Ribbentrop's own personal Büro, and Bohle's Auslandsorganisation, which used to be thought the organizing genius of the German Fifth Column. But he adds little to our knowledge of the more interesting figures around Weizsaecker; Ambassador Ritter, who stood trial with him; Gaus of the Legal Division, Clodius and Wiehl of the Economic Division; Keppler, the ex-business man, who crops up again and again in the Nazi diplomacy; or Ambassador Dieckhoff, who ended as Nazi Ambassador to Spain, in spite of a liberal background which made U. S. Ambassador Dodds find him so congenial a companion.

There are curious lacunae in the book also, most notably the jump in the narrative from Munich to August, 1939, omitting a period which covers one of Ribbentrop's most marked diplomatic failures—persuading Japan, between Munich and the outbreak of war, by negotiations carried out largely through unofficial channels, to sign an allegiance—and ending with his biggest diplomatic success, the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact, the spadework of which was largely the work of Ambassador von Schulenberg, a professional diplomatist.

Mr. Seabury is most to be commended for his final chapter, "The Vanishing Diplomat," which analyses in detail both the general deterioration in the position of the diplomatist in the twentieth century, and also the particular ways in which the circumstances of the German Foreign Ministry differed from this. The powerlessness of the German Foreign Ministry to oppose Hitler was that of any opponent to Hitler's policies within Germany. Power under the Nazi régime lay in controlling and using the opportunity to carry out Hitler's wishes. Refusal or opposition only opened the gate to others. In a very real sense government in Nazi Germany was government by competition.

London School of Economics and Political Science D. C. WATT

DEGRAS, JANE, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-1941.* Vol. III, *1933-1941.* Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1953. Pp. 500. $8.50.

BISHOP, DONALD G., ed., *Soviet Foreign Relations, Documents and Readings.* Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1953. Pp. 223. $3.75.

The final R.I.I.A. volume of Soviet documents on foreign relations covers the period from the rise of Hitler to his invasions of the Soviet Union. It contains no new revelations. However, it is an extremely valuable English language selection drawn from Russian, German, French, Italian, and English sources. The organization is strictly chronological. The documents are limited to those of Soviet origin, no pertinent documents emanating from other governments being included. Sixty per cent of the documents are taken from the contemporary Soviet periodical press

(*Izvestia, Pravda, Mirovoe Khoziaistvo*); another twenty per cent come from contemporary Soviet document collections and the contemporary Soviet non-periodical press. Contemporary non-Soviet document collections (principally the *League of Nations Official Journal*) account for twelve per cent. Most of the remaining eight per cent are selected from various post-World War II revelations covering the period 1939-1941.

In reading the pre-1939 public statements of Soviet officials one is struck by the keenness of their interpretation of the intentions of Hitler, his ruling group, and his allies. But perhaps more telling is a comparison of those criticisms with positions taken by the Soviet Union after World War II. For instance, in March, 1936, Litinov protested that Germany was using the signature of the Franco-Soviet Pact as a pretext for violation of the Locarno Treaty. "Without doubt," Litvinov stated, "this is an extremely convenient method of resolving international questions —when a country, convinced of the injustice of its case, confers upon itself, first the functions of a judge in its own cause, and then those of a sheriff's officer" (p. 172). Compare this to the Soviet interpretation of Yalta. Complaining, in September, 1937, against German and Japanese propaganda directed against Communism and Communist influences, Litvinov proclaimed, "All that is needed is to repeat day by day one and the same thing . . . the assumption being that an untruth repeated often enough may end by seeming true . . ." (p. 259). Clearly, understanding preceded emulation.

Soviet Foreign Relations consists of a highly selected group of documents designed not to tell "the full story of Soviet foreign policy," but by example to "reveal its true nature and consequences" (p. 1). The book has been prepared for use primarily as directed collateral reading for undergraduate students. An introductory chapter establishes principles to be borne in mind in reading the documents. The documents themselves, drawn entirely from English language sources, are organized into four major groups: (1) The Soviet Government and Foreign Relations, (2) Soviet-American Relations, (3) The Soviet Union and International Organization, and (4) International Communism. Some of the selections are now somewhat dated, the book having been published prior to the Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU, the death of Stalin, and the Korean and Indo-Chinese truces.

In any small selection of documents there would naturally be a wide divergence of opinion as to just what should be included. However, this reviewer particularly objects to the omission of the secret protocol from the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, the failure to include an example of the "Popular Front" policy adopted by the seventh Comintern congress, and the absence of the debt memorandum of November 15, 1933, from the extensive quotation of correspondence concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the United States. There are several typographical errors, a few mistakes and inconsistencies in spelling (*chinovik* for *chinovnik* (p. 35); Vishinsky—Vyshinsky (both on p. 28), and some confusion in terms, "the Central Committee (formerly called the Central executive Committee) of the Party . . ." (p. 17). In spite of these shortcomings the book is certainly usable for its intended purpose, although it should be supplemented by more comprehensive collections such as R.I.I.A. volume reviewed above.

Stanford University ROBERT W. COONROD

LAFFAN, R. G. D., et al., *Survey of International Affairs, 1938*. Volume III. Ed. by Veronica M. Toynbee. Royal Institute of International Affairs. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1953. Pp. xvi, 622. $9.50.

The third volume of the *Survey of International Affairs* for 1938 concludes the story of this dramatic year and brings it up to the spring of 1939 when the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by German forces radically changed the course of international events. There follow chapters on northeastern Europe, the U.S.S.R., the Balkan States and the rearmament of Great Britain, France and Germany down to the Munich Agreement.

A discussion recently took place by a portion of the British press about the merits and demerits of the work done by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. Many a reproachful word was directed on this occasion against the Institute's basic publication, *Survey of International Affairs.* Not wishing to enter into the details of this controversy, we shall confine ourselves to pointing out that the weakness of the method employed by the compilers of the *Surveys* is most evident precisely in the volumes dealing with the events of 1938. Instead of a fluent narrative we find here a mere conglomeration of articles by different authors, a mosaic which by no means presents a true picture of the dramatic past. Some of the chapters are authoritative, but some are a mere juxtaposition of excerpts from diplomatic documents. Once more we observe how inadequate it is to write diplomatic history only on the narrow basis of diplomatic documents, even though supplemented here and there by the memoirs of leading statesmen and by other literature. An example of this inadequacy is found in Mr. R. G. D. Laffan's courageous attempt in Part I to disentangle the complicated and sad business of the implementation of the Munich Agreement and of the destruction of Czechoslovakia. Though his work displays an abundant array of diplomatic documents, the picture is by no means complete. Thus without a discussion of the psychological background of Slovak separatism in 1938-39 the story of Slovak independence becomes unintelligible. Though there exists in the Czech and Slovak political literature a complete account of Prof. Tuka's career the present volume does not provide even a brief evaluation of this Don Quixote of Slovak separatism, who in his younger years freely established contact with both Nazi and Bolshevist circles only in order to undermine the hated Czechoslovak democracy. As to the journey of Msgr. Tiso and of President Hácha to Berlin, Czech and Slovak sources have recently brought to light much fuller details than those contained in the fragmentary files of the *Auswärtiges Amt* and used by the compilers of the *Survey*.

The editor states in the preface that "the division between the second and third volumes of the *Survey* for 1938 is a purely arbitrary one." Indeed, to speak of the German-Polish relations between January 1938 and March 1939, and not to mention the Polish-Lithuanian incident after the Anschluss until the second half of the last volume *is* rather arbitrary. The same may be said, of course, regarding Part V, by Viscount Chilston which deals with the rearmament of Great Britain, France and Germany.

Cicero, Illinois THEODORE PROCHÁZKA

KULSKI, W. W., *The Soviet Régime, Communism in Practice.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1954. Pp. 807. $8.00.

A friend of mine once said that from authentic communist materials about any field of Soviet life two books could be written without distorting a single quotation: a "rosy" one, and a "black" one, each of them giving half the truth. Professor Kulski, a former member of the Polish Government in Exile, has written the "black" book, not just about some specific field of Soviet life but about the

whole field of Soviet administrative practice as affecting cultural life. The first chapter bears the characteristic heading "The Party and the West," regulation of the activities of the individual citizen (including a very embryonic chapter on Courts, Civic Duties, Family and Youth) the position of the worker and the stratification of Sovet society, the peasant and collective farming. In the introduction the author's intention to fight communist delusions about the conditions of life in the USSR is made explicit; so there is little point in quarrelling with him about writing a book which deals nearly exclusively with the diverse aspects of the position of the individual towards the state. In this respect it contains a lot of authentic material which, if the author's bias is kept in mind, may be helpful to the non-specialist student who has no Russian. The author's bias is less evident in the selection of facts within the fields chosen by him. Indeed, more readily than most other American authors he admits a definite tendency to improve the standard of life, prospects of improving the agricultural position and a more flexible foreign policy than in the very delimitation of the material collected. The citizen appears the mere subject of administration, intellectual life as a mere succession of party interventions, political life, so far as it exists, as a mere struggle for power between a few individuals at the top and the hierarchies represented by them.

Similar books could be written about many countries: the soullessness in approach to the citizen which is implied in the purely administrative approach would however, never be as misleading as they are in their application to a country trained in a system of "power pure and simple," as the American public opinion has been trained. Moreover, Professor Kulski applies two definite standards to the evaluation of Soviet Communism. At least one of them is clearly extraneous. First, he intentionally measures by western standards, and this not only by the general standards of development as observed in western civilizations but by the very particular standards of mid-twentieth century western cultural fashions. In one of the most interesting statements of his book (p. 20ff.), Professor Kulski describes Soviet cultural policies as opposing the western standards of the nineteenth to those of the twentieth century; he does not even ask the question whether the Russians need be a hundred per cent wrong in following such a line, and whether one needs to be a Soviet party official in order to find some trends in modern western music pathological (p. 33). Secondly, like any disappointed Trotskyite, he measures Soviet life by egalitarian standards. In this respect I regard even some of his factual statements as unfounded. Surely it is an exaggeration to say that "an ordinary manual worker cannot hold a position of authority in the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such positions are reserved for the professional intelligentsia" (p. 460). It is an exaggeration, I say, unless the meaning of the statement is reduced to the mere truism that an ordinary worker, if promoted to a position of authority, say on the party or trade union lines, at some point of his career would have to take evening classes ranking at least as secondary political education. Nor is it correct to describe as a serious symptom of inequality of social opportunity (p. 478) the rulings on the allotment of eighty-five per cent of the places in the highest forms of the secondary schools to graduates from the lower forms. This statement appeared in a book concluded in 1954, i.e., at a time when the transition to full secondary education for all was already in full swing. In general, Professor Kulski's failure to report the facts of Soviet educational progress compares unfavorably with his readiness to accept the facts of industrial progress, which he emphasizes against western tendencies to underestimate the potential enemy. Similar or sharper things could be said about nearly every interpretive effort on the USSR made in the atmosphere of the "cold war"; but just because

Professor Kulski's book does not belong to those gross misrepresentations of Soviet conditions which are only too fashionable, it invites criticism directed against the whole approach so capably represented by it. I need not give this criticism myself because it has been given by facts, namely by Soviet developments since 1952. Professor Kulski is conscious of the problems thereby put and has treated the developments of 1953-4 in a special Part V, leaving the preceding four parts, which are intended to reflect conditions at the time of Stalin's death, unaltered, and inviting the reader to make his comparisons himself. Indeed, if he makes his comparisons merely with Professor Kulski's Part V (a very useful registration of the decrees and personal changes of 1953-4) he will not come to the conclusion that anything more important than prices of agricultural products and output of consumers' goods has altered; just incidentally he will learn that, in December, 1953, Khachaturyan and Ehrenburg criticized the strict censorship hitherto applied to artist productions, and that Lysenko's dictatorial power in the field of biology has been broken. From Professor Kulski's viewpoint this may matter little: he can quote ample evidence for the party's continuing claim to leadership in cultural life. The outbreak of frank argument in the literary field which has characterized Soviet intellectual life since the publication, in September, 1952, of Ovechkin's *District Routine,* does not concern the student to whom the impossibility of intellectual controversy and progress under a one-party system is *a priori* granted. To the present reviewer, Kulski's failure even to see what Ehrenburg's last novel has described as a "breaking of the ice," appears as evidence of the basic failure to see essentials implied in the very approach pursued in the book reviewed.

University of Glasgow RUDOLPH SCHLESINGER

GROSSER, ALFRED, *L'Allemagne de l'Occident, 1945-1952.* Paris: Gallimard, Second Edition, 1953. Pp. 340. 680 fr.

A very important factor in the affairs of Central Europe is French opinion about developments in that area. Grosser's sketch of the post-war history of Western Germany, said to be the first French effort of its kind, will interest readers in other lands more as a reflection of opinion west of the Rhine than for the generally familiar facts it summarizes. Since it was originally written in 1952 it necessarily deals rather with the background of current controversies than with the specific issues of today. The author, who is an assistant [professor] at the Sorbonne and director of studies at the Institut d'Études Politiques, has been very active in building up Franco-German student-exchange programs, both through UNESCO and through a special committee formed in France to further this work. He is therefore most anxious to be fair and objective in the treatment of his subject. He begins with a chapter on the background of the cold war, followed by one of the occupation of Germany and on the Nuremberg trials. The economic recovery of Western Germany, the social reconstruction, and the work of the churches, schools and information agencies are then surveyed. Finally the political development of Western Germany and the problem of Franco-German relations are considered.

Without forgetting the evils of Nazism or the threat of its revival, the author gives a sympathetic account of the hardships to which the conquered Germans were subjected in the months after VE Day. Though maintaining that among the occupation powers only the French had an adequate understanding of German psychology, he does not spare French military government officials in his portrayal of the harm done the reeducation program by widespread corruption and indul-

gence in needless luxury while the people to be reoriented were on semi-starvation rations (pp. 111-122). In his treatment of West Germany's remarkable economic revival, Grosser gives full credit to the neo-liberal ideas of the Swiss economist William Röpke, as applied by the German Minister Ludwig Erhard, but says nothing about the energy and discipline of the ordinary German worker. The author's political attitude is largely neutralist, and his solution of the problem of German rearmament is to request the Americans to provide all the troops needed to hold the Elbe line while allowing Germany and France to use their resources to pursue desirable internal reforms. He hopes that the privileged classes of his country will speed reforms in a prolonged "night of the Fourth of August" before encouraging militarism and neo-Nazism by emphasizing rearmament. From his standpoint the Soviet Union is something distant and shadowy while West Germany and France are very real and of primary importance.

University of Michigan MARSHALL KNAPPEN

SERAPHIM, PETER-HEINZ, *Industrie Kombinat Oberschlesien; das Ruhrgebiet des Ostens.* Köln-Braunsfeld: Verlagsgesellschaft Rudolf Müller, 1953. Pp. 101, 25 maps. DM $8.60.

If A. I. Mikoyan, the head of *Komekon,* has as yet no plan for an East Ruhr Iron and Steel Authority in Upper Silesia he can find one ready made in P. H. Seraphim's book *Industrie Kombinat Oberschlesien.* The author of the study has indeed made all essential calculations with the precision and foresight of a planning expert. Professor Seraphim is really convinced that his plan is workable and that a planned integral development of all natural and industrial resources of the area, shared formerly between Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and now between the two latter countries, is possible and desirable. He already sees the outlines of a powerful Silesian iron and steel combine à la Dniepropetrovsk on the Eastern horizon.

The study, as it is, has, on the other hand, a more specific intent; its central thesis, advocated quite frankly and openly, is a political one. The author seems to be sincerely concerned with a possible shift of the political balance and possible danger for Europe, more concretely, for Germany, of the rise of a big iron and steel center which, as he foresees, in its potentiality may overshadow the Ruhr in the West. Here the author has fallen the victim of his own projection. That some form of pooling of the resources of Silesia may prove beneficial for both Poles and Czechs does not mean that it will be equally beneficial for the Soviets. Indeed, Seraphim's assumption is questionable on *a priori* grounds i.e. whether Soviet Russia, or Germany for that matter, would like to see a large steel and iron center on the Czech-Polish frontier which would draw the two countries together economically. Moreover, to adduce, as the author does, that Czech-Polish cooperation, originally conceived in London in 1942 in a rather vague manner by democratic leaders of both nations, and formally confirmed by 1947 agreements (that is, before the Prague *coup d'état*), is "a first step" to and a convincing proof of the Soviet intention to build a steel combine in Upper Silesia is either a misjudgment of facts or poorly disguised political thinking. The consensus of close observers is that the wide cooperation agreed upon between Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1947 has been gradually dropped by the Communist Governments on both sides. The visible results of the cooperation between 1947-54 are definitely poor, to say the least. Trade agreements and mutual technical aid arrangements, cited as evidence in the study, do not go much beyond the pattern

usual between Czechoslovakia and other captive countries. The pattern of co-operation that is becoming more and more transparent throughout the Soviet orbit is that of *Komekon,* the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, established in January 1949. The cue, given by *Komekon,* seems to be rather to decentralize iron and steel production and scatter it as widely as Częstochowa, Nowa Huta, Kościuszko Foundry in Krakow district, and Huko, a started and abandoned project, in East Slovakia.

The interest of the Soviet Union in Silesian coal is more understandable: USSR has not much coking coal and only 10% of all her coal reserves lies in the richly populated European Russia. According to experts the richer mines of Donbas may be exhausted by 1970. Not too distant Polish coal would be a good match for the iron ores of Southern Ukraine. In fact, all planned railway routes are in the direction East-West; the Oder-Danube canal in which Poland, Czechoslovakia and other Danubian countries might be interested seems at the moment to be a dead project. It is this larger grouping of Ukrainian and Silesian resources, visualized also by Hitler in 1941-2, that may become a potential military danger worth pondering.

Historically, the area returns after slightly more than a half-century of semi-free enterprise (1890-1950) to the sphere of the State enterprise and planning. This is a good and also a bad omen. As an object of public policy it may be misused for non-economic purposes in the future as it was misused in the past. On the other hand, the area needs a good deal of guidance by the public hand in deepening its investment and to overcome many natural drawbacks of the area. A lot of investment in waterways and railways will be required to reach its natural markets in Eastern Europe.

Frontiers are a serious obstacle to expansion. The failure to expand output to a greater degree between the two wars was due to the frontier lines that ran across the area. At the moment both Poland and Germany claim the region for themselves. Professor Seraphim makes the reassertion of the German claim with the simultaneous plea for the development of the area as one economic unit. The ultimate solution may lie perhaps in the hope that Silesia may cease being the area of shifting national frontiers and develop sovereignty more in accord with the needs of its economic and social development.

New York City JÁN ŽÁK

ROCHLIN R. P., *Die Wirtschaft Polens von 1945 bis 1952.* Berlin: Deutsches Inst. f. Wirtschaftsforschung, 1953. Pp. 183. DM 15.40.

There is no book in English dealing with the national economy of present-day Poland, though a Handbook of Poland, expected to be published in the fall by the Mid-European Studies Center in New York, may fill this gap. Those interested in this problem, if unable to read Polish or Russian, could consult a comprehensive guide to Polish economics, *La Pologne, Memento Économique,* published two years ago by the official Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques in Paris. The German Institute of Economic Research in Berlin has now brought out a similar monograph by R. P. Rochlin under the title *Die Wirtschaft Polens von 1945 bis 1952.*

Of lesser dimensions than the French *Memento,* Mr. Rochlin's book deals systematically with the Polish finance and banking system, manpower problem, agriculture, industry and transportation. In the second part of the book, Polish foreign trade is discussed in detail; many statistical tables attached to this chapter are

very handy for the students of Polish ecenomics who hitherto have had to look for this kind of material in many separate publications.

The book is remarkably free from polemics and bitterness characteristic of most contemporary German studies of Poland, and has no propaganda message to convey to the reader. Objective coolness is preserved throughout the study with the result that when Mr. Rochlin draws his conclusions they are entirely acceptable. For example, his recapitulation of the development of Polish industry (pp. 92-3), though highly critical, is justified in the light of Polish reality.

Were another edition of Mr. Rochlin's study contemplated, he should rectify small factual errors which have crept into his useful book. Thus, the main mining machinery plant is located not at Piotrków but at Piotrowice in Upper Silesia (p. 65). The large coke plant at Zdzieszowice is not a new investment; it is identical with the Schaffgotzsch hydrogenation works at Deschowitz (later Odertal), finished during the war, partly dismantled by the Russians, and subsequently rebuilt as a coke plant (p. 66). The list of iron and steel works (p. 68) is far from complete; there are seven more primary metal plants, most of them in the post-German area, and about a dozen more rolling mills. The large blast furnace built in 1951 was erected at Chorzów, not Chrzanów (p. 69). The project of a huge metallurgic plant at Gliwice (Gleiwitz) was dropped as early as 1949 in favor of Nowa Huta near Cracow, now half-built; when finished, the latter will have four blast furnaces at 1000 cubic meters capacity, not eight (p. 69). Polish production of cadmium, representing about four per cent of the world output, cannot be qualified as unimportant (p. 71). In the section dealing with natural gas, there is no mention of the only significant deposit of it discovered after the war near Cieszyn (Teschen), (p. 73). The two dams at Odmuchów (Ottmachau) on the Eastern Neisse river (not on the Oder) and at Turawa on the Małopiana river were built before the war; the dam under construction on the Oder at Brzeg is a new project (p. 76). The fat combine under construction is located at Brzeg (Brieg), not Brzeg Dolny (Dyhenfürth), (p. 78). There is no coke plant at Racibórz (Ratibor), and no phosphate rock deposits at Kłodawa (p. 79). The large new plant at Zielonka is a brick yard, not cement plant (p. 84). Figures on the prewar and postwar production and consumption of margarine are conflicting (pp. 90-1). There are no Russian-gauge railroads in Poland at all (p. 101). Polish export to the United States has not run into difficulties (p. 136), and the data pertaining to it in 1952 quoted on pp. 135 and 159 are contradictory. It is surprising that most of these errors concern the post-German territories which should be more familiar to German research than the rest of Poland.

Washington, D. C. JAN WSZELAKI

SHEPHERD, GORDON, *Russia's Danubian Empire,* London: William Heineman, Ltd., 1954. Pp. 262. 21s.

This book was written by the correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph,* who has been living in Vienna for eight years after World War II as a lieutenant-colonel on the Allied Commission.

The first four-fifths of the book are devoted to the description and analysis of the Russian penetration into Danubian states since 1944. The final section gives the author's conclusions concerning the future of this area. From the first part the author has excluded Austria and Yugoslavia "for obvious reasons" (as he said), but the final fifth of the book is centered on Austria as the possible nucleus of a future Danubian federation.

The description of the Russian penetration into Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia gives the reader an insight into Soviet methods, first of deceit, then of violence. The author shows the common pattern of this penetration: the first stage was always an "indirect control" by "all-party Government." Communists held the positions of power—in police, army, education, and agriculture—and some fellow-travelers were tolerated in some ostensibly important positions. Meanwhile promises of land. In the next stage the Party itself achieved the premiership and the Party tried to gain control of trade unions and attracted small peasants by naming an insignificant puppet the head of the state. Then at last the Party took over the complete control of government.

The author pays particular attention to the case of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet government was well aware that this country would have resisted such crude methods as had been applied in Rumania and Hungary, and therefore more cautious procedure was chosen to curb Czechoslovakian democracy. Success was achieved, for the most part, by the underestimation of the danger and unpreparedness on the part of Czechoslovak political leaders. In discussing the factors which resisted Communism, the author points to the strong opposition of the Roman Catholic Church. Well deserved attention is paid to the problem of land reform. The author saw that "the need for fundamental land reform of some sort was genuine and acute in most parts of Eastern Europe" (p. 137), that in Hungary the land reform was "the key question" (e.g. Prince Eszterhazy owned about 300,000 acres of land—pp. 88, 93, etc.), and therefore the Communist land reform 'may well be judged in history as measures which achieved much permanent material good, though, from Western standards, this was realized by the wrong methods and for wrong aims." This opinion was corroborated from an unexpected source: the author had the opportunity to interview the Archduke Otto Hapsburg, the son of the last Emperor of Austro-Hungary, and "the descendant of the greatest landowners in the Danube Basin had this to say on the question of land reform: 'The big landowners in a country like Hungary were, anyway, both historically and morally condemned. Though the compensation issue needs going into, there can be no question of restoring these huge estates on the old pattern to their former owners' (p. 248). This admission may be revealing for many Western observers who are surprised by the impact of Marxism upon Russian, East European and even Asiatic peasants.

Another important political question in Soviet dominated countries is the fate of Jews. Many of them at first occupied high positions in the Party and the state administration, but later were victimized as scapegoats for Communist mistakes in economic policy of the respective countries. Some of them had succumbed to the temptation of political power—"the deadliest corrupter."

The descriptive part of this book is full of facts, carefully collected and documented by quotations from papers of the country in question. In the final part of his book, "The Danube and World Politics," Mr. Shepherd does not hide his sympathies and antipathies, caused evidently by his Viennese milieu and probably also by his disregard of political conditions in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before the first world war. The author writes about his friendship with Dr. Leopold Figl, chancellor of Austria from 1945 to 1953, and shares his opinions about the future role of Austria in the Danubian area. The author writes that "any federation of the Central Danubian peoples might focus itself upon Vienna. An alliance with the Austrians might give the Czech and Hungarian nations the best small Power protection against their own mutual rivalries . . ." Unfortunately, the Czechs and Slovaks do not forget the "protection" granted them by Vienna before

World War I. Concerning the present émigré politics we read: "East European politics tend not only to be a particularly bad victim of the theories of their university professors; they are to some extent the *invention* of such ambitious intellectuals." (p. 234). Actually, East and Central Europe are now victims of political mistakes made in Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam and in the headquarters of the Western Allies during World War II. There were no "professors with their theories." But Mr. Shepherd's political opinions about Austria's future do not decrease the informative value of his book which is probably one of the best ever written abut the post-war history of the Danubian countries.

University of Pittsburgh JOSEPH MACEK

LOSSKY, ANDREW, *Louis XIV, William III, and the Baltic Crisis of 1683*, University of California Publications in History, Volume 49. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954. Pp. 73. $1.00.

This brief study of Baltic diplomacy throws considerable light on the roles played by Louis XIV and William III during the complicated Baltic crisis of 1683 and on the decline of French influence in Northern and Eastern Europe on the eve of the War of the League of Augsburg. As Mr. Lossky states, the purpose of the monograph was not to challenge old conceptions as outlined in the more nationalistic studies, but rather to re-examine them from a variety of viewpoints. Let it be said to Mr. Lossky's credit, he has done just that. By far the best section of the work is that which treats Dutch naval operations in the Baltic in 1683. Herein manuscript sources were used to a much greater extent than elsewhere and with excellent results. Other portions suffer by comparison because in them the author limited himself for the most part to printed materials. A re-examination of the entire problem with a full use of archival materials would have added to the value of the work.

The subject matter of the monograph does not easily lend itself to stylistic excellence, but the book would have profited with extra effort along those lines. The transition from diplomacy *per se* to Baltic naval maneuvering is handled in such a way that at first glance the chronology appears to be faulty. Some Teutonic words employ the umlaut while others add the "e". "Ruegen," "Muenster," etc., are acceptable, but the spellings in this day of advanced type fonts are not common usage. There is no set pattern in making full identifications either in the notes, the index, or the body of the text. To give one out of a number of examples, Knud Thott, a Danish naval commissioner, although mentioned only once, is identified, while Martagis, a French diplomat who concluded an important treaty, is not.

Mr. Lossky's use of sources is in some places puzzling and in others a bit disturbing. His citations often are roundabout instead of being the most direct. Swedish, Danish, Dutch, and other sources are employed to illustrate French naval action, and at the same time materials from the French archives and the standard works by French naval historians are for the most part ignored. Pufendorf appears at best to be a weak source for the attitude of Charles II of England toward the French squadron. The Admiralty papers, the Pepysian manuscripts, or various materials in the British Museum and the Public Record Office might have been checked for verification after the *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1683*, failed to corroborate Pufendorf's statement as to the predilections of Charles II. One also wonders if D'Avaux who "acquitted himself very well" (p. 29) in obtaining Dutch naval secrets did not owe his success as much to Dutch laxity in security as to his own efforts.

Mr. Lossky has done a real service in calling attention to the Baltic crisis of 1683 and placing it in its general European setting. For this historians will be grateful. It is unfortunate, however, that he did not use the European archives to their fullest, and that greater care was not exercised on purely technical matters. Notwithstanding it is a book that can be consulted with profit by students of French, Dutch, and Baltic history.

Coe College JOHN J. MURRAY

SHORTER NOTICES

Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon,, 1815-1950. Published by the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, under the direction of Leo Santifaller, and edited by Eva Obemayer-Marnach. Graz-Köln: Hermann Bohlaus Nachf., 1954. I. part, pp. 96. DM $6.50.

It has long been realized that, useful as Wurzbach has been, it is many decades out of date, and something is needed to bring biographical data on Austro-Hungarian and Austrian personalities up to the post world war II period. The Vienna Academy established in 1946 a Kommission zur Ausarbeitung eines Österreichischen Biographischen Lexikons, and put it under the leadership of Professor Santifaller, the director of the Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung. The present volume is the first product of this commission's work. The rubrics run from *Aarau* to *Böhm*. When finished, it is calculated, the whole *Lexikon* would fill 2500-3000 double columned pages.

The limits 1815 to 1950 are chosen to cover the post-Congress of Vienna to World War II period. Those active after 1815, regardless of birth date, are included, and individuals living after 1950 are excluded. Prominence in political, military, and cultural life is the criterion of inclusion. Thus many artists, musicians, composers and writers rub elbows with ministers, diplomats, and generals. Of the latter, there well may be too many. Some of them, by modern standards should have been left to enjoy their well earned obscurity. A few important scholars may have been omitted. I do not find Rudolf Beer, for example. In general the Austrian and Hungarian personalities receive more space than those Slavic characters who find a place in the *Lexikon*. This proportion might be different elsewhere in the alphabet.

The biographical notices are in general short, varying from as little as two lines to slightly over two columns (e.g. Beethoven). The average would be around 10 lines. Standard abbreviations are used to utilize the space as far as possible, and for each biography a source or sources of his *Lebenslauf* is appended.

This is an excellent beginning and will be a most useful tool for students of the Hapsburg empire and the period of the Republic.

S. H. THOMSON

TREVEEN, FRITZ, *Gesamtstaat und Retablissement*. Göttingen: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1954. Pp. DM $19.80.

This little volume is a highly specialized study of the development of a section of East Prussia during the reign of Frederick William I. The author is primarily interested in three problems: the first is the colonization of the area; the second the integration of the area in the Prussian administrative system; and the third is the development of religious and educational institutions characteristic of Protest-

ant Prussia. In 1700 the four administrative units under question were sparsely populated by natives largely Lithuanian in language and culture. Forty years later the land was relatively thickly settled and German elements or, at least, German Christian civilization predominated. Dr. Treveen's principal thesis revolves around the belief that religious interests were the most important factors in producing this change.

Students with some knowledge of the bibliography of Prussian administration will be interested to know that Dr. Treveen has used the Prussian Archives at Königsberg (presumably in the period before Russian occupation as well as the printed materials available). He has also made considerable use of church records to bring out the religious aspects of the story. The documentation is actually more impressive than the text of the book itself.

For those interested in general history of Europe at the turn of the eighteenth century this book provides a fine statement of the exportation of "German Christian civilization" to the borderland peoples. Here are Prussian Protestant counterparts of the Austrian Catholic Kammeralists and bureaucrats, whose labors actually proved to have more permanent results than those of the Viennese chancellery.

University of Minnesota JOHN B. WOLF

KOSTUS, WOJCIECH, *Władztwo Polski nad Lęborkiem i Bytowem* (Sovereignty of Poland over Leborek (Lauenburg) and Bytow (Bütow)). Wrocław: Zakład imienia Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk. 1954. Pp. 139. Zł. 17.

This historical study deals with the period between the end of the 14th century (time of unification of various lands of Poland) and 1772 (first partition of Poland).

The history of forms of sovereignty of Poland over two small fiefs situated on the border of the Pomerania of Gdańsk (Danzig) and of the Western Pomerania has been neglected up to date.

After the last world war the territories of Lauenburg and Bütow have been reunited with the Polish state within the frontiers of the so-called "recovered territories" which turned back the pages of history to the first partition of Poland in 1772 when Leborek and Bütow had been incorporated into the Prussian state.

This prompted the Polish historians to study the archives at Szczecin together with the materials to be found in other Polish archives with the general view to show the links of the territories in question with the Polish state.

Kostuś examined numerous manuscripts (he lists 33 documents from the archives in Szczecin, Cracow, Lwów (now in Wrocław), Poznań, Gdańsk, and Toruń) as well as the printed sources in Latin, Polish, and German. It is a very well written, clear and interesting study.

A short index of names, geographical names, and problems dealt with complete the book.

The study shows the legal forms of Polish sovereignty over Leborek and Bytow, the vassals being first the dukes of Pomerania and later the Elector of Brandenburg.

University of Montreal LUDWIK KOS RABCEWICZ ZUBKOWSKI

ULEWICZ, TADEUSZ, *Sarmacja Studium z problematyki słowiańskiej* XV i XVI w. (Sarmatia. A study of Slavic problems of the 15th and 16th cenutries). Kraków: Biblioteka Studium Słowiańskiego Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego Seria A, Nr 7, 1950. Pp. 212.

The evolution of the term "Sarmatia" is the subject of this interesting semantic investigation. "Sermatia", "Sarmati", "Sarmatas", all these terms, familiar to historians of ancient Greece and originally used to describe a group of Iranian peoples, were subject to various changes of meaning. Semantically the word "Sa

matia" was applied as well to different geographical regions of Eastern Europe. Ulewicz has examined many sources (his bibliography contains 223 entries), both western and eastern European. He dwells at length on the career of the term "Sarmatia" in Poland in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, describing in detail the historical and geographical aspects, as well as the geopolitical and social (nobility) features of the myth "Sarmatae sive Poloni."

During the last half of the sixteenth century "Sarmatian" became a synonym for "ancient Slav" and was moreover linked with the notion of "honorableness" and with the nobility. This trend, first evidenced in the works of historians, appeared in "belles lettres" and later among almost all educated people. As a matter of fact, the term found its way into everyday language and was used even into the twentieth century; one use was in describing a type of old Polish nobility who was considered to possess true "Sarmatic" features.

The book is well documented with an interesting cross-section of the written sources of different periods. It is a thorough study of an historic myth which had a remarkable influence on the development of Polish literature and left its traces in the Polish cultural heritage. In this twentieth century we have already witnessed the creation or "renaissance" of several myths, especially in the geopolitical sphere. Ulewicz's history of one myth may provide some insight into the ways of the human mind in the field of myths and propaganda. As the human mind has not changed much in the last few centuries, this study might stimulate some reflection on the value and importance of the current myths.

University of Montreal LUDWIK KOS RABCEWICZ ZUBKOWSKI

WALTER TRAUTMAN, *Osthandel, ja oder nein,* Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 1954. Pp. 164. DM 7.80.

Germany has a long tradition of trade with the countries of the present Soviet orbit. Its commercial turnover with Russia before 1914 was large and profitable. After Rapallo, it flourished again. Deliveries to the Soviet Union of industrial equipment for the implementation of its first Five Year Plan were of utmost importance to German heavy industry during the depression (1929-1932). After the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of 1939, trade was again resumed on a large scale until the very day of Hitler's onslaught on Russia. In the interwar period, the countries of East Central Europe were among the principal suppliers of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and were regarded as "natural" markets for German industry. Since 1945, Western Germany has had no business to speak of with Soviet Russia and is only very slowly building up trade relations with Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other countries of the Soviet bloc. At the same time, Eastern Germany has emerged as the most important trade partner of Soviet Russia and East Central Europe. To quote but one figure, its 1953 commercial turnover with Poland alone reached 290 million dollars and is still expanding.

Walter Trautman's book *Osthandel ja oder nein* is a plea for the extension of Western German trade with the Soviet orbit. The writer is a spokesman of the many heavy industrial, and possibly also political, circles interested in such a revival; he quotes with approval ex-Chancellor Brüning's well known ideas on this subject. Trautman's book is well documented and prudent. He realizes that under the present circumstances the Soviet orbit has only a limited amount of surplus goods for exportation, but believes that with the easing of present political tensions and the launching of the synchronized series of new Five Year Plans 1956-1960 by all countries of the Soviet bloc (except Bulgaria) there will be good prospects for the extension of Western German trade with the latter. Not unnaturally, he pleads also for the relaxation of the present embargo on the export of strategic goods. He attaches perhaps too much importance to the Malenkov so-called New Course policy which has since (the book was written in the fall of 1954) been more or less abandoned.

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